Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.966, score 4.075) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.011, score -4.477) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -8.873) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.000) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.457) top features | y=EX (probability 0.013, score -4.324) top features | y=FED (probability 0.007, score -4.955) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -6.826) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -8.086) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.559) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.377) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.966, score 4.075) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +3.289 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| +0.798 | <BIAS> |
| … 53 more positive … | |
| … 43 more negative … | |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=CAP (probability 0.011, score -4.477) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 18 more positive … | |
| … 13 more negative … | |
| -1.056 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -3.740 | <BIAS> |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -8.873) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 64 more negative … | |
| -1.563 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -4.723 | <BIAS> |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.000) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 9 more positive … | |
| … 43 more negative … | |
| -0.908 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -2.684 | <BIAS> |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.457) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 66 more negative … | |
| -1.480 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -4.912 | <BIAS> |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=EX (probability 0.013, score -4.324) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 38 more positive … | |
| … 45 more negative … | |
| -2.156 | <BIAS> |
| -2.347 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=FED (probability 0.007, score -4.955) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 22 more positive … | |
| … 35 more negative … | |
| -0.621 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -3.331 | <BIAS> |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -6.826) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 6 more positive … | |
| … 26 more negative … | |
| -2.429 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -3.397 | <BIAS> |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -8.086) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 1 more positive … | |
| … 41 more negative … | |
| -1.829 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -3.793 | <BIAS> |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.559) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 13 more positive … | |
| … 35 more negative … | |
| -2.888 | <BIAS> |
| -3.629 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.377) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 74 more negative … | |
| -0.676 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -6.321 | <BIAS> |
The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.164, score -1.621) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.697, score 0.853) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -9.393) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -9.241) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -9.034) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -7.671) top features | y=FED (probability 0.138, score -1.826) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -8.187) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.574) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.483) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.486) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.164, score -1.621) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 13 more positive … | |
| … 16 more negative … | |
| -0.199 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -1.468 | <BIAS> |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=CAP (probability 0.697, score 0.853) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +2.251 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 11 more positive … | |
| … 17 more negative … | |
| -0.700 | <BIAS> |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -9.393) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 24 more negative … | |
| -2.685 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -4.361 | <BIAS> |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -9.241) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 11 more positive … | |
| … 8 more negative … | |
| -2.162 | <BIAS> |
| -6.647 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -9.034) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 2 more positive … | |
| … 13 more negative … | |
| -3.492 | <BIAS> |
| -4.390 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -7.671) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 17 more negative … | |
| -1.129 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -6.128 | <BIAS> |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=FED (probability 0.138, score -1.826) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.111 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 13 more positive … | |
| … 17 more negative … | |
| -1.179 | <BIAS> |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -8.187) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 30 more negative … | |
| -0.594 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -6.850 | <BIAS> |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.574) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 2 more positive … | |
| … 16 more negative … | |
| -2.671 | <BIAS> |
| -4.522 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.483) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 18 more negative … | |
| -2.339 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -5.138 | <BIAS> |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.486) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 26 more negative … | |
| -1.994 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -4.855 | <BIAS> |
Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.003, score -5.932) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.002, score -6.319) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -8.223) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -8.560) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.035, score -3.345) top features | y=EX (probability 0.781, score 1.159) top features | y=FED (probability 0.000, score -7.998) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.051, score -2.950) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.127, score -1.959) top features | y=POL (probability 0.001, score -6.934) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.101) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.003, score -5.932) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 18 more positive … | |
| … 25 more negative … | |
| -2.263 | <BIAS> |
| -2.872 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=CAP (probability 0.002, score -6.319) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 1 more positive … | |
| … 5 more negative … | |
| -1.665 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -4.497 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -8.223) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 8 more positive … | |
| … 25 more negative … | |
| -2.228 | <BIAS> |
| -3.541 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -8.560) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 32 more negative … | |
| -2.359 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -4.380 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=ENV (probability 0.035, score -3.345) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 20 more positive … | |
| … 25 more negative … | |
| -0.289 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -2.516 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=EX (probability 0.781, score 1.159) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.401 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 31 more positive … | |
| … 19 more negative … | |
| -0.631 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=FED (probability 0.000, score -7.998) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 36 more negative … | |
| -1.256 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -5.732 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=HEG (probability 0.051, score -2.950) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 17 more positive … | |
| … 25 more negative … | |
| -0.550 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -2.046 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=NAT (probability 0.127, score -1.959) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +3.079 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 10 more positive … | |
| … 40 more negative … | |
| -1.300 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=POL (probability 0.001, score -6.934) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 15 more negative … | |
| -1.409 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -5.180 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.101) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 49 more negative … | |
| -0.937 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -6.016 | <BIAS> |
In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.014, score -4.493) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.001, score -7.104) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.218, score -1.541) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.224, score -1.509) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.278, score -1.237) top features | y=EX (probability 0.189, score -1.713) top features | y=FED (probability 0.000, score -8.299) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.023, score -3.951) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.034, score -3.559) top features | y=POL (probability 0.017, score -4.285) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.833) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.014, score -4.493) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 21 more positive … | |
| … 18 more negative … | |
| -1.945 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -2.383 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=CAP (probability 0.001, score -7.104) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 8 more positive … | |
| … 9 more negative … | |
| -2.885 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -4.011 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=ECON (probability 0.218, score -1.541) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 20 more positive … | |
| … 16 more negative … | |
| -0.432 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -1.351 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=EDU (probability 0.224, score -1.509) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.909 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 14 more positive … | |
| … 12 more negative … | |
| -2.471 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=ENV (probability 0.278, score -1.237) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +2.044 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 13 more positive … | |
| … 22 more negative … | |
| -2.583 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=EX (probability 0.189, score -1.713) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +1.678 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 18 more positive … | |
| … 15 more negative … | |
| -3.467 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=FED (probability 0.000, score -8.299) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 20 more negative … | |
| -3.132 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -4.134 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=HEG (probability 0.023, score -3.951) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 23 more positive … | |
| … 15 more negative … | |
| -1.659 | <BIAS> |
| -4.013 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=NAT (probability 0.034, score -3.559) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +1.616 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 12 more positive … | |
| … 28 more negative … | |
| -2.941 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=POL (probability 0.017, score -4.285) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 17 more positive … | |
| … 13 more negative … | |
| -0.767 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -3.473 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.833) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 29 more negative … | |
| -1.928 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| -5.017 | <BIAS> |
The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.818, score 4.468) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.180, score -1.279) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -23.161) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.609) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.001, score -6.632) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -11.927) top features | y=FED (probability 0.000, score -7.669) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -7.768) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -13.722) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -26.284) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -13.450) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.818, score 4.468) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +1.793 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 196 more positive … | |
| … 204 more negative … | |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=CAP (probability 0.180, score -1.279) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 197 more positive … | |
| … 178 more negative … | |
| -6.553 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -23.161) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 50 more positive … | |
| … 60 more negative … | |
| -21.813 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.609) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 138 more positive … | |
| … 101 more negative … | |
| -14.942 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=ENV (probability 0.001, score -6.632) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 149 more positive … | |
| … 140 more negative … | |
| -7.199 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -11.927) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 164 more positive … | |
| … 163 more negative … | |
| -14.615 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=FED (probability 0.000, score -7.669) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 171 more positive … | |
| … 154 more negative … | |
| -7.530 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -7.768) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 158 more positive … | |
| … 178 more negative … | |
| -1.339 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -13.722) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 159 more positive … | |
| … 119 more negative … | |
| -21.282 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -26.284) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 59 more positive … | |
| … 47 more negative … | |
| -26.957 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -13.450) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 111 more positive … | |
| … 81 more negative … | |
| -16.635 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.565, score 3.567) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.014, score -3.710) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -7.854) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.024, score -3.158) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.129, score -1.257) top features | y=EX (probability 0.238, score -0.364) top features | y=FED (probability 0.006, score -4.642) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.021, score -3.290) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -5.156) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -11.216) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.451) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.565, score 3.567) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +3.168 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 183 more positive … | |
| … 189 more negative … | |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=CAP (probability 0.014, score -3.710) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 168 more positive … | |
| … 169 more negative … | |
| -2.545 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -7.854) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 121 more positive … | |
| … 99 more negative … | |
| -13.078 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=EDU (probability 0.024, score -3.158) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 119 more positive … | |
| … 115 more negative … | |
| -4.848 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=ENV (probability 0.129, score -1.257) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 164 more positive … | |
| … 135 more negative … | |
| -7.315 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=EX (probability 0.238, score -0.364) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.452 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 169 more positive … | |
| … 172 more negative … | |
| -0.316 | <BIAS> |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=FED (probability 0.006, score -4.642) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 145 more positive … | |
| … 158 more negative … | |
| -5.758 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=HEG (probability 0.021, score -3.290) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 172 more positive … | |
| … 167 more negative … | |
| -2.985 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -5.156) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 162 more positive … | |
| … 136 more negative … | |
| -9.390 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -11.216) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 101 more positive … | |
| … 105 more negative … | |
| -13.627 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.451) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 147 more positive … | |
| … 112 more negative … | |
| -14.338 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology, ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom. to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.991, score -0.156) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.004, score -6.295) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.439) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -13.028) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -12.051) top features | y=EX (probability 0.001, score -8.121) top features | y=FED (probability 0.001, score -8.063) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -6.550) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -8.775) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.531) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -12.347) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.991, score -0.156) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +3.156 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 202 more positive … | |
| … 223 more negative … | |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=CAP (probability 0.004, score -6.295) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 228 more positive … | |
| … 215 more negative … | |
| -10.657 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.439) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 60 more positive … | |
| … 54 more negative … | |
| -15.423 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -13.028) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 128 more positive … | |
| … 65 more negative … | |
| -20.574 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -12.051) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 159 more positive … | |
| … 127 more negative … | |
| -16.526 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=EX (probability 0.001, score -8.121) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 203 more positive … | |
| … 173 more negative … | |
| -11.338 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=FED (probability 0.001, score -8.063) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 179 more positive … | |
| … 151 more negative … | |
| -13.526 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -6.550) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 173 more positive … | |
| … 191 more negative … | |
| -5.999 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -8.775) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 130 more positive … | |
| … 105 more negative … | |
| -12.779 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.531) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 87 more positive … | |
| … 71 more negative … | |
| -18.429 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -12.347) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 161 more positive … | |
| … 111 more negative … | |
| -18.660 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.742, score 4.661) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.001, score -6.560) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -12.093) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -14.946) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -9.765) top features | y=EX (probability 0.141, score -1.465) top features | y=FED (probability 0.001, score -7.251) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.115, score -1.703) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -14.869) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -15.957) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -14.035) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.742, score 4.661) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +5.062 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 209 more positive … | |
| … 215 more negative … | |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=CAP (probability 0.001, score -6.560) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 225 more positive … | |
| … 232 more negative … | |
| -6.336 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -12.093) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 176 more positive … | |
| … 123 more negative … | |
| -21.644 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -14.946) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 196 more positive … | |
| … 175 more negative … | |
| -15.419 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -9.765) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 185 more positive … | |
| … 158 more negative … | |
| -14.103 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=EX (probability 0.141, score -1.465) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 198 more positive … | |
| … 208 more negative … | |
| -3.126 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=FED (probability 0.001, score -7.251) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 210 more positive … | |
| … 203 more negative … | |
| -12.548 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=HEG (probability 0.115, score -1.703) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 202 more positive … | |
| … 199 more negative … | |
| -1.461 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -14.869) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 173 more positive … | |
| … 149 more negative … | |
| -14.244 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -15.957) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 169 more positive … | |
| … 112 more negative … | |
| -23.087 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -14.035) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 166 more positive … | |
| … 129 more negative … | |
| -20.496 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.740, score 2.086) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.139, score -1.606) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.003, score -5.778) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.002, score -6.122) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.003, score -5.763) top features | y=EX (probability 0.045, score -2.870) top features | y=FED (probability 0.064, score -2.487) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -5.804) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -5.699) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -14.623) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -7.164) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.740, score 2.086) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +3.783 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 111 more positive … | |
| … 127 more negative … | |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=CAP (probability 0.139, score -1.606) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 139 more positive … | |
| … 127 more negative … | |
| -0.450 | <BIAS> |
| -1.612 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=ECON (probability 0.003, score -5.778) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 77 more positive … | |
| … 64 more negative … | |
| -7.289 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=EDU (probability 0.002, score -6.122) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 72 more positive … | |
| … 73 more negative … | |
| -7.406 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=ENV (probability 0.003, score -5.763) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 103 more positive … | |
| … 89 more negative … | |
| -6.893 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=EX (probability 0.045, score -2.870) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 122 more positive … | |
| … 116 more negative … | |
| -0.340 | <BIAS> |
| -4.177 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=FED (probability 0.064, score -2.487) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 110 more positive … | |
| … 93 more negative … | |
| -5.406 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -5.804) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 123 more positive … | |
| … 113 more negative … | |
| -9.281 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -5.699) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 128 more positive … | |
| … 108 more negative … | |
| -8.346 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -14.623) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 56 more positive … | |
| … 63 more negative … | |
| -13.176 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -7.164) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 92 more positive … | |
| … 79 more negative … | |
| -8.504 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.565, score 0.519) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.118, score -1.898) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -9.892) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.151) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.530) top features | y=EX (probability 0.002, score -6.113) top features | y=FED (probability 0.001, score -6.713) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.312, score -0.636) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -10.008) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -9.530) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -7.044) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.565, score 0.519) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +5.062 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 226 more positive … | |
| … 250 more negative … | |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=CAP (probability 0.118, score -1.898) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 210 more positive … | |
| … 207 more negative … | |
| -4.120 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -9.892) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 191 more positive … | |
| … 124 more negative … | |
| -18.639 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.151) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 219 more positive … | |
| … 212 more negative … | |
| -7.901 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.530) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 201 more positive … | |
| … 172 more negative … | |
| -13.021 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=EX (probability 0.002, score -6.113) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 219 more positive … | |
| … 220 more negative … | |
| -9.620 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=FED (probability 0.001, score -6.713) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 215 more positive … | |
| … 189 more negative … | |
| -6.116 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=HEG (probability 0.312, score -0.636) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.268 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 194 more positive … | |
| … 204 more negative … | |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -10.008) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 172 more positive … | |
| … 195 more negative … | |
| -6.208 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -9.530) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 170 more positive … | |
| … 166 more negative … | |
| -6.651 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -7.044) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 162 more positive … | |
| … 180 more negative … | |
| -3.289 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.599, score -1.047) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.120, score -2.905) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -14.099) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -14.391) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -10.444) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -8.498) top features | y=FED (probability 0.162, score -2.581) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.106, score -3.033) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.189) top features | y=POL (probability 0.012, score -5.239) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -11.921) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.599, score -1.047) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 239 more positive … | |
| … 233 more negative … | |
| -3.657 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=CAP (probability 0.120, score -2.905) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 216 more positive … | |
| … 236 more negative … | |
| -5.563 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -14.099) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 155 more positive … | |
| … 147 more negative … | |
| -15.265 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -14.391) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 136 more positive … | |
| … 125 more negative … | |
| -15.935 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -10.444) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 204 more positive … | |
| … 126 more negative … | |
| -19.442 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -8.498) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 237 more positive … | |
| … 234 more negative … | |
| -9.929 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=FED (probability 0.162, score -2.581) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 213 more positive … | |
| … 207 more negative … | |
| -2.791 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=HEG (probability 0.106, score -3.033) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.974 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 218 more positive … | |
| … 234 more negative … | |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.189) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 179 more positive … | |
| … 164 more negative … | |
| -10.956 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=POL (probability 0.012, score -5.239) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 123 more positive … | |
| … 122 more negative … | |
| -4.996 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -11.921) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 130 more positive … | |
| … 142 more negative … | |
| -8.994 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.486, score -1.634) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.000, score -8.817) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -15.231) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -9.807) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.004, score -6.635) top features | y=EX (probability 0.018, score -5.130) top features | y=FED (probability 0.003, score -6.943) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.475, score -1.662) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.002, score -7.588) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -18.837) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.012, score -5.478) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.486, score -1.634) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 236 more positive … | |
| … 261 more negative … | |
| -0.313 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=CAP (probability 0.000, score -8.817) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 229 more positive … | |
| … 226 more negative … | |
| -7.245 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -15.231) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 204 more positive … | |
| … 130 more negative … | |
| -22.912 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -9.807) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 167 more positive … | |
| … 140 more negative … | |
| -12.583 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=ENV (probability 0.004, score -6.635) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 190 more positive … | |
| … 179 more negative … | |
| -9.801 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=EX (probability 0.018, score -5.130) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 224 more positive … | |
| … 248 more negative … | |
| -2.795 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=FED (probability 0.003, score -6.943) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 201 more positive … | |
| … 198 more negative … | |
| -8.373 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=HEG (probability 0.475, score -1.662) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 260 more positive … | |
| … 253 more negative … | |
| -3.485 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=NAT (probability 0.002, score -7.588) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 184 more positive … | |
| … 179 more negative … | |
| -8.736 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -18.837) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 176 more positive … | |
| … 113 more negative … | |
| -25.878 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
y=TOP (probability 0.012, score -5.478) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 156 more positive … | |
| … 127 more negative … | |
| -10.771 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.074, score -4.872) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.791, score -2.424) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -31.290) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.074, score -4.869) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.002, score -8.406) top features | y=EX (probability 0.039, score -5.513) top features | y=FED (probability 0.016, score -6.412) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -8.201) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -20.176) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.828) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -9.069) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.074, score -4.872) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 163 more positive … | |
| … 194 more negative … | |
| -0.150 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=CAP (probability 0.791, score -2.424) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 176 more positive … | |
| … 157 more negative … | |
| -2.431 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -31.290) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 5 more positive … | |
| … 49 more negative … | |
| -26.238 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=EDU (probability 0.074, score -4.869) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 99 more positive … | |
| … 90 more negative … | |
| -6.022 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=ENV (probability 0.002, score -8.406) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 97 more positive … | |
| … 102 more negative … | |
| -10.363 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=EX (probability 0.039, score -5.513) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 140 more positive … | |
| … 143 more negative … | |
| -2.869 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=FED (probability 0.016, score -6.412) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 156 more positive … | |
| … 150 more negative … | |
| -5.447 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -8.201) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 117 more positive … | |
| … 117 more negative … | |
| -9.185 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -20.176) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 49 more positive … | |
| … 82 more negative … | |
| -16.314 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.828) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 53 more positive … | |
| … 58 more negative … | |
| -15.869 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -9.069) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 81 more positive … | |
| … 91 more negative … | |
| -8.301 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.669, score 1.349) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.065, score -2.482) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.293) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -7.851) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.004) top features | y=EX (probability 0.083, score -2.212) top features | y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.072) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.180, score -1.301) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.715) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -12.825) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -9.255) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.669, score 1.349) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +1.441 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 243 more positive … | |
| … 235 more negative … | |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=CAP (probability 0.065, score -2.482) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 210 more positive … | |
| … 202 more negative … | |
| -3.251 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.293) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 108 more positive … | |
| … 78 more negative … | |
| -18.390 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -7.851) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 197 more positive … | |
| … 179 more negative … | |
| -9.540 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.004) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 145 more positive … | |
| … 135 more negative … | |
| -7.781 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=EX (probability 0.083, score -2.212) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 187 more positive … | |
| … 172 more negative … | |
| -5.992 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.072) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 207 more positive … | |
| … 201 more negative … | |
| -9.281 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=HEG (probability 0.180, score -1.301) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.114 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 203 more positive … | |
| … 216 more negative … | |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.715) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 153 more positive … | |
| … 129 more negative … | |
| -11.432 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -12.825) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 130 more positive … | |
| … 107 more negative … | |
| -17.544 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -9.255) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 147 more positive … | |
| … 127 more negative … | |
| -13.815 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.962, score 3.979) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.023, score -3.745) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -27.245) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.181) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.288) top features | y=EX (probability 0.012, score -4.354) top features | y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.209) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -7.515) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -11.738) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -14.646) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -9.846) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.962, score 3.979) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +6.703 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 185 more positive … | |
| … 208 more negative … | |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=CAP (probability 0.023, score -3.745) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 201 more positive … | |
| … 177 more negative … | |
| -6.861 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -27.245) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 26 more positive … | |
| … 48 more negative … | |
| -24.230 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.181) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 153 more positive … | |
| … 144 more negative … | |
| -11.056 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.288) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 120 more positive … | |
| … 110 more negative … | |
| -12.067 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=EX (probability 0.012, score -4.354) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 182 more positive … | |
| … 143 more negative … | |
| -11.735 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.209) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 182 more positive … | |
| … 163 more negative … | |
| -10.067 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -7.515) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 160 more positive … | |
| … 177 more negative … | |
| -5.601 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -11.738) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 91 more positive … | |
| … 85 more negative … | |
| -15.675 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -14.646) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 111 more positive … | |
| … 91 more negative … | |
| -18.525 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -9.846) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 170 more positive … | |
| … 145 more negative … | |
| -13.060 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.944, score 3.935) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.050, score -2.907) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -35.206) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -8.577) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.908) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -11.926) top features | y=FED (probability 0.000, score -8.118) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -8.591) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.735) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.613) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.006, score -5.085) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.944, score 3.935) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +2.007 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 225 more positive … | |
| … 208 more negative … | |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=CAP (probability 0.050, score -2.907) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 196 more positive … | |
| … 207 more negative … | |
| -2.373 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -35.206) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 31 more positive … | |
| … 53 more negative … | |
| -29.865 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -8.577) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 141 more positive … | |
| … 109 more negative … | |
| -8.463 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.908) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 89 more positive … | |
| … 88 more negative … | |
| -13.407 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -11.926) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 207 more positive … | |
| … 163 more negative … | |
| -19.171 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=FED (probability 0.000, score -8.118) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 175 more positive … | |
| … 183 more negative … | |
| -7.156 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -8.591) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 188 more positive … | |
| … 158 more negative … | |
| -12.362 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.735) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 130 more positive … | |
| … 77 more negative … | |
| -15.648 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.613) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 46 more positive … | |
| … 70 more negative … | |
| -14.076 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
y=TOP (probability 0.006, score -5.085) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 144 more positive … | |
| … 100 more negative … | |
| -10.717 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.772, score -0.391) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.041, score -3.831) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -12.398) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.355) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.398) top features | y=EX (probability 0.001, score -7.269) top features | y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.897) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.004, score -6.063) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -7.400) top features | y=POL (probability 0.178, score -2.275) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -11.699) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.772, score -0.391) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.838 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 180 more positive … | |
| … 198 more negative … | |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=CAP (probability 0.041, score -3.831) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 208 more positive … | |
| … 191 more negative … | |
| -5.552 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -12.398) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 90 more positive … | |
| … 93 more negative … | |
| -11.292 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.355) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 128 more positive … | |
| … 130 more negative … | |
| -6.716 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.398) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 154 more positive … | |
| … 117 more negative … | |
| -9.557 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=EX (probability 0.001, score -7.269) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 138 more positive … | |
| … 133 more negative … | |
| -10.266 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.897) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 147 more positive … | |
| … 151 more negative … | |
| -9.343 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=HEG (probability 0.004, score -6.063) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 135 more positive … | |
| … 143 more negative … | |
| -4.465 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -7.400) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 123 more positive … | |
| … 98 more negative … | |
| -9.181 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=POL (probability 0.178, score -2.275) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 98 more positive … | |
| … 98 more negative … | |
| -3.793 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -11.699) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 124 more positive … | |
| … 139 more negative … | |
| -10.590 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.717, score 0.980) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.008, score -4.786) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.002, score -6.453) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.504) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -10.282) top features | y=EX (probability 0.163, score -1.618) top features | y=FED (probability 0.003, score -5.874) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.041, score -3.135) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -6.529) top features | y=POL (probability 0.057, score -2.799) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.008, score -4.856) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.717, score 0.980) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +1.851 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 219 more positive … | |
| … 209 more negative … | |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=CAP (probability 0.008, score -4.786) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 208 more positive … | |
| … 195 more negative … | |
| -5.051 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=ECON (probability 0.002, score -6.453) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 144 more positive … | |
| … 122 more negative … | |
| -7.220 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.504) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 185 more positive … | |
| … 148 more negative … | |
| -8.553 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -10.282) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 192 more positive … | |
| … 184 more negative … | |
| -12.787 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=EX (probability 0.163, score -1.618) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +1.342 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 216 more positive … | |
| … 238 more negative … | |
| -0.401 | <BIAS> |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=FED (probability 0.003, score -5.874) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 205 more positive … | |
| … 192 more negative … | |
| -7.966 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=HEG (probability 0.041, score -3.135) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 216 more positive … | |
| … 209 more negative … | |
| -4.294 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -6.529) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 218 more positive … | |
| … 206 more negative … | |
| -10.190 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=POL (probability 0.057, score -2.799) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 176 more positive … | |
| … 166 more negative … | |
| -5.259 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
y=TOP (probability 0.008, score -4.856) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 215 more positive … | |
| … 196 more negative … | |
| -6.389 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.415, score -1.714) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.072, score -3.601) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -25.423) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -11.988) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.093, score -3.338) top features | y=EX (probability 0.226, score -2.401) top features | y=FED (probability 0.015, score -5.187) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.157, score -2.794) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.009, score -5.660) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.639) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.012, score -5.440) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.415, score -1.714) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.844 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 114 more positive … | |
| … 125 more negative … | |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=CAP (probability 0.072, score -3.601) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 114 more positive … | |
| … 112 more negative … | |
| -0.351 | <BIAS> |
| -4.490 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -25.423) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 1 more positive … | |
| … 32 more negative … | |
| -21.765 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -11.988) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 63 more positive … | |
| … 54 more negative … | |
| -11.393 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=ENV (probability 0.093, score -3.338) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 80 more positive … | |
| … 77 more negative … | |
| -5.183 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=EX (probability 0.226, score -2.401) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 92 more positive … | |
| … 99 more negative … | |
| -1.798 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=FED (probability 0.015, score -5.187) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 86 more positive … | |
| … 85 more negative … | |
| -5.723 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=HEG (probability 0.157, score -2.794) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 83 more positive … | |
| … 82 more negative … | |
| -2.938 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=NAT (probability 0.009, score -5.660) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 105 more positive … | |
| … 100 more negative … | |
| -8.004 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.639) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 37 more positive … | |
| … 46 more negative … | |
| -5.612 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
y=TOP (probability 0.012, score -5.440) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 76 more positive … | |
| … 50 more negative … | |
| -9.195 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.572, score -2.915) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.015, score -6.622) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.001, score -8.951) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.579) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.939) top features | y=EX (probability 0.002, score -8.495) top features | y=FED (probability 0.290, score -3.620) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.117, score -4.541) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.002, score -8.581) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.272) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -19.492) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.572, score -2.915) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 215 more positive … | |
| … 235 more negative … | |
| -0.782 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=CAP (probability 0.015, score -6.622) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 220 more positive … | |
| … 201 more negative … | |
| -0.444 | <BIAS> |
| -7.669 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=ECON (probability 0.001, score -8.951) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 111 more positive … | |
| … 87 more negative … | |
| -11.781 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.579) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 191 more positive … | |
| … 131 more negative … | |
| -16.930 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.939) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 125 more positive … | |
| … 162 more negative … | |
| -8.531 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=EX (probability 0.002, score -8.495) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 219 more positive … | |
| … 199 more negative … | |
| -14.235 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=FED (probability 0.290, score -3.620) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 195 more positive … | |
| … 215 more negative … | |
| -2.112 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=HEG (probability 0.117, score -4.541) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 213 more positive … | |
| … 206 more negative … | |
| -3.790 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=NAT (probability 0.002, score -8.581) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 190 more positive … | |
| … 199 more negative … | |
| -5.035 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.272) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 153 more positive … | |
| … 102 more negative … | |
| -20.162 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -19.492) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 157 more positive … | |
| … 150 more negative … | |
| -17.942 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.474, score 4.369) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.015, score -3.422) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.389) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -18.465) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.053, score -2.093) top features | y=EX (probability 0.003, score -5.191) top features | y=FED (probability 0.001, score -6.172) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -6.138) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -6.126) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -9.678) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.452, score 2.793) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.474, score 4.369) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +6.270 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 178 more positive … | |
| … 192 more negative … | |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=CAP (probability 0.015, score -3.422) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 195 more positive … | |
| … 165 more negative … | |
| -5.272 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.389) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 80 more positive … | |
| … 78 more negative … | |
| -15.117 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -18.465) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 60 more positive … | |
| … 61 more negative … | |
| -18.108 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=ENV (probability 0.053, score -2.093) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 150 more positive … | |
| … 92 more negative … | |
| -10.665 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=EX (probability 0.003, score -5.191) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 152 more positive … | |
| … 133 more negative … | |
| -7.538 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=FED (probability 0.001, score -6.172) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 152 more positive … | |
| … 148 more negative … | |
| -9.346 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -6.138) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 155 more positive … | |
| … 134 more negative … | |
| -8.384 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -6.126) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 155 more positive … | |
| … 156 more negative … | |
| -10.638 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -9.678) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 78 more positive … | |
| … 54 more negative … | |
| -12.296 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
y=TOP (probability 0.452, score 2.793) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.602 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 104 more positive … | |
| … 88 more negative … | |
if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.970, score 1.543) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.006, score -5.346) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -31.427) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -16.364) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.937) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.013) top features | y=FED (probability 0.022, score -3.968) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -11.701) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -6.120) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -19.160) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -24.510) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.970, score 1.543) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +7.632 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 198 more positive … | |
| … 203 more negative … | |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=CAP (probability 0.006, score -5.346) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 192 more positive … | |
| … 193 more negative … | |
| -4.195 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -31.427) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 6 more positive … | |
| … 38 more negative … | |
| -27.946 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -16.364) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 78 more positive … | |
| … 77 more negative … | |
| -14.076 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.937) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 115 more positive … | |
| … 108 more negative … | |
| -12.157 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.013) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 164 more positive … | |
| … 150 more negative … | |
| -9.814 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=FED (probability 0.022, score -3.968) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 197 more positive … | |
| … 148 more negative … | |
| -6.561 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -11.701) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 138 more positive … | |
| … 116 more negative … | |
| -16.240 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -6.120) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 126 more positive … | |
| … 149 more negative … | |
| -5.117 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -19.160) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 30 more positive … | |
| … 54 more negative … | |
| -16.504 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -24.510) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 50 more positive … | |
| … 66 more negative … | |
| -23.545 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.507, score -2.454) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.041, score -5.036) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -14.164) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.003, score -7.583) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.141, score -3.792) top features | y=EX (probability 0.261, score -3.158) top features | y=FED (probability 0.003, score -7.631) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.024, score -5.586) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.017, score -5.935) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -21.164) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.002, score -7.942) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.507, score -2.454) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 156 more positive … | |
| … 127 more negative … | |
| -4.492 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=CAP (probability 0.041, score -5.036) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 127 more positive … | |
| … 153 more negative … | |
| -3.922 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -14.164) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 43 more positive … | |
| … 61 more negative … | |
| -11.926 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=EDU (probability 0.003, score -7.583) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 63 more positive … | |
| … 62 more negative … | |
| -9.235 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=ENV (probability 0.141, score -3.792) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 107 more positive … | |
| … 91 more negative … | |
| -8.101 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=EX (probability 0.261, score -3.158) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 145 more positive … | |
| … 110 more negative … | |
| -5.565 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=FED (probability 0.003, score -7.631) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 118 more positive … | |
| … 98 more negative … | |
| -12.685 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=HEG (probability 0.024, score -5.586) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 97 more positive … | |
| … 100 more negative … | |
| -7.213 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=NAT (probability 0.017, score -5.935) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 125 more positive … | |
| … 107 more negative … | |
| -8.012 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -21.164) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 41 more positive … | |
| … 48 more negative … | |
| -20.368 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
y=TOP (probability 0.002, score -7.942) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 65 more positive … | |
| … 63 more negative … | |
| -9.117 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.878, score 1.598) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.034, score -3.400) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.003, score -5.819) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -23.265) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.022, score -3.854) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -16.715) top features | y=FED (probability 0.000, score -19.175) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -7.499) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -18.417) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -21.094) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.030, score -3.537) top features | y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -22.162) top features | y=QER (probability 0.033, score -3.449) top features | y=COL (probability 0.000, score -13.536) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.878, score 1.598) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +4.150 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 38 more positive … | |
| … 56 more negative … | |
| -0.283 | <BIAS> |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=CAP (probability 0.034, score -3.400) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 55 more positive … | |
| … 39 more negative … | |
| -0.513 | <BIAS> |
| -4.435 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=ECON (probability 0.003, score -5.819) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 56 more positive … | |
| … 53 more negative … | |
| -0.384 | <BIAS> |
| -6.095 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -23.265) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 1 more positive … | |
| … 43 more negative … | |
| -16.024 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=ENV (probability 0.022, score -3.854) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 62 more positive … | |
| … 29 more negative … | |
| -7.321 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -16.715) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 24 more positive … | |
| … 48 more negative … | |
| -0.403 | <BIAS> |
| -11.615 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=FED (probability 0.000, score -19.175) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 17 more positive … | |
| … 45 more negative … | |
| -0.326 | <BIAS> |
| -13.048 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -7.499) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 53 more positive … | |
| … 47 more negative … | |
| -0.401 | <BIAS> |
| -7.268 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -18.417) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 9 more positive … | |
| … 38 more negative … | |
| -0.339 | <BIAS> |
| -12.817 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -21.094) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 49 more negative … | |
| -0.289 | <BIAS> |
| -13.333 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=TOP (probability 0.030, score -3.537) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 59 more positive … | |
| … 34 more negative … | |
| -0.399 | <BIAS> |
| -7.313 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -22.162) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 52 more negative … | |
| -0.279 | <BIAS> |
| -13.846 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=QER (probability 0.033, score -3.449) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 61 more positive … | |
| … 42 more negative … | |
| -0.491 | <BIAS> |
| -5.493 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
y=COL (probability 0.000, score -13.536) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 32 more positive … | |
| … 47 more negative … | |
| -0.350 | <BIAS> |
| -10.800 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.012, score -4.182) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.059, score -2.546) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.134, score -1.623) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -46.942) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.002, score -5.847) top features | y=EX (probability 0.002, score -5.948) top features | y=FED (probability 0.333, score -0.370) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.018, score -3.781) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.124, score -1.715) top features | y=POL (probability 0.022, score -3.591) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.136, score -1.603) top features | y=ORI (probability 0.041, score -2.946) top features | y=QER (probability 0.062, score -2.493) top features | y=COL (probability 0.054, score -2.654) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.012, score -4.182) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 90 more positive … | |
| … 69 more negative … | |
| -5.615 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=CAP (probability 0.059, score -2.546) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 112 more positive … | |
| … 91 more negative … | |
| -0.503 | <BIAS> |
| -3.747 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=ECON (probability 0.134, score -1.623) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 110 more positive … | |
| … 124 more negative … | |
| -0.607 | <BIAS> |
| -0.956 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -46.942) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 47 more negative … | |
| -40.997 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=ENV (probability 0.002, score -5.847) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 91 more positive … | |
| … 58 more negative … | |
| -11.612 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=EX (probability 0.002, score -5.948) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 86 more positive … | |
| … 47 more negative … | |
| -11.920 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=FED (probability 0.333, score -0.370) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 105 more positive … | |
| … 91 more negative … | |
| -0.500 | <BIAS> |
| -1.746 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=HEG (probability 0.018, score -3.781) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 93 more positive … | |
| … 87 more negative … | |
| -0.340 | <BIAS> |
| -2.367 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=NAT (probability 0.124, score -1.715) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 138 more positive … | |
| … 102 more negative … | |
| -0.390 | <BIAS> |
| -4.714 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=POL (probability 0.022, score -3.591) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 81 more positive … | |
| … 58 more negative … | |
| -6.308 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=TOP (probability 0.136, score -1.603) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 118 more positive … | |
| … 110 more negative … | |
| -0.556 | <BIAS> |
| -0.944 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=ORI (probability 0.041, score -2.946) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 93 more positive … | |
| … 61 more negative … | |
| -0.345 | <BIAS> |
| -5.581 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=QER (probability 0.062, score -2.493) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 114 more positive … | |
| … 84 more negative … | |
| -0.513 | <BIAS> |
| -3.908 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
y=COL (probability 0.054, score -2.654) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 94 more positive … | |
| … 64 more negative … | |
| -0.345 | <BIAS> |
| -7.655 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.070, score -3.050) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.073, score -3.018) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.621, score -0.409) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -55.961) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -40.969) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.447) top features | y=FED (probability 0.015, score -4.656) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.006, score -5.555) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.008, score -5.263) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -15.929) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.161, score -2.161) top features | y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -16.635) top features | y=QER (probability 0.043, score -3.554) top features | y=COL (probability 0.003, score -6.188) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.070, score -3.050) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 216 more positive … | |
| … 214 more negative … | |
| -0.359 | <BIAS> |
| -3.586 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=CAP (probability 0.073, score -3.018) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 202 more positive … | |
| … 184 more negative … | |
| -0.331 | <BIAS> |
| -4.653 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=ECON (probability 0.621, score -0.409) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +0.662 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 214 more positive … | |
| … 222 more negative … | |
| -0.448 | <BIAS> |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -55.961) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 38 more negative … | |
| -51.225 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -40.969) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 44 more negative … | |
| -36.539 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.447) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 87 more positive … | |
| … 86 more negative … | |
| -11.174 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=FED (probability 0.015, score -4.656) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 170 more positive … | |
| … 152 more negative … | |
| -0.340 | <BIAS> |
| -6.126 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=HEG (probability 0.006, score -5.555) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 117 more positive … | |
| … 63 more negative … | |
| -10.770 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=NAT (probability 0.008, score -5.263) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 193 more positive … | |
| … 174 more negative … | |
| -5.557 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -15.929) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 7 more positive … | |
| … 49 more negative … | |
| -11.182 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=TOP (probability 0.161, score -2.161) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 234 more positive … | |
| … 225 more negative … | |
| -0.477 | <BIAS> |
| -3.300 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -16.635) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 24 more positive … | |
| … 56 more negative … | |
| -11.365 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=QER (probability 0.043, score -3.554) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 236 more positive … | |
| … 194 more negative … | |
| -0.431 | <BIAS> |
| -5.614 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
y=COL (probability 0.003, score -6.188) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 109 more positive … | |
| … 70 more negative … | |
| -9.669 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.004, score -5.910) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.000, score -8.821) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.064, score -2.967) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -11.711) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -12.140) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.351) top features | y=FED (probability 0.307, score -1.190) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.013, score -4.582) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.566, score -0.283) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.017) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.042, score -3.414) top features | y=ORI (probability 0.001, score -7.506) top features | y=QER (probability 0.003, score -6.186) top features | y=COL (probability 0.000, score -21.922) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.004, score -5.910) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 137 more positive … | |
| … 115 more negative … | |
| -8.314 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=CAP (probability 0.000, score -8.821) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 111 more positive … | |
| … 89 more negative … | |
| -12.564 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=ECON (probability 0.064, score -2.967) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 180 more positive … | |
| … 164 more negative … | |
| -0.398 | <BIAS> |
| -4.384 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -11.711) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 13 more positive … | |
| … 52 more negative … | |
| -5.825 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -12.140) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 21 more positive … | |
| … 53 more negative … | |
| -6.519 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.351) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 119 more positive … | |
| … 85 more negative … | |
| -8.830 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=FED (probability 0.307, score -1.190) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 197 more positive … | |
| … 182 more negative … | |
| -0.403 | <BIAS> |
| -2.279 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=HEG (probability 0.013, score -4.582) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 147 more positive … | |
| … 98 more negative … | |
| -8.316 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=NAT (probability 0.566, score -0.283) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +2.753 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 216 more positive … | |
| … 256 more negative … | |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.017) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 97 more positive … | |
| … 79 more negative … | |
| -8.687 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=TOP (probability 0.042, score -3.414) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 224 more positive … | |
| … 199 more negative … | |
| -0.319 | <BIAS> |
| -5.176 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=ORI (probability 0.001, score -7.506) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 101 more positive … | |
| … 81 more negative … | |
| -10.879 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=QER (probability 0.003, score -6.186) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 133 more positive … | |
| … 88 more negative … | |
| -8.521 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
y=COL (probability 0.000, score -21.922) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 9 more positive … | |
| … 58 more negative … | |
| -13.683 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions of ‘security’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.212, score -2.205) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.020, score -4.659) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.214, score -2.192) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -36.737) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -62.867) top features | y=EX (probability 0.000, score -10.321) top features | y=FED (probability 0.013, score -5.100) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -28.812) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.153, score -2.562) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -35.837) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.338, score -1.669) top features | y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -68.424) top features | y=QER (probability 0.049, score -3.747) top features | y=COL (probability 0.001, score -7.316) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.212, score -2.205) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 228 more positive … | |
| … 226 more negative … | |
| -0.261 | <BIAS> |
| -1.914 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=CAP (probability 0.020, score -4.659) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 134 more positive … | |
| … 114 more negative … | |
| -7.152 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=ECON (probability 0.214, score -2.192) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 167 more positive … | |
| … 133 more negative … | |
| -0.318 | <BIAS> |
| -5.396 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -36.737) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 2 more positive … | |
| … 58 more negative … | |
| -28.545 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -62.867) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 42 more negative … | |
| -54.885 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=EX (probability 0.000, score -10.321) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 125 more positive … | |
| … 82 more negative … | |
| -13.033 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=FED (probability 0.013, score -5.100) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 155 more positive … | |
| … 123 more negative … | |
| -0.330 | <BIAS> |
| -9.349 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -28.812) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 17 more positive … | |
| … 46 more negative … | |
| -23.082 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=NAT (probability 0.153, score -2.562) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 120 more positive … | |
| … 103 more negative … | |
| -3.592 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -35.837) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 2 more positive … | |
| … 50 more negative … | |
| -28.898 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=TOP (probability 0.338, score -1.669) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 237 more positive … | |
| … 252 more negative … | |
| -0.384 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -68.424) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 38 more negative … | |
| -60.617 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=QER (probability 0.049, score -3.747) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 203 more positive … | |
| … 177 more negative … | |
| -0.391 | <BIAS> |
| -4.667 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=COL (probability 0.001, score -7.316) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 105 more positive … | |
| … 82 more negative … | |
| -8.263 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
Explained as: linear model
| y=ANB (probability 0.181, score -1.352) top features | y=CAP (probability 0.026, score -3.497) top features | y=ECON (probability 0.023, score -3.619) top features | y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -47.133) top features | y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -54.973) top features | y=EX (probability 0.001, score -7.211) top features | y=FED (probability 0.008, score -4.741) top features | y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -13.203) top features | y=NAT (probability 0.004, score -5.380) top features | y=POL (probability 0.000, score -18.957) top features | y=TOP (probability 0.752, score 1.754) top features | y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -65.868) top features | y=QER (probability 0.005, score -5.241) top features | y=COL (probability 0.000, score -9.216) top features | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
y=ANB (probability 0.181, score -1.352) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 244 more positive … | |
| … 229 more negative … | |
| -0.205 | <BIAS> |
| -1.889 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=CAP (probability 0.026, score -3.497) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 158 more positive … | |
| … 105 more negative … | |
| -10.434 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=ECON (probability 0.023, score -3.619) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 160 more positive … | |
| … 124 more negative … | |
| -0.331 | <BIAS> |
| -6.167 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -47.133) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 48 more negative … | |
| -40.664 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -54.973) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 55 more negative … | |
| -46.405 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=EX (probability 0.001, score -7.211) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 97 more positive … | |
| … 65 more negative … | |
| -8.208 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=FED (probability 0.008, score -4.741) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 155 more positive … | |
| … 123 more negative … | |
| -0.285 | <BIAS> |
| -7.274 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -13.203) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 27 more positive … | |
| … 62 more negative … | |
| -7.942 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=NAT (probability 0.004, score -5.380) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 125 more positive … | |
| … 91 more negative … | |
| -7.728 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=POL (probability 0.000, score -18.957) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 2 more positive … | |
| … 55 more negative … | |
| -12.649 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=TOP (probability 0.752, score 1.754) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| +3.380 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
| … 232 more positive … | |
| … 258 more negative … | |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -65.868) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 50 more negative … | |
| -57.944 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=QER (probability 0.005, score -5.241) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 199 more positive … | |
| … 181 more negative … | |
| -0.407 | <BIAS> |
| -6.003 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o
y=COL (probability 0.000, score -9.216) top features
| Contribution? | Feature |
|---|---|
| … 113 more positive … | |
| … 92 more negative … | |
| -11.131 | Highlighted in text (sum) |
as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o