Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.966, score 4.075) top features y=CAP (probability 0.011, score -4.477) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -8.873) top features y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.000) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.457) top features y=EX (probability 0.013, score -4.324) top features y=FED (probability 0.007, score -4.955) top features y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -6.826) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -8.086) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.559) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.377) top features
Contribution? Feature
+0.798 <BIAS>
+0.576 [124] racism
+0.529 [79] black
+0.486 [112] black
+0.430 [117] color
+0.425 [2] narrative
+0.394 [60] narratives
+0.394 [44] narrative
+0.362 [128] society
+0.327 [85] deviant
+0.300 [52] Blackness
+0.289 [116] of
+0.281 [64] stories
+0.259 [38] of
… 53 more positive …
… 43 more negative …
-0.259 [121] affected
-0.269 [86] dangerous
-0.286 [3] would
-0.304 [24] safe
-0.316 [47] take
-0.330 [89] threat
Contribution? Feature
+0.165 [126] impacts
+0.151 [24] safe
+0.134 [99] campuses
+0.128 [47] take
+0.124 [43] dominant
+0.116 [15] precaution
+0.107 [49] consideration
… 18 more positive …
… 13 more negative …
-0.110 [109] world
-0.113 [117] color
-0.116 [76] innocent
-0.118 [80] lives
-0.122 [77] brown
-0.130 [68] Oscar
-0.134 [9] police
-0.145 [124] racism
-0.157 [29] cops
-0.201 [64] stories
-0.281 [79] black
-0.353 [112] black
-3.740 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 64 more negative …
-0.065 [83] suspected
-0.067 [87] and
-0.069 [62] understanding
-0.069 [93] community
-0.071 [25] and
-0.075 [79] black
-0.075 [55] communities
-0.075 [78] and
-0.075 [113] and
-0.076 [99] campuses
-0.077 [128] society
-0.078 [106] in
-0.082 [129] as
-0.095 [22] communities
-0.096 [40] community
-0.096 [114] POC
-0.100 [112] black
-0.111 [124] racism
-0.111 [117] color
-4.723 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.658 [98] college
+0.470 [118] students
+0.302 [99] campuses
+0.289 [47] take
+0.267 [90] to
+0.233 [18] make
+0.224 [95] may
… 9 more positive …
… 43 more negative …
-0.210 [63] the
-0.210 [36] the
-0.218 [2] narrative
-0.241 [60] narratives
-0.246 [117] color
-0.250 [44] narrative
-0.250 [38] of
-0.277 [52] Blackness
-0.292 [65] of
-0.369 [112] black
-0.377 [124] racism
-0.412 [79] black
-2.684 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 66 more negative …
-0.060 [91] the
-0.061 [29] cops
-0.063 [63] the
-0.063 [44] narrative
-0.064 [118] students
-0.065 [74] were
-0.066 [123] the
-0.066 [35] protecting
-0.068 [11] a
-0.068 [36] the
-0.071 [111] our
-0.073 [7] calling
-0.073 [2] narrative
-0.078 [98] college
-0.081 [40] community
-0.081 [116] of
-0.121 [112] black
-0.124 [124] racism
-0.135 [79] black
-4.912 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.639 [89] threat
+0.445 [86] dangerous
+0.423 [83] suspected
+0.340 [59] counter
+0.282 [121] affected
+0.276 [3] would
… 38 more positive …
… 45 more negative …
-0.294 [40] community
-0.303 [93] community
-0.309 [12] practice
-0.315 [117] color
-0.327 [112] black
-0.339 [60] narratives
-0.344 [44] narrative
-0.355 [2] narrative
-0.363 [79] black
-0.404 [118] students
-0.425 [128] society
-0.454 [124] racism
-0.519 [98] college
-2.156 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.341 [69] Grant
+0.304 [99] campuses
+0.281 [98] college
+0.237 [12] practice
+0.225 [118] students
+0.216 [7] calling
+0.202 [49] consideration
+0.189 [17] should
+0.182 [56] Taking
… 22 more positive …
… 35 more negative …
-0.183 [64] stories
-0.190 [38] of
-0.240 [112] black
-0.263 [124] racism
-0.265 [85] deviant
-0.286 [60] narratives
-0.297 [117] color
-0.309 [44] narrative
-0.329 [2] narrative
-0.434 [79] black
-3.331 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.120 [89] threat
+0.116 [66] Tamir
… 6 more positive …
… 26 more negative …
-0.101 [39] the
-0.104 [70] and
-0.110 [118] students
-0.111 [50] the
-0.116 [44] narrative
-0.128 [116] of
-0.149 [11] a
-0.154 [112] black
-0.158 [12] practice
-0.169 [117] color
-0.169 [124] racism
-0.173 [85] deviant
-0.188 [22] communities
-0.197 [60] narratives
-0.197 [2] narrative
-0.218 [113] and
-0.223 [62] understanding
-3.397 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.327 [55] communities
+0.319 [22] communities
… 1 more positive …
… 41 more negative …
-0.111 [31] a
-0.111 [97] our
-0.119 [28] the
-0.123 [50] the
-0.125 [38] of
-0.127 [13] of
-0.130 [103] what
-0.131 [8] the
-0.136 [127] our
-0.139 [112] black
-0.145 [65] of
-0.146 [52] Blackness
-0.161 [79] black
-0.165 [116] of
-0.181 [44] narrative
-0.183 [124] racism
-0.240 [2] narrative
-3.793 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.157 [19] sure
… 13 more positive …
… 35 more negative …
-0.150 [107] the
-0.159 [85] deviant
-0.168 [109] world
-0.168 [93] community
-0.169 [123] the
-0.175 [79] black
-0.192 [38] of
-0.193 [111] our
-0.195 [8] the
-0.208 [13] of
-0.220 [21] our
-0.237 [97] our
-0.237 [44] narrative
-0.240 [2] narrative
-0.250 [54] our
-0.259 [65] of
-0.263 [116] of
-0.303 [124] racism
-2.888 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 74 more negative …
-0.030 [118] students
-0.030 [114] POC
-0.031 [103] what
-0.032 [104] happens
-0.032 [105] out
-0.033 [45] does
-0.033 [0] The
-0.033 [128] society
-0.033 [14] just
-0.034 [99] campuses
-0.034 [4] say
-0.034 [112] black
-0.036 [121] affected
-0.038 [117] color
-0.039 [93] community
-0.040 [40] community
-0.043 [79] black
-0.044 [18] make
-0.044 [62] understanding
-6.321 <BIAS>

y=ANB (probability 0.966, score 4.075) top features

Contribution? Feature
+3.289 Highlighted in text (sum)
+0.798 <BIAS>
… 53 more positive …
… 43 more negative …

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=CAP (probability 0.011, score -4.477) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 18 more positive …
… 13 more negative …
-1.056 Highlighted in text (sum)
-3.740 <BIAS>

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -8.873) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 64 more negative …
-1.563 Highlighted in text (sum)
-4.723 <BIAS>

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.000) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 9 more positive …
… 43 more negative …
-0.908 Highlighted in text (sum)
-2.684 <BIAS>

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.457) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 66 more negative …
-1.480 Highlighted in text (sum)
-4.912 <BIAS>

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=EX (probability 0.013, score -4.324) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 38 more positive …
… 45 more negative …
-2.156 <BIAS>
-2.347 Highlighted in text (sum)

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=FED (probability 0.007, score -4.955) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 22 more positive …
… 35 more negative …
-0.621 Highlighted in text (sum)
-3.331 <BIAS>

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -6.826) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 6 more positive …
… 26 more negative …
-2.429 Highlighted in text (sum)
-3.397 <BIAS>

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -8.086) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 1 more positive …
… 41 more negative …
-1.829 Highlighted in text (sum)
-3.793 <BIAS>

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.559) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 13 more positive …
… 35 more negative …
-2.888 <BIAS>
-3.629 Highlighted in text (sum)

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.377) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 74 more negative …
-0.676 Highlighted in text (sum)
-6.321 <BIAS>

The dominant narrative would say that immediately calling the police is a practice of just precaution. We should make sure that our communities are safe and so calling the cops on a “suspicious person” is protecting the whole of the community. However, this dominant narrative does not take into consideration the anti-Blackness in our communities. Taking into account counter narratives means understanding the stories of Tamir Rice, Oscar Grant, and Renisha McBride. They were all innocent brown and black lives that were suspected as deviant, dangerous, and a threat to the larger community. We may think our college campuses are immune to what happens out in the real world. Yet, our black and POC (people of color) students are still affected by the racism that impacts our society as a whole.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.164, score -1.621) top features y=CAP (probability 0.697, score 0.853) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -9.393) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -9.241) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -9.034) top features y=EX (probability 0.000, score -7.671) top features y=FED (probability 0.138, score -1.826) top features y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -8.187) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.574) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.483) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.486) top features
Contribution? Feature
+0.499 [11] their
+0.487 [20] of
+0.475 [28] or
+0.465 [13] of
+0.450 [44] of
+0.432 [39] of
+0.347 [5] historians
+0.277 [19] forms
+0.268 [4] and
+0.258 [38] forms
… 13 more positive …
… 16 more negative …
-0.257 [23] practice
-0.265 [32] welfare
-0.288 [35] state
-0.402 [30] market
-0.443 [7] adopted
-0.448 [48] ownership
-0.624 [46] markets
-0.715 [2] economists
-0.716 [0] Economists
-1.468 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.426 [14] capitalism
+0.417 [31] capitalism
+0.378 [33] capitalism
+0.377 [36] capitalism
+0.346 [40] capitalism
+0.328 [38] forms
+0.308 [19] forms
+0.265 [9] perspectives
+0.261 [46] markets
+0.259 [12] analyses
+0.220 [30] market
+0.183 [42] varying
+0.140 [25] include
… 11 more positive …
… 17 more negative …
-0.134 [17] recognized
-0.140 [4] and
-0.209 [32] welfare
-0.376 [11] their
-0.382 [5] historians
-0.417 [35] state
-0.700 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 24 more negative …
-0.131 [40] capitalism
-0.132 [39] of
-0.136 [3] sociologists
-0.137 [42] varying
-0.137 [14] capitalism
-0.138 [20] of
-0.138 [35] state
-0.138 [38] forms
-0.140 [18] various
-0.142 [31] capitalism
-0.142 [9] perspectives
-0.142 [29] free
-0.142 [23] practice
-0.143 [1] political
-0.143 [37] Different
-0.147 [25] include
-0.148 [47] public
-0.149 [17] recognized
-0.158 [8] different
-4.361 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.946 [43] degrees
+0.610 [47] public
+0.370 [25] include
+0.362 [16] have
… 11 more positive …
… 8 more negative …
-0.392 [21] it
-0.439 [2] economists
-0.452 [0] Economists
-0.498 [1] political
-0.554 [5] historians
-0.560 [44] of
-0.564 [39] of
-0.573 [3] sociologists
-0.577 [13] of
-0.600 [20] of
-0.713 [14] capitalism
-0.729 [40] capitalism
-0.734 [36] capitalism
-0.745 [31] capitalism
-0.805 [33] capitalism
-2.162 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 2 more positive …
… 13 more negative …
-0.196 [29] free
-0.200 [4] and
-0.201 [44] of
-0.212 [11] their
-0.212 [23] practice
-0.212 [13] of
-0.214 [43] degrees
-0.223 [3] sociologists
-0.229 [35] state
-0.230 [40] capitalism
-0.231 [7] adopted
-0.239 [39] of
-0.245 [20] of
-0.248 [31] capitalism
-0.251 [33] capitalism
-0.255 [47] public
-0.257 [32] welfare
-0.262 [5] historians
-0.273 [1] political
-3.492 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 17 more negative …
-0.043 [36] capitalism
-0.043 [33] capitalism
-0.044 [38] forms
-0.044 [32] welfare
-0.048 [0] Economists
-0.052 [23] practice
-0.052 [14] capitalism
-0.053 [2] economists
-0.055 [9] perspectives
-0.057 [18] various
-0.058 [45] free
-0.058 [44] of
-0.062 [31] capitalism
-0.065 [40] capitalism
-0.072 [3] sociologists
-0.079 [47] public
-0.080 [35] state
-0.082 [43] degrees
-0.083 [29] free
-6.128 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.981 [2] economists
+0.977 [0] Economists
+0.862 [35] state
+0.649 [32] welfare
+0.420 [7] adopted
+0.392 [47] public
+0.374 [48] ownership
+0.365 [17] recognized
… 13 more positive …
… 17 more negative …
-0.315 [28] or
-0.360 [40] capitalism
-0.385 [12] analyses
-0.392 [18] various
-0.394 [33] capitalism
-0.405 [14] capitalism
-0.413 [36] capitalism
-0.424 [31] capitalism
-0.439 [9] perspectives
-0.690 [19] forms
-0.691 [38] forms
-1.179 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 30 more negative …
-0.030 [17] recognized
-0.030 [25] include
-0.030 [12] analyses
-0.030 [18] various
-0.030 [35] state
-0.031 [40] capitalism
-0.031 [33] capitalism
-0.031 [1] political
-0.031 [14] capitalism
-0.031 [23] practice
-0.031 [13] of
-0.031 [48] ownership
-0.031 [36] capitalism
-0.031 [3] sociologists
-0.032 [8] different
-0.032 [11] their
-0.032 [28] or
-0.034 [46] markets
-0.034 [30] market
-6.850 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.683 [48] ownership
+0.454 [6] have
+0.406 [16] have
… 2 more positive …
… 16 more negative …
-0.297 [20] of
-0.309 [29] free
-0.311 [2] economists
-0.313 [39] of
-0.318 [45] free
-0.356 [13] of
-0.358 [40] capitalism
-0.387 [36] capitalism
-0.390 [9] perspectives
-0.395 [0] Economists
-0.415 [33] capitalism
-0.428 [14] capitalism
-0.432 [47] public
-0.438 [31] capitalism
-0.454 [3] sociologists
-0.462 [43] degrees
-2.671 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 18 more negative …
-0.089 [43] degrees
-0.094 [3] sociologists
-0.095 [26] laissez
-0.103 [33] capitalism
-0.107 [1] political
-0.115 [8] different
-0.116 [40] capitalism
-0.120 [18] various
-0.122 [39] of
-0.123 [23] practice
-0.128 [44] of
-0.130 [36] capitalism
-0.131 [14] capitalism
-0.132 [11] their
-0.134 [31] capitalism
-0.145 [20] of
-0.149 [47] public
-0.152 [13] of
-0.153 [9] perspectives
-5.138 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.198 [7] adopted
… 26 more negative …
-0.102 [47] public
-0.103 [39] of
-0.106 [44] of
-0.106 [20] of
-0.110 [4] and
-0.113 [34] and
-0.117 [11] their
-0.120 [43] degrees
-0.121 [36] capitalism
-0.122 [40] capitalism
-0.123 [22] in
-0.125 [14] capitalism
-0.129 [33] capitalism
-0.129 [1] political
-0.131 [13] of
-0.138 [31] capitalism
-0.141 [9] perspectives
-0.156 [3] sociologists
-4.855 <BIAS>

y=ANB (probability 0.164, score -1.621) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 13 more positive …
… 16 more negative …
-0.199 Highlighted in text (sum)
-1.468 <BIAS>

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=CAP (probability 0.697, score 0.853) top features

Contribution? Feature
+2.251 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 11 more positive …
… 17 more negative …
-0.700 <BIAS>

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -9.393) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 24 more negative …
-2.685 Highlighted in text (sum)
-4.361 <BIAS>

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -9.241) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 11 more positive …
… 8 more negative …
-2.162 <BIAS>
-6.647 Highlighted in text (sum)

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -9.034) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 2 more positive …
… 13 more negative …
-3.492 <BIAS>
-4.390 Highlighted in text (sum)

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -7.671) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 17 more negative …
-1.129 Highlighted in text (sum)
-6.128 <BIAS>

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=FED (probability 0.138, score -1.826) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.111 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 13 more positive …
… 17 more negative …
-1.179 <BIAS>

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -8.187) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 30 more negative …
-0.594 Highlighted in text (sum)
-6.850 <BIAS>

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.574) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 2 more positive …
… 16 more negative …
-2.671 <BIAS>
-4.522 Highlighted in text (sum)

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.483) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 18 more negative …
-2.339 Highlighted in text (sum)
-5.138 <BIAS>

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.486) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 26 more negative …
-1.994 Highlighted in text (sum)
-4.855 <BIAS>

Economists, political economists, sociologists and historians have adopted different perspectives in their analyses of capitalism and have recognized various forms of it in practice. These include laissez-faire or free-market capitalism, welfare capitalism and state capitalism. Different forms of capitalism feature varying degrees of free markets, public ownership,

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.003, score -5.932) top features y=CAP (probability 0.002, score -6.319) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -8.223) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -8.560) top features y=ENV (probability 0.035, score -3.345) top features y=EX (probability 0.781, score 1.159) top features y=FED (probability 0.000, score -7.998) top features y=HEG (probability 0.051, score -2.950) top features y=NAT (probability 0.127, score -1.959) top features y=POL (probability 0.001, score -6.934) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.101) top features
Contribution? Feature
+0.572 [6] of
+0.558 [43] degrading
+0.539 [18] of
+0.496 [23] of
+0.311 [21] and
… 18 more positive …
… 25 more negative …
-0.278 [36] intact
-0.289 [77] report
-0.322 [32] rainforest
-0.329 [48] faster
-0.332 [64] northeast
-0.339 [14] farms
-0.347 [10] have
-0.353 [51] tropical
-0.412 [25] Atlantic
-0.435 [26] forests
-0.466 [20] forests
-0.476 [73] hectares
-0.479 [40] rapidly
-0.491 [69] doubled
-2.263 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.081 [23] of
+0.075 [33] is
+0.070 [18] of
… 1 more positive …
… 5 more negative …
-0.052 [58] area
-0.053 [19] dry
-0.057 [14] farms
-0.072 [36] intact
-0.098 [62] Brazil
-0.099 [20] forests
-0.103 [26] forests
-0.113 [48] faster
-0.114 [32] rainforest
-0.127 [10] have
-0.129 [73] hectares
-0.139 [51] tropical
-0.153 [31] Amazon
-0.160 [25] Atlantic
-0.175 [77] report
-0.248 [2] Americas
-4.497 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.841 [69] doubled
+0.614 [48] faster
+0.436 [27] notes
+0.311 [77] report
… 8 more positive …
… 25 more negative …
-0.292 [23] of
-0.292 [43] degrading
-0.301 [50] cerrado
-0.313 [60] cultivation
-0.339 [18] of
-0.353 [6] of
-0.358 [51] tropical
-0.367 [25] Atlantic
-0.389 [58] area
-0.398 [20] forests
-0.411 [52] savannah
-0.420 [32] rainforest
-0.471 [66] frontier
-0.504 [26] forests
-0.535 [2] Americas
-2.228 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 32 more negative …
-0.099 [20] forests
-0.099 [14] farms
-0.102 [30] The
-0.102 [64] northeast
-0.103 [8] grass
-0.106 [76] the
-0.111 [2] Americas
-0.115 [66] frontier
-0.115 [23] of
-0.122 [32] rainforest
-0.123 [53] Between
-0.126 [38] it
-0.130 [52] savannah
-0.140 [9] prairies
-0.140 [26] forests
-0.151 [50] cerrado
-0.156 [25] Atlantic
-0.159 [31] Amazon
-0.160 [41] diminishing
-4.380 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.550 [19] dry
+0.503 [40] rapidly
+0.470 [48] faster
+0.305 [39] is
+0.296 [33] is
+0.296 [72] 5m
+0.294 [12] transformed
+0.259 [60] cultivation
… 20 more positive …
… 25 more negative …
-0.199 [23] of
-0.205 [52] savannah
-0.208 [9] prairies
-0.208 [18] of
-0.218 [35] mostly
-0.227 [31] Amazon
-0.248 [15] along
-0.281 [64] northeast
-0.404 [25] Atlantic
-0.478 [66] frontier
-0.586 [2] Americas
-2.516 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.439 [53] Between
+0.202 [24] the
+0.201 [16] with
+0.190 [15] along
+0.187 [28] the
+0.175 [18] of
+0.169 [55] to
+0.162 [40] rapidly
+0.159 [64] northeast
+0.154 [45] with
+0.152 [76] the
… 31 more positive …
… 19 more negative …
-0.150 [73] hectares
-0.153 [29] report
-0.195 [60] cultivation
-0.209 [26] forests
-0.213 [20] forests
-0.260 [14] farms
-0.260 [9] prairies
-0.348 [65] agricultural
-0.631 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 36 more negative …
-0.048 [50] cerrado
-0.049 [25] Atlantic
-0.051 [64] northeast
-0.051 [69] doubled
-0.054 [20] forests
-0.055 [43] degrading
-0.057 [49] disappearing
-0.058 [32] rainforest
-0.061 [51] tropical
-0.065 [10] have
-0.065 [52] savannah
-0.068 [48] faster
-0.069 [19] dry
-0.073 [36] intact
-0.077 [53] Between
-0.079 [40] rapidly
-0.080 [0] In
-0.088 [11] been
-0.108 [31] Amazon
-5.732 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.749 [2] Americas
+0.494 [25] Atlantic
+0.313 [52] savannah
+0.272 [29] report
+0.262 [11] been
+0.257 [77] report
+0.247 [69] doubled
+0.239 [62] Brazil
… 17 more positive …
… 25 more negative …
-0.223 [51] tropical
-0.244 [65] agricultural
-0.252 [14] farms
-0.252 [32] rainforest
-0.268 [60] cultivation
-0.273 [58] area
-0.328 [40] rapidly
-0.349 [53] Between
-0.365 [20] forests
-0.413 [26] forests
-0.416 [19] dry
-2.046 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.736 [26] forests
+0.697 [14] farms
+0.680 [20] forests
+0.593 [65] agricultural
+0.550 [9] prairies
+0.520 [58] area
+0.483 [32] rainforest
+0.345 [60] cultivation
+0.339 [31] Amazon
+0.336 [73] hectares
+0.317 [10] have
… 10 more positive …
… 40 more negative …
-0.276 [46] an
-0.282 [4] than
-0.283 [68] than
-0.287 [45] with
-0.291 [18] of
-0.301 [16] with
-0.354 [53] Between
-0.443 [72] 5m
-1.300 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 15 more negative …
-0.040 [7] high
-0.043 [61] in
-0.052 [51] tropical
-0.053 [76] the
-0.058 [36] intact
-0.058 [12] transformed
-0.060 [32] rainforest
-0.062 [45] with
-0.064 [1] the
-0.070 [15] along
-0.071 [26] forests
-0.077 [2] Americas
-0.085 [24] the
-0.085 [23] of
-0.086 [57] the
-0.088 [53] Between
-0.102 [16] with
-0.114 [6] of
-0.141 [18] of
-5.180 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 49 more negative …
-0.040 [36] intact
-0.041 [25] Atlantic
-0.042 [5] 95
-0.044 [17] 72
-0.044 [45] with
-0.045 [13] into
-0.046 [41] diminishing
-0.046 [23] of
-0.046 [73] hectares
-0.050 [51] tropical
-0.050 [47] even
-0.052 [0] In
-0.054 [40] rapidly
-0.054 [30] The
-0.055 [31] Amazon
-0.056 [72] 5m
-0.056 [11] been
-0.058 [53] Between
-0.058 [43] degrading
-6.016 <BIAS>

y=ANB (probability 0.003, score -5.932) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 18 more positive …
… 25 more negative …
-2.263 <BIAS>
-2.872 Highlighted in text (sum)

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=CAP (probability 0.002, score -6.319) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 1 more positive …
… 5 more negative …
-1.665 Highlighted in text (sum)
-4.497 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -8.223) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 8 more positive …
… 25 more negative …
-2.228 <BIAS>
-3.541 Highlighted in text (sum)

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -8.560) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 32 more negative …
-2.359 Highlighted in text (sum)
-4.380 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=ENV (probability 0.035, score -3.345) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 20 more positive …
… 25 more negative …
-0.289 Highlighted in text (sum)
-2.516 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=EX (probability 0.781, score 1.159) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.401 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 31 more positive …
… 19 more negative …
-0.631 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=FED (probability 0.000, score -7.998) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 36 more negative …
-1.256 Highlighted in text (sum)
-5.732 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=HEG (probability 0.051, score -2.950) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 17 more positive …
… 25 more negative …
-0.550 Highlighted in text (sum)
-2.046 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=NAT (probability 0.127, score -1.959) top features

Contribution? Feature
+3.079 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 10 more positive …
… 40 more negative …
-1.300 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=POL (probability 0.001, score -6.934) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 15 more negative …
-1.409 Highlighted in text (sum)
-5.180 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.101) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 49 more negative …
-0.937 Highlighted in text (sum)
-6.016 <BIAS>

In the Americas, more than 95% of high-grass prairies have been transformed into farms, along with 72% of dry forests and 88% of the Atlantic forests, notes the report. The Amazon rainforest is still mostly intact, but it is rapidly diminishing and degrading along with an even faster disappearing cerrado (tropical savannah). Between 2003 to 2013, the area under cultivation in Brazil’s northeast agricultural frontier more than doubled to 2.5m hectares, according to the report.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.014, score -4.493) top features y=CAP (probability 0.001, score -7.104) top features y=ECON (probability 0.218, score -1.541) top features y=EDU (probability 0.224, score -1.509) top features y=ENV (probability 0.278, score -1.237) top features y=EX (probability 0.189, score -1.713) top features y=FED (probability 0.000, score -8.299) top features y=HEG (probability 0.023, score -3.951) top features y=NAT (probability 0.034, score -3.559) top features y=POL (probability 0.017, score -4.285) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.833) top features
Contribution? Feature
+0.504 [49] of
+0.454 [14] of
+0.437 [2] of
+0.433 [4] is
+0.430 [23] is
+0.425 [31] of
+0.386 [45] is
+0.371 [38] of
+0.365 [58] of
… 21 more positive …
… 18 more negative …
-0.371 [25] up
-0.430 [54] Rice
-0.450 [6] accelerating
-0.541 [3] decline
-0.578 [52] said
-0.632 [1] rate
-0.658 [34] average
-0.677 [33] global
-0.685 [30] rate
-0.727 [48] quarter
-2.383 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.340 [2] of
+0.276 [38] of
+0.236 [46] using
+0.232 [23] is
+0.225 [5] moreover
+0.204 [14] of
+0.188 [4] is
+0.173 [45] is
… 8 more positive …
… 9 more negative …
-0.230 [22] population
-0.292 [33] global
-0.307 [28] twice
-0.307 [54] Rice
-0.343 [3] decline
-0.465 [34] average
-0.487 [48] quarter
-0.520 [60] Americas
-0.541 [9] Americas
-0.568 [1] rate
-0.699 [30] rate
-4.011 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+1.608 [1] rate
+1.583 [30] rate
+1.056 [3] decline
+0.998 [48] quarter
+0.702 [34] average
+0.582 [52] said
+0.557 [6] accelerating
… 20 more positive …
… 16 more negative …
-0.418 [14] of
-0.420 [58] of
-0.445 [31] of
-0.453 [49] of
-0.456 [38] of
-0.549 [26] resources
-0.592 [9] Americas
-0.627 [51] resources
-0.666 [60] Americas
-0.840 [16] world
-0.904 [19] biodiversity
-1.148 [43] planet
-1.351 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.241 [26] resources
+0.232 [21] regional
+0.169 [22] population
+0.149 [9] Americas
+0.136 [33] global
+0.132 [61] assessment
+0.131 [51] resources
+0.128 [60] Americas
+0.116 [49] of
+0.107 [27] at
+0.088 [34] average
… 14 more positive …
… 12 more negative …
-0.073 [5] moreover
-0.076 [43] planet
-0.083 [46] using
-0.086 [36] having
-0.094 [53] Jake
-0.100 [55] a
-0.103 [44] it
-0.107 [47] a
-2.471 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.774 [19] biodiversity
+0.733 [43] planet
+0.662 [51] resources
+0.661 [26] resources
+0.527 [33] global
+0.422 [46] using
+0.420 [6] accelerating
+0.308 [54] Rice
… 13 more positive …
… 22 more negative …
-0.171 [36] having
-0.190 [39] the
-0.198 [35] Despite
-0.211 [40] people
-0.216 [32] the
-0.220 [8] the
-0.224 [0] The
-0.243 [20] the
-0.246 [42] the
-0.260 [15] the
-0.285 [3] decline
-2.583 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.897 [43] planet
+0.542 [22] population
+0.444 [19] biodiversity
+0.431 [16] world
+0.279 [12] about
+0.237 [34] average
+0.231 [40] people
+0.226 [9] Americas
+0.193 [4] is
+0.170 [60] Americas
+0.169 [38] of
… 18 more positive …
… 15 more negative …
-0.186 [11] has
-0.200 [41] on
-0.207 [33] global
-0.258 [51] resources
-0.258 [26] resources
-0.338 [21] regional
-0.341 [52] said
-0.353 [61] assessment
-3.467 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.150 [21] regional
… 20 more negative …
-0.121 [27] at
-0.125 [45] is
-0.126 [1] rate
-0.127 [4] is
-0.130 [9] Americas
-0.138 [60] Americas
-0.147 [17] s
-0.158 [34] average
-0.159 [12] about
-0.160 [47] a
-0.178 [33] global
-0.191 [30] rate
-0.219 [35] Despite
-0.227 [25] up
-0.234 [6] accelerating
-0.262 [48] quarter
-0.268 [43] planet
-0.311 [3] decline
-4.134 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.430 [9] Americas
+0.424 [52] said
+0.411 [60] Americas
+0.336 [39] the
+0.327 [16] world
+0.318 [59] the
+0.306 [0] The
+0.302 [42] the
+0.299 [50] the
… 23 more positive …
… 15 more negative …
-0.399 [51] resources
-0.441 [22] population
-0.466 [26] resources
-0.528 [19] biodiversity
-0.570 [3] decline
-0.609 [6] accelerating
-0.662 [48] quarter
-1.106 [34] average
-1.182 [30] rate
-1.203 [1] rate
-1.659 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+1.412 [51] resources
+1.289 [26] resources
+0.904 [19] biodiversity
+0.810 [22] population
+0.427 [54] Rice
+0.388 [21] regional
+0.361 [18] remaining
+0.273 [40] people
… 12 more positive …
… 28 more negative …
-0.276 [25] up
-0.296 [53] Jake
-0.316 [41] on
-0.347 [6] accelerating
-0.371 [47] a
-0.401 [52] said
-0.403 [55] a
-0.405 [30] rate
-0.453 [44] it
-0.469 [28] twice
-0.514 [27] at
-2.941 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
+0.813 [60] Americas
+0.644 [9] Americas
+0.376 [35] Despite
+0.356 [7] In
+0.329 [41] on
+0.323 [40] people
+0.313 [16] world
+0.255 [11] has
+0.252 [12] about
+0.221 [28] twice
… 17 more positive …
… 13 more negative …
-0.218 [23] is
-0.228 [48] quarter
-0.255 [44] it
-0.513 [51] resources
-0.579 [6] accelerating
-0.674 [30] rate
-0.681 [26] resources
-0.723 [19] biodiversity
-0.777 [1] rate
-3.473 <BIAS>
Contribution? Feature
… 29 more negative …
-0.089 [53] Jake
-0.090 [33] global
-0.092 [4] is
-0.093 [11] has
-0.094 [22] population
-0.094 [40] people
-0.096 [28] twice
-0.098 [26] resources
-0.098 [30] rate
-0.099 [16] world
-0.102 [48] quarter
-0.103 [1] rate
-0.108 [12] about
-0.108 [27] at
-0.109 [9] Americas
-0.109 [52] said
-0.110 [60] Americas
-0.117 [34] average
-0.120 [6] accelerating
-5.017 <BIAS>

y=ANB (probability 0.014, score -4.493) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 21 more positive …
… 18 more negative …
-1.945 Highlighted in text (sum)
-2.383 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=CAP (probability 0.001, score -7.104) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 8 more positive …
… 9 more negative …
-2.885 Highlighted in text (sum)
-4.011 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=ECON (probability 0.218, score -1.541) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 20 more positive …
… 16 more negative …
-0.432 Highlighted in text (sum)
-1.351 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=EDU (probability 0.224, score -1.509) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.909 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 14 more positive …
… 12 more negative …
-2.471 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=ENV (probability 0.278, score -1.237) top features

Contribution? Feature
+2.044 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 13 more positive …
… 22 more negative …
-2.583 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversitythe regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=EX (probability 0.189, score -1.713) top features

Contribution? Feature
+1.678 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 18 more positive …
… 15 more negative …
-3.467 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=FED (probability 0.000, score -8.299) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 20 more negative …
-3.132 Highlighted in text (sum)
-4.134 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=HEG (probability 0.023, score -3.951) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 23 more positive …
… 15 more negative …
-1.659 <BIAS>
-4.013 Highlighted in text (sum)

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=NAT (probability 0.034, score -3.559) top features

Contribution? Feature
+1.616 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 12 more positive …
… 28 more negative …
-2.941 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=POL (probability 0.017, score -4.285) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 17 more positive …
… 13 more negative …
-0.767 Highlighted in text (sum)
-3.473 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.833) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 29 more negative …
-1.928 Highlighted in text (sum)
-5.017 <BIAS>

The rate of decline is moreover accelerating. In the Americas – which has about 40% of the world’s remaining biodiversity – the regional population is gobbling up resources at twice the rate of the global average. Despite having 13% of the people on the planet, it is using a quarter of the resources, said Jake Rice, a co-chair of the Americas assessment.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.818, score 4.468) top features y=CAP (probability 0.180, score -1.279) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -23.161) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.609) top features y=ENV (probability 0.001, score -6.632) top features y=EX (probability 0.000, score -11.927) top features y=FED (probability 0.000, score -7.669) top features y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -7.768) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -13.722) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -26.284) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -13.450) top features
Contribution? Feature
+2.341 the
+2.072 and
+1.654 in
+0.922 difference
+0.754 practices of
+0.735 west
+0.715 racial
+0.647 technological
+0.590 scholars
… 196 more positive …
… 204 more negative …
-0.601 the west
-0.611 intersecting dynamics
-0.633 difference and
-0.670 disarmament
-0.680 mathur 2014
-0.689 practices
-0.710 and the
-0.843 control
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-0.881 to
-1.473 weapons
Contribution? Feature
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+0.908 with regard
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+0.747 and technological
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+0.695 of the
+0.688 of these
… 197 more positive …
… 178 more negative …
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-0.729 of racial
-0.761 racial
-0.763 the rest
-0.780 of hiroshima
-0.793 techno racism
-0.805 is
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-0.848 of denial
-1.001 with
-4.856 and
Contribution? Feature
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+0.593 these
+0.525 technoracial discourses
… 50 more positive …
… 60 more negative …
-0.568 regulation
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Contribution? Feature
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+1.069 with regard
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… 138 more positive …
… 101 more negative …
-0.984 discourses
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-1.127 by
-1.173 international
-1.231 this
-1.316 denial
-1.317 racial reductionism
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-3.034 and
-4.339 of
-7.192 the
Contribution? Feature
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+0.723 these
+0.721 and the
+0.719 dynamic of
+0.709 in addressing
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… 149 more positive …
… 140 more negative …
-0.863 racial
-0.867 and prohibition
-0.887 civilizational
-0.933 of weapons
-1.312 west
-1.350 a
-1.534 weapons
-1.550 on
-1.775 practices of
-5.417 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.095 control and
+0.649 and disarmament
+0.628 in the
+0.606 this paper
+0.586 to weapons
+0.536 techno racism
… 164 more positive …
… 163 more negative …
-0.542 disarmament a
-0.544 for
-0.546 of difference
-0.561 as
-0.582 the rest
-0.710 a growing
-0.723 addressing the
-0.746 discourses
-0.806 scholars
-0.841 paper
-0.919 racism
-2.292 and
-3.450 the
-5.454 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.299 the concept
+1.184 of weapons
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+0.866 technoracial discourses
+0.863 and disarmament
… 171 more positive …
… 154 more negative …
-0.629 rest
-0.643 an
-0.647 is
-0.680 postcolonial
-0.701 denial
-0.815 reductionism
-0.894 of the
-0.969 a
-0.970 of difference
-0.990 to the
-1.020 control
-1.113 racial
-1.120 this
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Contribution? Feature
+1.947 control and
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+0.879 nuclear
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+0.871 difference and
+0.839 2014
+0.765 hiroshima
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+0.750 as a
… 158 more positive …
… 178 more negative …
-0.849 practices
-0.869 dynamic
-1.022 discourses
-1.040 postcolonial
-1.358 racial
-2.680 the
-6.917 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.335 of difference
+1.010 with regard
+0.889 racial
+0.860 this paper
+0.813 understanding of
… 159 more positive …
… 119 more negative …
-0.907 weapons
-0.982 is
-1.071 a
-1.168 paper
-1.176 technoracial
-1.315 determinism
-1.411 racism
-1.428 the concept
-1.432 arms
-1.456 practices of
-1.491 for
-1.562 discourses
-2.758 in
-2.886 and
-5.146 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.993 the concept
+1.977 practices of
+1.738 of difference
+1.604 to the
+1.409 this paper
+1.314 of weapons
+1.226 difference and
+1.185 of the
+1.164 and the
… 59 more positive …
… 47 more negative …
-1.248 control
-1.286 south
-1.522 discourses
-1.807 in
-2.000 for
-2.060 racial
-2.502 is
-3.031 to
-7.466 and
-7.781 the
-9.862 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.378 and disarmament
+1.227 and the
+1.106 of denial
+1.091 in the
+0.964 concept of
+0.850 of techno
+0.823 adas 1989
… 111 more positive …
… 81 more negative …
-0.801 discourses
-0.811 control and
-0.829 regard
-0.892 is
-0.918 denial
-0.961 nuclear
-0.973 control
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-5.348 of
-6.518 the

y=ANB (probability 0.818, score 4.468) top features

Contribution? Feature
+1.793 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 196 more positive …
… 204 more negative …

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘thewest and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of differencein the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=CAP (probability 0.180, score -1.279) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 197 more positive …
… 178 more negative …
-6.553 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference betweenthewest and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denialand a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racismthis paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denialof the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -23.161) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 50 more positive …
… 60 more negative …
-21.813 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denialand a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept oftechno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept oftechno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denialof the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.609) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 138 more positive …
… 101 more negative …
-14.942 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference betweenthewest and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denialand a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring thedynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denialof the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=ENV (probability 0.001, score -6.632) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 149 more positive …
… 140 more negative …
-7.199 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference betweenthewest and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring thedynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -11.927) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 164 more positive …
… 163 more negative …
-14.615 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the restas a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of differencein the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept oftechno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept oftechno racismthis paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=FED (probability 0.000, score -7.669) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 171 more positive …
… 154 more negative …
-7.530 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denialof the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -7.768) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 158 more positive …
… 178 more negative …
-1.339 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring thedynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -13.722) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 159 more positive …
… 119 more negative …
-21.282 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of differencein the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racismthis paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -26.284) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 59 more positive …
… 47 more negative …
-26.957 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of differencein the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -13.450) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 111 more positive …
… 81 more negative …
-16.635 Highlighted in text (sum)

how has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? what are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? it is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (abraham, 1998; biswas, 2014; beier, 2002; hecht, 2012; mathur, 2014). this intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the global south in addressing the problems of weapons control. this sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of hiroshima and nagasaki (taylor & jacobs, 2015). on the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “west and the rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). it is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denialand a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of international relations and weapons control. it tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of hiroshima. this paper introduces the concept oftechno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. in developing the concept oftechno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as michael adas (1989), gabrielle hecht (2012), roh, huang, and niu (2015). the concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. the deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. the differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. the power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. a growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. it is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring thedynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in international relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the orient and the occident (adas, 1989). this is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denialof the global south’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the west to meet its obligations under the existing nuclear nonproliferation treaty (npt). these intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the west and the rest. this helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of global south in weapons regulation and prohibition.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.565, score 3.567) top features y=CAP (probability 0.014, score -3.710) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -7.854) top features y=EDU (probability 0.024, score -3.158) top features y=ENV (probability 0.129, score -1.257) top features y=EX (probability 0.238, score -0.364) top features y=FED (probability 0.006, score -4.642) top features y=HEG (probability 0.021, score -3.290) top features y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -5.156) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -11.216) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.451) top features
Contribution? Feature
+3.174 the
+0.813 racism
+0.680 that
+0.607 sense
+0.556 is not
+0.556 practices
+0.459 colonies
+0.434 the colonial
+0.421 and
+0.400 colonizer to
… 183 more positive …
… 189 more negative …
-0.389 ideology of
-0.391 deliberately discouraged
-0.394 colonies thus
-0.400 possession
-0.426 this
-0.431 on
-0.477 of technological
-0.497 weapons
-0.704 not
-0.823 arms
Contribution? Feature
+0.755 of technological
+0.606 and power
+0.554 this
+0.542 of colonial
+0.456 very
+0.392 is
+0.381 practices
+0.380 threat
… 168 more positive …
… 169 more negative …
-0.372 even
-0.387 of threat
-0.405 according
-0.414 power
-0.415 the colonies
-0.420 colonies
-0.435 weapons
-0.647 it
-0.649 that
-0.654 in
-0.830 powers
-0.980 to
Contribution? Feature
+1.986 sense of
+1.355 colonial racism
+1.294 to the
+0.653 innovation
+0.542 source of
… 121 more positive …
… 99 more negative …
-0.552 according
-0.572 this
-0.621 colonized
-0.636 of the
-0.642 not
-0.683 among
-0.804 powers
-0.897 colonies
-0.964 in
-1.105 and
-1.222 arms
-1.562 a
-1.743 colonial
-2.587 the
-4.319 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.188 these
+1.004 practices of
+0.754 among the
+0.710 innovation
+0.648 source
+0.574 technological innovation
+0.545 deliberately
+0.507 trade in
+0.501 it is
… 119 more positive …
… 115 more negative …
-0.501 argument
-0.513 further
-0.603 arms
-0.621 it
-0.636 in
-0.640 sense of
-0.792 is
-1.121 was
-1.152 colonial
-1.667 that
-3.034 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.781 among the
+0.682 is
+0.608 deliberately
+0.606 a sense
+0.545 for
+0.485 arms to
… 164 more positive …
… 135 more negative …
-0.461 as
-0.470 well
-0.520 powers
-0.563 racism
-0.584 arms
-0.611 a
-0.619 trade
-0.690 from
-0.764 for the
-0.871 not
-0.901 sense
-0.932 colonies
-1.041 colonial
-1.997 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.626 colonies
+0.501 as
+0.429 correspond with
+0.387 trade is
+0.380 the size
+0.376 it was
+0.357 free trade
+0.356 of threat
+0.343 first to
+0.336 the source
+0.333 technical current
… 169 more positive …
… 172 more negative …
-0.316 <BIAS>
-0.347 the colonizer
-0.371 technical
-0.395 colonized
-0.401 all
-0.429 deliberately
-0.476 source of
-0.587 for the
-0.966 sense of
Contribution? Feature
+1.083 sense of
+0.614 is
+0.489 practices of
+0.364 it was
+0.347 and the
+0.344 of fear
… 145 more positive …
… 158 more negative …
-0.342 deliberately cultivated
-0.348 result
-0.375 wars
-0.458 as
-0.481 the colonized
-0.518 wealth
-0.534 among
-0.589 not
-0.594 that
-0.619 was
-0.666 it
-0.814 sense
-0.882 in
-1.777 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.689 sense of
+0.513 western powers
+0.491 arms
+0.444 not
+0.422 according to
+0.344 of implements
+0.334 even diminish
+0.311 into irrefutable
… 172 more positive …
… 167 more negative …
-0.307 the source
-0.322 are
-0.323 wealth
-0.327 it
-0.403 standards of
-0.418 is part
-0.430 transfer of
-0.463 colonies
-0.472 colonial
-0.648 racism
-0.857 for
-1.564 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.812 colonial racism
+0.698 wealth
+0.671 practices of
+0.637 colonies
+0.556 among the
+0.490 of wealth
+0.454 transfer of
… 162 more positive …
… 136 more negative …
-0.484 racism
-0.486 and
-0.494 ideology
-0.508 all
-0.514 western
-0.541 was
-0.596 in
-0.641 is
-0.689 arms
-0.987 of
-1.665 sense of
-1.699 a
-4.403 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.132 as the
+0.971 to the
+0.959 western powers
+0.853 among the
+0.705 is not
+0.653 these
… 101 more positive …
… 105 more negative …
-0.766 is
-0.776 racism
-0.808 colonies
-0.829 further
-0.837 that
-0.934 a
-1.081 colonial
-1.158 and
-1.203 sense
-1.391 of
-1.496 it
-2.046 in
-2.347 to
-3.227 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.263 to the
+1.108 colonial racism
+0.797 among the
+0.703 a sense
… 147 more positive …
… 112 more negative …
-0.530 raw
-0.557 this
-0.589 western
-0.670 in
-0.698 trade
-0.773 in the
-0.775 western powers
-0.883 among
-0.886 colonial
-0.969 for the
-1.174 is
-1.368 it
-1.370 that
-1.528 to
-1.827 a
-3.611 of

y=ANB (probability 0.565, score 3.567) top features

Contribution? Feature
+3.168 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 183 more positive …
… 189 more negative …

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=CAP (probability 0.014, score -3.710) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 168 more positive …
… 169 more negative …
-2.545 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -7.854) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 121 more positive …
… 99 more negative …
-13.078 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=EDU (probability 0.024, score -3.158) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 119 more positive …
… 115 more negative …
-4.848 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free tradein arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=ENV (probability 0.129, score -1.257) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 164 more positive …
… 135 more negative …
-7.315 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect thewell springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated asthe colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=EX (probability 0.238, score -0.364) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.452 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 169 more positive …
… 172 more negative …
-0.316 <BIAS>

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense oftechnical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated asthe colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=FED (probability 0.006, score -4.642) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 145 more positive …
… 158 more negative …
-5.758 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=HEG (probability 0.021, score -3.290) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 172 more positive …
… 167 more negative …
-2.985 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -5.156) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 162 more positive …
… 136 more negative …
-9.390 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed to ‘colonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -11.216) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 101 more positive …
… 105 more negative …
-13.627 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free trade’ in arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed tocolonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated asthe colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -8.451) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 147 more positive …
… 112 more negative …
-14.338 Highlighted in text (sum)

first phase: colonial racism in practices of arms control and disarmament it is argued that from the late 18th century, the ideology of laissez faire in arms gov- erned western powers. according to this ideology,  ... trade is seen as the source of wealth and power and the engine of growth for sustained and enhanced productive capacity; this would logically result in fewer direct restrictions on arms transfers. a shift to indirect political interven- tion in the market also follows from this, and objections to the trade in technol- ogy may even diminish, as long as the wellsprings of technological innovation are not directly threatened.58 one might very well question how this sense of threat emerged among the western powers. the possession of colonies among the western powers represented a source of wealth and power. this very possession generated a sense of vulnerability. the colonies provided the raw materials necessary for the production of weapons and sol- diers to fight imperial wars. thus, there was a sense of fear that transfer of arms to the colonies might result in their use against the colonial masters. a serious sense of threat governed all imperial decisions, including transfer of arms, with regard to maintaining control over the colonies. thus, the argument on ‘free tradein arms did not extend to the colonies lacking freedom.  to further protect the ‘well springs of technological innovation’ education, fun- damental research in sciences or development of indigenous scientific capabilities were deliberately discouraged in the colonies.59 this, according to albert memmi, can be attributed tocolonial racism’.60 the practices of colonial racism deliberately emphasize and exploit the differences between the colonized and the colonizers. they further seek to sustain these differences, transforming them into irrefutable standards of fact that correspond with concrete realities to the benefit of the colonial powers. it was these explicit practices of colonial racism that made it impossible for the colo- nized to cultivate any taste for ‘mechanized civilization and a feeling for machin- ery’.61 a sense of ‘technical inadequacy’ was deliberately cultivated as ‘the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current’.62 it was under these circumstances of a deliberately created sense of tech- nical inadequacy that: [w]hile it is pardonable for the colonizer to have his little arsenals, the discov- ery of even a rusty weapon among the colonized is cause for immediate punish- ment ... and nostalgia for arms is always present, and is part of all ceremonies in africa, from north to south. the lack of implements of war appears pro- portional to the size of the colonialist forces; the most isolated tribes are still the first to pick up these weapons. this is not a proof of savagery, but only evi- dence that the conditioning is not sufficiently maintained.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.991, score -0.156) top features y=CAP (probability 0.004, score -6.295) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.439) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -13.028) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -12.051) top features y=EX (probability 0.001, score -8.121) top features y=FED (probability 0.001, score -8.063) top features y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -6.550) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -8.775) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.531) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -12.347) top features
Contribution? Feature
+1.190 orientalism
+0.934 of power
+0.572 of
+0.470 127
+0.462 orientalism as
+0.416 his
+0.414 government england
+0.401 amount of
+0.396 it settling
+0.392 tableau was
+0.388 this
+0.349 and having
… 202 more positive …
… 223 more negative …
-0.362 sacy
-0.366 of a
-0.375 england knows
-0.385 epistemological both
-0.403 pages on
-0.428 having
-0.429 could only
-0.482 egyptians egypt
Contribution? Feature
+0.522 and power
+0.503 1978
+0.459 manufactured meta
+0.454 england knows
+0.418 epistemological both
… 228 more positive …
… 215 more negative …
-0.400 127
-0.405 demonstrates
-0.411 this
-0.435 knows
-0.454 tableau was
-0.471 for dealing
-0.531 in the
-0.538 orientalism
-0.578 is
-0.591 his
-0.970 a
-1.201 of power
-1.791 the
-1.871 and
-2.368 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.137 as a
+1.053 was
+1.044 power could
+0.960 and power
+0.435 sacy s
… 60 more positive …
… 54 more negative …
-0.406 occupation
-0.435 only
-0.441 european
-0.629 s
-0.746 the
-0.867 england
-0.912 his
-1.052 as
-1.456 egypt
-1.526 and
-1.563 its
-1.642 power
-1.656 orientalism
-1.814 in
-4.908 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.602 of power
+1.289 and power
+0.786 power and
… 128 more positive …
… 65 more negative …
-0.734 for
-0.745 this
-0.755 with
-0.801 a
-0.818 on
-0.848 england
-0.852 knowledge
-1.009 by
-1.095 orientalism
-1.143 egypt
-1.378 his
-1.583 s
-2.081 power
-2.123 said
-2.225 and
-2.277 of
-3.782 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.322 and power
+1.157 knowledge
+0.678 condition of
… 159 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-0.665 an
-0.690 orient
-0.700 power
-0.747 form
-0.765 by
-0.796 learned
-0.800 his
-0.822 egypt
-0.864 structure
-0.871 is
-0.929 for
-0.930 said
-0.952 discipline
-1.521 a
-1.909 and
-2.148 orientalism
-3.575 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.849 analysis of
+0.756 egypt is
+0.631 as a
+0.570 england knows
+0.518 examining
+0.517 of power
… 203 more positive …
… 173 more negative …
-0.536 discipline
-0.563 form
-0.666 through
-0.674 its
-0.835 of orientalism
-0.913 england
-0.944 and
-1.051 power
-1.074 s
-1.261 is
-1.299 for
-1.500 orientalism
-1.910 the
-1.954 a
Contribution? Feature
+0.798 egypt is
+0.503 sacy s
+0.500 power could
+0.474 nietzschean truths
+0.467 england knows
… 179 more positive …
… 151 more negative …
-0.462 only
-0.494 it
-0.552 the orient
-0.590 epistemological
-0.628 dealing
-0.792 s
-0.804 said
-0.878 sacy
-0.884 knows
-1.217 its
-1.546 by
-1.792 orientalism
-1.842 for
-1.878 a
-1.909 and
Contribution? Feature
+0.861 egypt
+0.628 as
+0.549 sacy
+0.506 that it
+0.487 could only
+0.457 out the
+0.457 the dacier
+0.441 as a
… 173 more positive …
… 191 more negative …
-0.440 structure
-0.443 for
-0.496 with
-0.523 foucault
-0.534 of
-0.585 through
-0.679 what
-0.721 the orient
-0.725 in
-0.873 orientalism
-1.133 is
-3.233 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.102 of orientalism
+1.049 as a
+0.770 knowledge and
+0.718 it by
+0.628 of orientalist
+0.604 could only
… 130 more positive …
… 105 more negative …
-0.643 orient
-0.727 this
-0.744 egypt
-0.793 through
-0.805 knows
-0.881 it
-0.942 in
-1.019 power
-1.239 is
-1.367 s
-1.435 the
-1.736 orientalism
-1.754 a
-3.565 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.148 of power
+1.076 in the
+0.790 and power
+0.787 knowledge and
+0.710 as a
… 87 more positive …
… 71 more negative …
-0.713 demonstrates
-0.798 its
-0.868 a
-0.930 is
-1.146 his
-1.308 epistemological
-1.327 as
-1.611 orientalism
-1.695 by
-1.738 egypt
-1.826 s
-1.901 in
-1.919 power
-2.530 and
-2.629 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.902 egypt is
+0.804 and power
+0.751 as a
+0.748 knowledge and
+0.634 analysis of
+0.634 orientalism as
… 161 more positive …
… 111 more negative …
-0.633 through
-0.657 structure
-0.662 s
-0.673 foucault
-0.753 european
-1.060 ontological
-1.127 a
-1.379 knowledge
-1.386 and
-1.414 orientalism
-1.975 that
-2.146 in
-2.276 is
-6.990 of

y=ANB (probability 0.991, score -0.156) top features

Contribution? Feature
+3.156 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 202 more positive …
… 223 more negative …

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=CAP (probability 0.004, score -6.295) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 228 more positive …
… 215 more negative …
-10.657 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.439) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 60 more positive …
… 54 more negative …
-15.423 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacys role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalisms inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacys pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -13.028) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 128 more positive …
… 65 more negative …
-20.574 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalisms inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then saids third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -12.051) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 159 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-16.526 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=EX (probability 0.001, score -8.121) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 203 more positive …
… 173 more negative …
-11.338 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalisms inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=FED (probability 0.001, score -8.063) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 179 more positive …
… 151 more negative …
-13.526 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacys role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalisms inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacys pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then saids third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orientdealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -6.550) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 173 more positive …
… 191 more negative …
-5.999 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalism’s inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -8.775) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 130 more positive …
… 105 more negative …
-12.779 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalisms inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.531) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 87 more positive …
… 71 more negative …
-18.429 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucault’s postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalisms inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucault’s ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -12.347) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 161 more positive …
… 111 more negative …
-18.660 Highlighted in text (sum)

but orientalism, as a symbolic revolt, was not just about the critique, deconstruction and exposure of ideological and epistemological eurocentric frameworks that monopolised the realm of discursive production. appropriating michel foucaults postulation that power is everywhere and that it is diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and “regimes of truth”, said presents the second mode of critique; namely, orientalism as the ontological nature, structure and a priori condition of power. in this sense, knowledge or the historical materialisation of specific nietzschean truths were a form of power and power could only be deciphered through critiquing its manufactured meta-narrative and mapping out the transmutation and movement of its anthropomorphisms, metaphors and metonymies. said demonstrates this through examining sylvester de sacy’s role in the dacier report (1802). conducted for examining the state of orientalist learning, the report was commissioned by napoleon bonaparte. said writes: the importance of the tableau historique for an understanding of orientalisms inaugural phase is that it exteriorizes the form of orientalist knowledge and its features, as it also describes the orientalist’s relationship to his subject matter. in sacy’s pages on orientalism … he speaks of his own work as having uncovered, brought to light, rescued a vast amount of obscure matter. why? in order to place it before the student. for like all his learned contemporaries sacy considered a learned work a positive addition to an edifice that all scholars erected together. knowledge was essentially the making visible of material, and the aim of a tableau was the construction of a sort of benthamite panopticon. scholarly discipline was therefore a specific technology of power …(1978, 127).3 elsewhere in his analysis of arthur james balfour’s speech in the house of commons on the 13 june 1910, said declares: england knows egypt; egypt is what england knows; england knows that egypt cannot have self-government; england confirms that by occupying egypt; for the egyptians, egypt is what england has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of contemporary egyptian civilization; egypt requires, indeed, insists upon british occupation (1978, 34). in other words, said postulated that orientalism exuded epistemic violence through its inherent relation with european colonial power. and, in turn, european colonial power could only dominate the region through orientalism functioning as a technique and instrument of power. here then said’s third definition of orientalism, drawing from the two previous epistemological definitions, demonstrates the intrinsically dialectical relation between knowledge and power. said posits orientalism is also: (3) the corporate institution for dealing with the orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient collectively said conceptualises orientalism as epistemological (both as a corpus of scholarly writings and a historical system of thought) and ontological (as in the nature of being, the structure and condition of power). read critically, for said the synthesis of western power and knowledge had a singular ontological and teleological purpose; namely, the thingification or subjectivation of the colonized oriental subject. this point is best demonstrated by william d. hart’s analysis of orientalism: in his description of discourse, said appropriates foucaults ideas of discipline and power/knowledge. by discipline, foucault [and by default said] means those methods of modern punitive power that establishes meticulous control over the body, assuring its constant subjection by imposing a relation of “docility-utility”. discipline, that is, makes human bodies docile and useful [thingifies], and advertises their availability for political, economic,

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.742, score 4.661) top features y=CAP (probability 0.001, score -6.560) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -12.093) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -14.946) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -9.765) top features y=EX (probability 0.141, score -1.465) top features y=FED (probability 0.001, score -7.251) top features y=HEG (probability 0.115, score -1.703) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -14.869) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -15.957) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -14.035) top features
Contribution? Feature
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… 209 more positive …
… 215 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 225 more positive …
… 232 more negative …
-0.378 places this
-0.386 must
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-0.410 s
-0.476 idea
-0.595 the same
-0.698 is
-0.724 a
-0.725 not
-0.868 china
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Contribution? Feature
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… 176 more positive …
… 123 more negative …
-0.600 texts
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Contribution? Feature
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… 196 more positive …
… 175 more negative …
-0.605 orientalist
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Contribution? Feature
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… 185 more positive …
… 158 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 198 more positive …
… 208 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 210 more positive …
… 203 more negative …
-0.549 a
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Contribution? Feature
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… 202 more positive …
… 199 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 173 more positive …
… 149 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 169 more positive …
… 112 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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y=ANB (probability 0.742, score 4.661) top features

Contribution? Feature
+5.062 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 209 more positive …
… 215 more negative …

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=CAP (probability 0.001, score -6.560) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 225 more positive …
… 232 more negative …
-6.336 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -12.093) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 176 more positive …
… 123 more negative …
-21.644 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -14.946) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 196 more positive …
… 175 more negative …
-15.419 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing aschina studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucaults idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucaults inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -9.765) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 185 more positive …
… 158 more negative …
-14.103 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=EX (probability 0.141, score -1.465) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 198 more positive …
… 208 more negative …
-3.126 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing aschina studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watchingcultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=FED (probability 0.001, score -7.251) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 210 more positive …
… 203 more negative …
-12.548 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=HEG (probability 0.115, score -1.703) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 202 more positive …
… 199 more negative …
-1.461 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing aschina studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarlyhas greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -14.869) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 173 more positive …
… 149 more negative …
-14.244 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -15.957) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 169 more positive …
… 112 more negative …
-23.087 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -14.035) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 166 more positive …
… 129 more negative …
-20.496 Highlighted in text (sum)

as will quickly become evident, by “sinology” and the “sinological” i refer to more than the original china-centered field within the older orientalism (going back at least to the early 1700s), and more than the specialized area studies instituted across the u.s.-west after the revolution of 1949. note, however, that there is no such thing as “china studies” within china. this is part of my point in seeing the production of knowledge about china, even today, as being awfully similar to the older, more obviously orientalist mode. while specialized work, particularly within the social sciences and politics, occupies much of my attention, i also use texts from film studies, literature, journalism, and current “theory.” in doing so i mean to follow adorno: his oft-stated desire to write books that are constellations that make unlike things alike. but i also rely on foucault’s idea that the things that make up a discourse are dispersed across the social field, yet combine to form a common unit that has regularized “statements” and effects of power. this combination is foucault’s inescapable gesture to the totality or interdisciplinarity. the china field is in this sense an expanded and expansive one. in the texts i examine in this book there emerges a common statement: china is becoming-the-same as the liberal and modern west (howsoever haltingly), or it must and should and will do so; this is the chief statement of the new orientalism. this can, in turn, be seen as emerging from other, related discursive themes: that china is becoming democratic, normal, civil, creative– artistic (avant-garde), liberal, and so on; that it still lacks something (often the same items); that its maoist, revolutionary past is something either in the dustbin of history or must still be overcome. but “statement” here should be understood in the foucaultian sense: it is at times more or less explicit (as in a speech act), but more often implied or signified indirectly and even non-linguistically. we must emphasize the rhetorical, discursive function of the statement – less the exact words, more its status as authorized “knowledge.”13 these are things that can be signified as easily by the newscaster as by the specialist, and likewise for the more popular “china watching” cultural producer and citizen. this last aspect speaks to more than just the fact that area specialists and journalists often overlap and write cross-over – or identical – texts. (the journalistic quality of much china studies can indeed be striking to observers of the discipline.) it speaks to the fact that, as one chinese marxist might have put it, correct and incorrect ideas come from multiple places; this is what makes them the ruling discourses and difficult to change. the idea and knowledges of china we have do not stem only from specialists and the rarefied realms of truth. this is why the critique of sinological discourse has to engage demography as much as film studies, creative texts as much as “scientific” ones. much of what i am saying here about how the china field cannot be delimited in the traditional, gate-keeping way has been better said by aziz al-azmeh, whose critiques of orientalism should be much more widely known. pointing to shared conceptions of islam in specialized and popular texts alike, he states: we are not talking of two separate types and domains of knowledge about islam, one for the scholarly elect and another for the rude masses, but of the coexistence within orientalism of two substantially concordant registers, one of which – the scholarly – has greater access to observation .. . and which looks all the more abject for this... . regardless of access to real or specious facts, facts are always constructed and their construction is invariably culture-specific. orientalist scholarship is a cultural mood born of mythological classificatory lore, a visceral, savage division of the world, much like such partisanship as animates support for football clubs. (islams 127–8) certainly i do not quite mean

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.740, score 2.086) top features y=CAP (probability 0.139, score -1.606) top features y=ECON (probability 0.003, score -5.778) top features y=EDU (probability 0.002, score -6.122) top features y=ENV (probability 0.003, score -5.763) top features y=EX (probability 0.045, score -2.870) top features y=FED (probability 0.064, score -2.487) top features y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -5.804) top features y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -5.699) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -14.623) top features y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -7.164) top features
Contribution? Feature
+0.799 orientalism
+0.522 tradition of
+0.499 of the
+0.386 think
+0.386 us to
+0.376 postcolonialism
+0.376 were
+0.372 to begin
+0.358 geography
+0.347 that what
+0.331 whole
+0.327 cultural
+0.321 is no
+0.318 territorial colonies
+0.315 nothing of
… 111 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-0.308 begin
-0.424 mapmakers it
-0.477 from
-0.483 blunt and
-0.558 there is
Contribution? Feature
+0.663 and
+0.581 what they
+0.388 and places
+0.365 of 18thand
+0.347 studies postcolonialism
+0.333 take seriously
+0.333 geographical sectors
+0.322 are man
… 139 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-0.319 undeveloped barbaric
-0.323 was
-0.326 to begin
-0.344 orientalism
-0.402 power
-0.417 were
-0.421 west
-0.423 take
-0.450 <BIAS>
-0.502 it
-0.695 tradition of
-0.772 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.745 of the
+0.981 there is
+0.898 what they
+0.743 the non
+0.539 is to
+0.424 must take
… 77 more positive …
… 64 more negative …
-0.454 dispossession
-0.455 its
-0.482 what
-0.532 west
-0.585 orient
-0.601 cultural
-0.610 as
-0.665 in
-0.818 said
-1.038 or
-1.150 and
-1.333 is
-1.425 geographical
-2.471 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.806 there is
+0.606 the non
+0.525 geographical and
+0.505 of the
+0.469 thesis is
+0.465 we take
… 72 more positive …
… 73 more negative …
-0.413 europe
-0.474 postcolonialism
-0.478 made
-0.482 orientalism
-0.491 its
-0.510 think
-0.528 is
-0.536 west
-0.605 power
-0.704 in
-0.729 dispossession
-0.951 as
-1.904 geographical
-1.978 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.786 there is
+0.638 what they
+0.577 and the
+0.536 to begin
+0.488 that
+0.476 is to
+0.469 to think
+0.452 to use
… 103 more positive …
… 89 more negative …
-0.411 postcolonialism
-0.533 non
-0.566 and
-0.623 think
-0.689 in
-0.701 as
-0.713 europe
-0.850 there
-0.927 geographical
-1.189 orientalism
-1.742 is
-2.370 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.516 there
+0.457 geographical and
+0.424 forms of
+0.406 is what
+0.402 is to
+0.318 orient were
… 122 more positive …
… 116 more negative …
-0.313 eastern artistic
-0.315 origins
-0.324 ways
-0.332 we
-0.332 geographical
-0.332 passive
-0.340 <BIAS>
-0.407 the connections
-0.427 what
-0.481 and
-0.483 it
-0.596 as
-0.728 orientalism
-1.630 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.789 of the
+0.708 what they
+0.422 non west
+0.403 represent the
+0.387 tradition of
+0.387 18thand 19th
… 110 more positive …
… 93 more negative …
-0.419 in fact
-0.424 west
-0.433 cultural
-0.446 to think
-0.451 its
-0.510 of
-0.534 were
-0.554 for
-0.572 tradition
-0.583 orientalism
-0.678 take
-0.727 in
-1.026 is
-1.146 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.526 there are
+0.474 were in
+0.396 locales
+0.358 wrote we
… 123 more positive …
… 113 more negative …
-0.362 geography
-0.384 that
-0.398 there
-0.406 take
-0.412 to begin
-0.422 we
-0.431 for
-0.561 of
-0.593 cultural
-0.635 tradition
-0.635 as
-0.804 to
-0.985 orientalism
-1.114 geographical
-1.294 the
-1.600 and
Contribution? Feature
+0.615 of the
+0.574 is to
+0.460 and mcewan
+0.452 ways we
+0.428 hybridity and
+0.418 artistic or
… 128 more positive …
… 108 more negative …
-0.420 of historical
-0.474 for
-0.485 orient
-0.488 that
-0.547 to
-0.549 orientalism
-0.552 in
-0.624 were
-0.644 what
-0.657 it
-0.665 of
-0.948 as
-1.947 and
-2.292 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.332 geographical and
+0.674 of the
+0.615 that
+0.541 and the
… 56 more positive …
… 63 more negative …
-0.456 tradition
-0.457 it
-0.483 power
-0.536 in
-0.549 orient
-0.607 for
-0.653 its
-0.674 what
-0.736 said
-0.780 entities
-0.929 as
-1.173 geographical
-1.501 of
-1.674 and
-2.479 the
-2.652 is
Contribution? Feature
+1.073 begin to
+1.041 what they
+0.676 to begin
+0.527 geographical and
+0.449 non west
… 92 more positive …
… 79 more negative …
-0.449 were
-0.489 think
-0.517 tradition
-0.541 they
-0.544 orient
-0.605 made
-0.662 orientalism
-0.754 said
-0.863 in
-0.958 the
-0.969 geographical
-1.054 is
-1.210 of
-1.294 as
-1.363 and

y=ANB (probability 0.740, score 2.086) top features

Contribution? Feature
+3.783 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 111 more positive …
… 127 more negative …

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=CAP (probability 0.139, score -1.606) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 139 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-0.450 <BIAS>
-1.612 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=ECON (probability 0.003, score -5.778) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 77 more positive …
… 64 more negative …
-7.289 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors asorientand “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=EDU (probability 0.002, score -6.122) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 72 more positive …
… 73 more negative …
-7.406 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=ENV (probability 0.003, score -5.763) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 103 more positive …
… 89 more negative …
-6.893 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=EX (probability 0.045, score -2.870) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 122 more positive …
… 116 more negative …
-0.340 <BIAS>
-4.177 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=FED (probability 0.064, score -2.487) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 110 more positive …
… 93 more negative …
-5.406 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -5.804) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 123 more positive …
… 113 more negative …
-9.281 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “orient” and “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -5.699) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 128 more positive …
… 108 more negative …
-8.346 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors asorientand “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -14.623) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 56 more positive …
… 63 more negative …
-13.176 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors asorientand “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -7.164) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 92 more positive …
… 79 more negative …
-8.504 Highlighted in text (sum)

there are two things to note from the above discussion. first, that the forms of colonial dispossession, conquest and discovery through which europe variously annexed its territorial colonies, were in fact enabled by orientalising ways of seeing the non-west. in other words, cultural representations of the non-west, the orient, were never far from power. it was precisely the ability of the west to authoritatively represent the peoples and places of the east as at one and the same time passive, exotic, undeveloped, barbaric and alluring, that laid the foundation for contact, dispossession and colonial rule by imperial powers. just as there is a vast tradition of 18thand 19th-century european orientalist painters (figure 1), novelists and mapmakers, it is significant that there is no similar south asian, african or middle eastern artistic or literary tradition of representing europe. with orientalism, power flows one way. second, said’s whole thesis is profoundly geographical, and for geography educators the opening pages of orientalism should be of especial interest. as said wrote: we must take seriously [the] … great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors asorientand “occident” are man-made. (said, 1978, pp. 4–5) to use orientalism to begin to think postcolonially, therefore, is to begin to think geographically (blunt and mcewan, 2002). despite its birth in literary studies, postcolonialism is an inherently geographical mode of thought. it encourages us to consider the ways we think about distant and different elsewheres, the connections familiar from globalisation, immigration or cultural hybridity, and the western and imperial origins of the spaces and places we take for granted. thinking postcolonially is to critically probe our own geographical imaginations (gregory, 1994).

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.565, score 0.519) top features y=CAP (probability 0.118, score -1.898) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -9.892) top features y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.151) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.530) top features y=EX (probability 0.002, score -6.113) top features y=FED (probability 0.001, score -6.713) top features y=HEG (probability 0.312, score -0.636) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -10.008) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -9.530) top features y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -7.044) top features
Contribution? Feature
+2.433 of
+1.231 and
+0.688 studies at
+0.681 s military
+0.668 these
+0.543 and the
+0.521 production about
+0.508 seyyed vali
+0.478 are
+0.458 paradigmatic
+0.444 blair president
+0.427 what
… 226 more positive …
… 250 more negative …
-0.427 and knowing
-0.429 reza nasr
-0.448 an epistemic
-0.473 the middle
-0.503 that is
-0.504 military
-0.583 east
-0.649 national
Contribution? Feature
+0.602 azar nafisi
+0.571 as
+0.542 production that
+0.498 knowledge production
+0.489 mode of
+0.410 integral to
+0.392 of knowledge
+0.390 of public
… 210 more positive …
… 207 more negative …
-0.370 in the
-0.395 on
-0.402 we have
-0.420 iraq
-0.436 islam
-0.454 through
-0.503 production
-0.547 east
-0.570 of national
-0.647 that
-0.730 in
-2.538 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.252 a
+0.900 s
+0.886 grain of
+0.827 at the
+0.726 nasr
… 191 more positive …
… 124 more negative …
-0.728 by
-0.753 like
-0.753 ibn
-0.860 as
-0.899 u
-0.923 u s
-0.955 that
-0.965 public
-0.968 east and
-0.990 in
-1.281 are
-1.382 knowledge
-2.579 and
-3.707 the
-5.487 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.790 u s
+1.123 and
+0.913 azar nafisi
+0.813 of knowledge
+0.805 national security
+0.755 to the
+0.665 at the
… 219 more positive …
… 212 more negative …
-0.596 endosmosis
-0.609 azar
-0.664 and the
-0.714 this
-0.790 is not
-0.794 at
-0.808 production about
-0.851 s
-0.923 to
-1.537 of
-1.623 the middle
-1.701 in
-3.155 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.502 these
+0.911 ray takeyh
+0.882 studies at
+0.768 azar nafisi
+0.740 through a
+0.710 while
+0.691 epistemic endosmosis
… 201 more positive …
… 172 more negative …
-0.762 that i
-0.801 iraq
-0.845 by
-0.902 knowledge
-0.911 ray
-0.980 public
-1.134 to
-1.220 a
-1.238 of
-1.383 in
-1.431 about
-2.636 the u
-4.982 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.299 u s
+1.038 reza nasr
+1.029 knowledge production
+0.918 middle
+0.794 takeyh
+0.770 about
+0.717 in the
+0.688 east and
… 219 more positive …
… 220 more negative …
-0.765 seyyed vali
-0.792 integral to
-0.902 in
-0.956 knowledge
-0.957 as
-1.141 public
-1.236 s military
-1.250 production
-1.556 at
-1.692 a
-1.915 the
-3.710 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.299 the middle
+0.745 seyyed vali
+0.624 about islam
+0.606 and ray
+0.587 national
+0.576 vali reza
… 215 more positive …
… 189 more negative …
-0.494 it
-0.495 islam
-0.500 irshad manji
-0.501 ism
-0.528 studies
-0.530 knowledge
-0.628 seyyed
-0.654 more
-0.686 vali
-0.714 about
-0.724 the u
-0.757 in
-0.894 at
-2.447 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.875 middle east
+0.789 military
+0.744 knowledge production
+0.715 of knowledge
+0.562 that is
+0.551 a grain
+0.539 of national
+0.524 pr firms
+0.505 iraq
+0.466 center for
+0.440 through the
… 194 more positive …
… 204 more negative …
-0.449 the department
-0.472 mode of
-0.526 national security
-0.593 is
-0.693 s military
-0.749 knowledge
-0.753 these
-0.874 production about
-1.332 through
Contribution? Feature
+1.099 u
+0.907 knowledge production
+0.849 of national
+0.776 military
+0.733 about islam
+0.626 that i
+0.612 manner of
+0.577 vali reza
… 172 more positive …
… 195 more negative …
-0.520 more
-0.592 with
-0.613 this
-0.617 paradigmatic
-0.692 to
-0.720 professor
-0.816 the u
-0.824 not
-0.908 is
-0.963 at
-1.274 in
-3.848 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.496 a
+1.320 vali reza
+0.936 are
+0.884 that
+0.870 the u
+0.774 at the
+0.716 discourse
+0.696 mode of
+0.674 studies at
+0.674 knowledge production
… 170 more positive …
… 166 more negative …
-0.626 nasr and
-0.719 seyyed
-0.727 in
-0.751 ray
-0.824 by
-0.871 in the
-1.139 through
-1.240 s
-1.770 knowledge
-7.024 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.780 vali reza
+0.723 studies at
+0.666 written by
+0.636 about islam
+0.618 or
+0.612 of what
+0.609 are
+0.607 through a
+0.597 is not
+0.580 knowledge production
+0.564 in the
… 162 more positive …
… 180 more negative …
-0.588 knowledge
-0.687 not
-0.741 need
-0.818 ray
-0.913 through
-1.165 the u
-1.233 to
-1.366 in
-2.770 of

y=ANB (probability 0.565, score 0.519) top features

Contribution? Feature
+5.062 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 226 more positive …
… 250 more negative …

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=CAP (probability 0.118, score -1.898) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 210 more positive …
… 207 more negative …
-4.120 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -9.892) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 191 more positive …
… 124 more negative …
-18.639 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.151) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 219 more positive …
… 212 more negative …
-7.901 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.530) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 201 more positive …
… 172 more negative …
-13.021 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=EX (probability 0.002, score -6.113) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 219 more positive …
… 220 more negative …
-9.620 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=FED (probability 0.001, score -6.713) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 215 more positive …
… 189 more negative …
-6.116 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=HEG (probability 0.312, score -0.636) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.268 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 194 more positive …
… 204 more negative …

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -10.008) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 172 more positive …
… 195 more negative …
-6.208 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -9.530) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 170 more positive …
… 166 more negative …
-6.651 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -7.044) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 162 more positive …
… 180 more negative …
-3.289 Highlighted in text (sum)

primitivization of knowledge in u.s. think tanks and the cor- •poratization of american universities are both coterminous with this development that i identify as epistemic endosmosis, in the sense that when we see a book written by someone like seyyed vali reza nasr, while employed at the department of national security affairs at the u.s. naval postgraduate school, or another by ray takeyh, while a professor of national security studies at the national war college, or a professor and director of studies at the near east and south asia center for strategic studies at the national defense university, or else a fellow at the washington institute for near east policy, then the knowledge that these gentlemen and their respective books and articles (they have recently started in fact writing joint articles) produce about shi'ism or iran, while both employed by the u.s. military, through a process of endosmosis flows through the membrane of their pr firms and mass media access into the currents of public at large and helps in the social construction of reality about islam, iran, "the middle east," and if need be about somalia, north korea, venezuela—anywhere that the u.s. military may need to engage in psychological operations at both the home front and on the battle zones. what we have witnessed in the famous case when the u.s. military commissioned a series of articles favorable to the u.s. military occupation of iraq written by a pr firm in washington dc, then translated into arabic and placed in newspapers in iraq9 is only a slightly exaggerated case of what seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh are doing in the united states. the epistemic endosmosis that i suggest as the most recent phase of knowledge production about the middle east is not limited to the bizarre condition in which the u.s. military (through seyyed vali reza nasr and ray takeyh) produces knowledge and disseminates it as psych-op for general public consumption—effectively changing the critical discourse away from the u.s. responsibility for the mayhem in afghanistan and iraq and blaming it on medieval sectarian hostilities among the natives. in this phase we have entered a mode of knowledge production that is no longer predicated on a particular manner of subject-formation (the study of "the orient" cross-generated "the west" as the sovereign and knowing subject of history). here such diverse figures as ibn warraq, ayaan hirsi ali, fouad ajami, irshad manji, salman rushdie, pope benedict vi, prime minister tony blair, president george w. bush, michael ignatieff and the entire discourse of human rights, allan dershowitz and the zionist propaganda machinery, azar nafisi and her brand of women's rights, the danish cartoonist of jyllands-posten, the comic books of frank miller and the cinema of zach snyder, the late italian journalist oriana fallaci and the expansive islamophobia she represented are all integral to an amorphous manner of public knowledge production about islam and "the middle east" through a miasmatic spectrum that is not integral to any paradigmatic or epistemic formation. these modes of knowledge production about islam or "the middle east" are infinitely more popular, politically more potent, and socially far more formative of opinions, judgments, and even votes in democratic contexts than libraries full of detailed research conducted by qualified and responsible scholars. the thing that holds these people together is neither an epistemic cohesion, nor a paradigmatic modality, and certainly not a conspiracy to deceive and misinform. there is indeed a grain of truth in much of what people like hirsi ali or irshad manji or ibn warraq or azar nafisi say—a grain of truth wrapped inside insidious falsities at the service of mass deception—or a "noble lie" as leo strauss's version of plato would say. these creatures of media and pr firms are competing with each other to grab a larger share of the public attention via a mode of knowledge production that is categorically miasmatic in its sentiments, spontaneous in its marketability, and

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.599, score -1.047) top features y=CAP (probability 0.120, score -2.905) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -14.099) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -14.391) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -10.444) top features y=EX (probability 0.000, score -8.498) top features y=FED (probability 0.162, score -2.581) top features y=HEG (probability 0.106, score -3.033) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.189) top features y=POL (probability 0.012, score -5.239) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -11.921) top features
Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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… 236 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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y=ANB (probability 0.599, score -1.047) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 239 more positive …
… 233 more negative …
-3.657 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use ones mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=CAP (probability 0.120, score -2.905) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 216 more positive …
… 236 more negative …
-5.563 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -14.099) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 155 more positive …
… 147 more negative …
-15.265 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -14.391) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 136 more positive …
… 125 more negative …
-15.935 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -10.444) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 204 more positive …
… 126 more negative …
-19.442 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -8.498) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 237 more positive …
… 234 more negative …
-9.929 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=FED (probability 0.162, score -2.581) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 213 more positive …
… 207 more negative …
-2.791 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=HEG (probability 0.106, score -3.033) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.974 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 218 more positive …
… 234 more negative …

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.189) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 179 more positive …
… 164 more negative …
-10.956 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=POL (probability 0.012, score -5.239) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 123 more positive …
… 122 more negative …
-4.996 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -11.921) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 130 more positive …
… 142 more negative …
-8.994 Highlighted in text (sum)

twenty-five years after orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the orient since napoleon’s entry into egypt two centuries ago. arabs and muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depreda- tions of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. you have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern orientalist. this of course is also v. s. naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. but what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of palestinians or congolese or algerians or iraqis. we allow justly that the holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what orientalism continues to do? think of the line that starts with napoleon, continues with the rise of oriental studies and the take over of north africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in vietnam, in egypt, in palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the gulf, in iraq, syria, palestine, and afghanistan. then think contrapuntally of the rise of anti- colonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics. my intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. i have called what i try to do ‘humanism’, a word i continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. by humanism i mean first of all attempting to dissolve blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. this is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. the disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘islam vs. the west’ seem to conquer. for those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluri- cultural life as it entails islam and the west, i have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. certainly i think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experi- ence and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. this is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. our role is to widen the field of discu

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.486, score -1.634) top features y=CAP (probability 0.000, score -8.817) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -15.231) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -9.807) top features y=ENV (probability 0.004, score -6.635) top features y=EX (probability 0.018, score -5.130) top features y=FED (probability 0.003, score -6.943) top features y=HEG (probability 0.475, score -1.662) top features y=NAT (probability 0.002, score -7.588) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -18.837) top features y=TOP (probability 0.012, score -5.478) top features
Contribution? Feature
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+0.377 and museums
+0.364 into meaningless
+0.334 all kinds
… 236 more positive …
… 261 more negative …
-0.319 ground into
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-0.406 dizzying variety
-0.420 their
-0.491 by
-0.579 iraq
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Contribution? Feature
+0.652 s
+0.593 middle east
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… 229 more positive …
… 226 more negative …
-0.432 re
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-0.558 have
-0.573 has
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-0.666 our
-0.880 and the
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Contribution? Feature
+0.704 power
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… 204 more positive …
… 130 more negative …
-0.525 peoples
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-0.577 all
-0.663 with
-0.667 history
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Contribution? Feature
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… 167 more positive …
… 140 more negative …
-0.607 west
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-1.582 to
-2.118 that
-3.502 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.644 the other
+0.637 can
+0.567 the orient
+0.536 middle east
… 190 more positive …
… 179 more negative …
-0.475 societies
-0.486 to
-0.501 peoples
-0.501 like
-0.605 our
-0.620 these
-0.649 orient
-0.659 what
-0.810 s
-0.819 and
-0.889 that
-0.907 the
-1.022 all
-1.063 in the
-1.064 of
-1.118 we
Contribution? Feature
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+0.562 process the
+0.524 libraries and
+0.496 middle east
+0.471 in the
+0.470 orientalism
+0.456 wish i
+0.442 but
+0.432 it accordingly
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… 224 more positive …
… 248 more negative …
-0.409 these
-0.414 however that
-0.447 have
-0.449 what
-0.483 the orient
-0.491 of human
-0.512 has
-0.665 this
-1.117 for
-2.884 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.838 with
+0.755 for
+0.679 understanding
+0.527 so that
+0.498 of their
+0.496 peoples
+0.462 that our
+0.458 peoples languages
… 201 more positive …
… 198 more negative …
-0.463 made
-0.465 like
-0.479 as
-0.516 that history
-0.558 all
-0.720 history
-0.811 and
-0.815 has
-0.843 what
-1.515 to
-2.455 of the
-3.447 of
Contribution? Feature
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+0.448 in the
+0.411 and apache
+0.391 east
+0.363 this
+0.341 shapes imposed
+0.332 to assert
… 260 more positive …
… 253 more negative …
-0.349 s
-0.350 were taken
-0.374 for
-0.397 this minute
-0.398 and re
-0.407 accordingly
-0.413 on
-0.431 peoples
-0.469 of the
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-0.558 orient
-0.662 middle east
-1.075 in
Contribution? Feature
+0.680 with
+0.607 in the
+0.595 orientalism
+0.593 so
+0.512 sediments of
+0.372 and re
… 184 more positive …
… 179 more negative …
-0.422 on
-0.434 part
-0.450 events
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-0.637 what
-0.646 is
-0.692 are
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-1.651 to
-1.808 that
-2.220 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.930 of the
+0.720 united states
+0.624 our own
… 176 more positive …
… 113 more negative …
-0.633 however
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-0.668 what
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-5.585 of
Contribution? Feature
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+0.710 on the
+0.557 through an
+0.551 power
+0.544 the other
… 156 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-0.526 more
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-0.590 i
-0.600 these
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y=ANB (probability 0.486, score -1.634) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 236 more positive …
… 261 more negative …
-0.313 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so thatour’ east, ‘ourorient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=CAP (probability 0.000, score -8.817) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 229 more positive …
… 226 more negative …
-7.245 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the otherarevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdads libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -15.231) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 204 more positive …
… 130 more negative …
-22.912 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -9.807) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 167 more positive …
… 140 more negative …
-12.583 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with theorient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=ENV (probability 0.004, score -6.635) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 190 more positive …
… 179 more negative …
-9.801 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so thatwe’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with theorient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orients nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so thatour’ east, ‘ourorient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=EX (probability 0.018, score -5.130) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 224 more positive …
… 248 more negative …
-2.795 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with theorient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=FED (probability 0.003, score -6.943) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 201 more positive …
… 198 more negative …
-8.373 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so thatour’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=HEG (probability 0.475, score -1.662) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 260 more positive …
… 253 more negative …
-3.485 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orients nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=NAT (probability 0.002, score -7.588) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 184 more positive …
… 179 more negative …
-8.736 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -18.837) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 176 more positive …
… 113 more negative …
-25.878 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with the ‘orient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

y=TOP (probability 0.012, score -5.478) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 156 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-10.771 Highlighted in text (sum)

yet, orientalism isvery much tied to the tumultuous dynamics of con- temporary history. i emphasize in it accordingly that neither the term orient nor theconcept of the west has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort,partly affirmation,partly identification of the other. that these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulationand the organization of collective passion has never been more evident than in our time,whenthe mobilization of fear, hatred, disgust andresurgent self-pride and arrogance— much of it having to do with islam and the arabs on one side, ‘we’ westerners on the other— arevery large-scale enterprises.orientalism’s first page opens with a 1975 description of the lebanese civil war that ended in 1990, but the violence and the ugly shedding of human blood continues up to this minute. we have had the failure of the oslo peace process, the outbreak of the second intifada, and the awful suffering of the palestinians on the reinvaded west bank and gaza, with israeli f-16s and apache helicopters used routinely on defenceless civilians as part of their collective punishment. the suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of september 11 and their aftermath in the wars against afghanistan and iraq. as i write these lines, the illegal and unsanctioned imperial occupation of iraq by britain and the united states proceeds, with resulting physical ravagement and political unrest that is truly awful to contemplate. this is all part of what is supposed to be a clash of civilizations, unending, implacable, irremediable. nevertheless, i think not. i wish i could say, however, that general understanding of the middle east, the arabs and islam in the united states has improved somewhat, but alas, it really hasn’t.for all kinds of reasons, the situation in europe seems to be considerably better. in the us, the hardening of attitudes, the tighten- ing of the grip of demeaning generalization and triumphalist cliche ́ , the dominance of crude power allied with simplistic contempt for dissenters and ‘others’ has found a fitting correlative in the looting, pillaging and destruction of iraq’s libraries and museums. what our leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow. it is quite common to hear high officials in washington and else- where speak of changing the map of the middle east, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. but this has often happened with theorient’, that semi-mythical construct which since napoleon’s invasion of egypt in the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the orient’s nature, and we must deal with it accordingly. in the process the uncountable sediments of his- tory, that include innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences, and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored, relegated to the sand heap along with the treasures ground into meaningless fragments that were taken out of baghdad’s libraries and museums. my argument is that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and re-written, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated, so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ‘ours’ to possess and direct. i should say again that i have no ‘real’ orient to argue for. i do, however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.there has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the arab and muslim for their backwardness, lack of demo- crac

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.074, score -4.872) top features y=CAP (probability 0.791, score -2.424) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -31.290) top features y=EDU (probability 0.074, score -4.869) top features y=ENV (probability 0.002, score -8.406) top features y=EX (probability 0.039, score -5.513) top features y=FED (probability 0.016, score -6.412) top features y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -8.201) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -20.176) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.828) top features y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -9.069) top features
Contribution? Feature
+0.863 this
+0.636 homosexuality
+0.583 brand
+0.579 queerness
+0.493 study of
+0.477 is
+0.453 to how
+0.452 as resistant
+0.440 an
+0.439 national homosexuality
+0.428 bodies my
+0.426 these
… 163 more positive …
… 194 more negative …
-0.473 production
-0.480 with
-0.499 of homosexuality
-0.561 as a
-0.584 this brand
-0.884 form
-1.426 to
-1.513 national
Contribution? Feature
+0.474 as a
+0.467 form of
+0.448 whiteness is
+0.371 populations of
+0.347 of terrorist
+0.332 diversity in
+0.328 project
+0.325 and where
+0.323 out of
+0.307 a dexterous
… 176 more positive …
… 157 more negative …
-0.338 a
-0.344 to how
-0.345 in notions
-0.347 as the
-0.354 not
-0.354 regard to
-0.357 the racial
-0.365 operates as
-0.375 in
-2.971 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.554 sexual exceptionalism
… 5 more positive …
… 49 more negative …
-0.498 an
-0.511 queer
-0.540 biopolitics
-0.556 from
-0.618 ascendancy
-0.662 national
-0.681 term
-0.776 of
-0.806 others
-0.817 subjects
-1.032 whiteness
-1.222 i
-1.477 what
-1.965 a
-2.004 homosexuality
-2.380 and
-2.950 that
-3.180 the
-4.118 in
Contribution? Feature
+1.282 to the
+0.678 i term
+0.621 of homosexuality
+0.571 not only
+0.538 and where
+0.432 by rey
+0.429 mechanistic explanatory
+0.417 with
… 99 more positive …
… 90 more negative …
-0.415 diversity
-0.432 from
-0.468 propagation
-0.471 a
-0.497 the
-0.587 that
-0.656 homosexuality
-0.677 life
-0.733 homonationalism
-0.756 or
-0.833 ascendancy
-4.466 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.160 of sexual
+1.152 to the
+1.029 this brand
+0.857 the project
+0.766 as well
+0.690 these three
… 97 more positive …
… 102 more negative …
-0.589 whiteness
-0.590 life
-0.646 homosexuality
-0.676 together
-0.804 from
-0.842 in
-1.004 national
-1.026 as
-1.087 what
-1.301 a
-1.532 to
-1.835 the
-1.947 and
-2.137 that
Contribution? Feature
+0.859 is a
+0.818 of queer
+0.740 well as
+0.733 empire
+0.647 national
+0.566 to the
+0.533 brand of
+0.500 of the
+0.498 all the
+0.462 the national
… 140 more positive …
… 143 more negative …
-0.578 in the
-0.608 subjects
-0.630 a
-0.630 s
-0.638 and
-0.819 form of
-1.189 that
-1.279 in
-1.358 sexual
-1.497 is
Contribution? Feature
+1.315 national
+0.992 sexual racial
+0.625 as the
+0.583 through
+0.561 an exceptional
+0.542 of life
+0.502 exceptionalism a
+0.482 regulatory
… 156 more positive …
… 150 more negative …
-0.441 subjects
-0.448 not
-0.485 as
-0.522 this
-0.534 what
-0.542 an
-0.550 a
-0.562 racial and
-0.612 study of
-0.748 in
-1.061 is
-4.541 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.876 out of
+0.722 i explore
+0.689 project of
+0.638 well as
+0.628 this brand
+0.530 to the
… 117 more positive …
… 117 more negative …
-0.563 or
-0.578 the
-0.617 i
-0.672 not
-0.694 exceptional
-0.703 homosexuality
-0.804 an exceptional
-0.814 is
-1.112 these
-1.116 a
-1.291 in
-1.312 as
-1.486 of
-1.505 and
Contribution? Feature
+2.655 to the
+2.356 of the
+1.407 of life
+1.078 is a
+0.756 in the
… 49 more positive …
… 82 more negative …
-0.521 have
-0.552 whiteness
-0.580 national
-0.587 homosexuality
-0.601 regard
-0.641 form
-0.705 sexual
-0.723 i
-0.772 who
-0.784 that
-0.944 ascendancy
-1.009 subjects
-2.739 a
-5.608 the
-7.797 of
Contribution? Feature
+2.579 to the
+1.809 is a
+1.133 of the
+1.102 of national
+1.046 of whiteness
+1.020 ascendancy of
+0.513 of queer
… 53 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-0.517 life
-0.704 exceptionalism
-0.805 homonationalism
-0.849 that
-0.915 subjects
-1.007 others
-1.239 and
-1.997 to
-2.150 national
-2.307 in
-2.454 a
-4.306 the
-5.822 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.415 is a
+1.375 of life
+0.954 sexual exceptionalism
+0.924 in the
+0.908 regard to
+0.854 of the
+0.820 the project
… 81 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-0.557 i
-0.583 s
-0.589 in
-0.606 form
-0.678 sexual
-0.773 from
-0.923 but
-0.964 homosexuality
-1.226 as
-1.470 life
-1.738 a
-2.494 is
-2.951 of

y=ANB (probability 0.074, score -4.872) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 163 more positive …
… 194 more negative …
-0.150 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=CAP (probability 0.791, score -2.424) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 176 more positive …
… 157 more negative …
-2.431 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -31.290) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 5 more positive …
… 49 more negative …
-26.238 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalismthe emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whitenessand their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=EDU (probability 0.074, score -4.869) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 99 more positive …
… 90 more negative …
-6.022 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=ENV (probability 0.002, score -8.406) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 97 more positive …
… 102 more negative …
-10.363 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whitenessand their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=EX (probability 0.039, score -5.513) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 140 more positive …
… 143 more negative …
-2.869 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=FED (probability 0.016, score -6.412) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 156 more positive …
… 150 more negative …
-5.447 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=HEG (probability 0.003, score -8.201) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 117 more positive …
… 117 more negative …
-9.185 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -20.176) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 49 more positive …
… 82 more negative …
-16.314 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.828) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 53 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-15.869 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalismthe emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whitenessand their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

y=TOP (probability 0.001, score -9.069) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 81 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-8.301 Highlighted in text (sum)

national recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. at work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what i term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of american empire. further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. there is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the united states as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. the fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. in what follows i explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. my goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. in the case of what i term ‘‘u.s. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. collectively, they continue or extend the project of u.s. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. the terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. i unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. the ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by rey chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. i elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.669, score 1.349) top features y=CAP (probability 0.065, score -2.482) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.293) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -7.851) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.004) top features y=EX (probability 0.083, score -2.212) top features y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.072) top features y=HEG (probability 0.180, score -1.301) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.715) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -12.825) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -9.255) top features
Contribution? Feature
+0.844 femininity
+0.734 the
+0.428 masculinity
+0.411 of military
+0.408 us
+0.361 and women
+0.357 by
+0.332 hegemonic
+0.326 its
+0.312 begin with
+0.310 the basis
+0.299 masculinities
+0.295 military masculinity
… 243 more positive …
… 235 more negative …
-0.296 threat of
-0.304 of the
-0.324 and
-0.346 never equal
-0.484 women
-0.685 have
-1.537 military
Contribution? Feature
+1.152 of
+0.914 the us
+0.705 military masculinity
+0.570 us marine
+0.555 but also
+0.505 us military
+0.391 reading the
+0.370 concept
+0.357 basis
… 210 more positive …
… 202 more negative …
-0.329 or
-0.342 in the
-0.344 out that
-0.398 norms of
-0.440 also
-0.495 their
-0.731 masculinity
-0.790 us
-0.820 military
-1.041 that
-3.039 the
Contribution? Feature
+2.874 military masculinity
+1.543 in the
+1.368 not
+1.194 in which
… 108 more positive …
… 78 more negative …
-0.764 of
-0.789 as a
-0.839 marine
-0.839 masculinity
-0.850 hierarchies
-0.879 is
-0.916 women
-0.995 2012
-1.097 the us
-1.097 us
-1.728 that
-1.789 on
-2.253 also
-2.486 and
-2.996 military
-5.052 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.969 as a
+0.945 and
+0.741 the military
+0.643 whitworth
+0.627 have
+0.612 in the
+0.571 more
… 197 more positive …
… 179 more negative …
-0.524 2012
-0.533 men
-0.614 the basis
-0.617 hegemonic
-0.718 t
-0.728 claims
-0.753 femininity
-0.813 a
-1.184 as
-1.214 military
-1.389 that
-1.403 is
-4.158 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.917 to
+1.498 military masculinity
+1.154 masculinity is
+0.862 as a
+0.848 to women
+0.807 these
+0.800 in the
+0.645 the us
… 145 more positive …
… 135 more negative …
-0.608 been
-0.668 it
-0.749 hegemonic
-0.834 2012
-0.989 of
-1.158 us marine
-1.273 military
-1.399 us
-1.451 with
-1.696 masculinity
-2.219 as
-3.268 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.045 in the
+0.794 the us
+0.694 not
+0.546 us marine
+0.538 gay
… 187 more positive …
… 172 more negative …
-0.443 theme in
-0.488 are
-0.516 also
-0.540 brotherhood
-0.542 on
-0.544 military to
-0.546 that
-0.552 norms
-0.565 men
-0.631 as
-0.637 hegemonic
-0.788 femininity
-0.789 2008
-0.941 in
-1.088 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.243 and
+0.869 the us
+0.769 importantly
+0.657 hegemonic masculinity
+0.648 masculinity in
+0.580 its
+0.545 to women
… 207 more positive …
… 201 more negative …
-0.560 success in
-0.607 by
-0.643 deeply
-0.686 us
-0.752 claims
-0.760 with
-0.814 as a
-0.833 hegemonic
-0.975 this
-1.043 of
-1.413 masculinity
-1.871 in
-3.636 the
Contribution? Feature
+3.123 military
+0.650 marine corps
+0.468 to women
+0.433 resisted
+0.405 as a
+0.396 have
+0.390 observed in
+0.386 women for
+0.384 men
… 203 more positive …
… 216 more negative …
-0.383 femininity
-0.413 power women
-0.436 authority
-0.474 gay
-0.546 a
-0.566 who
-0.583 masculinity
-0.622 which
-0.656 this
-0.820 is
-1.023 as
Contribution? Feature
+1.408 the us
+1.351 of the
+0.967 us military
+0.803 is
+0.665 dependent on
+0.645 marine corps
+0.622 been
… 153 more positive …
… 129 more negative …
-0.638 up
-0.706 women
-0.735 2008
-0.740 on
-0.747 military
-0.759 this
-0.866 t
-0.957 femininity
-1.360 in
-1.691 as
-2.225 the
-2.441 masculinity
-4.028 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.446 the us
+1.138 in the
+0.823 military masculinity
+0.785 in which
+0.577 masculinity and
+0.564 them
… 130 more positive …
… 107 more negative …
-0.572 study
-0.608 who
-0.708 2012
-0.852 femininity
-1.067 hegemonic
-1.452 are
-1.457 which
-1.651 us
-1.888 in
-1.956 masculinity
-1.971 that
-2.060 a
-2.234 to
-4.400 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.555 as a
+1.544 of the
+1.246 military masculinity
+0.666 us marine
+0.573 us military
+0.547 the military
+0.501 while
… 147 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-0.517 dependent
-0.565 who
-0.644 their
-0.656 2008
-0.797 are
-0.885 militaries
-1.207 in
-1.225 military
-1.304 and
-1.396 us
-1.844 of
-2.774 masculinity
-6.633 the

y=ANB (probability 0.669, score 1.349) top features

Contribution? Feature
+1.441 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 243 more positive …
… 235 more negative …

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=CAP (probability 0.065, score -2.482) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 210 more positive …
… 202 more negative …
-3.251 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.293) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 108 more positive …
… 78 more negative …
-18.390 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinityas a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -7.851) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 197 more positive …
… 179 more negative …
-9.540 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -8.004) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 145 more positive …
… 135 more negative …
-7.781 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinityas a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=EX (probability 0.083, score -2.212) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 187 more positive …
… 172 more negative …
-5.992 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in thebrotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.072) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 207 more positive …
… 201 more negative …
-9.281 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinityas a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=HEG (probability 0.180, score -1.301) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.114 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 203 more positive …
… 216 more negative …

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinityas a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to powerwomen have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.715) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 153 more positive …
… 129 more negative …
-11.432 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinityas a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -12.825) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 130 more positive …
… 107 more negative …
-17.544 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinity ‘as a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, while ‘military masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -9.255) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 147 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-13.815 Highlighted in text (sum)

militaries and militarism have discursively and practically been dependent on deploying gendered myths and images – and on a variety of persons inside and outside militaries who accept them and act them out. it thus becomes imperative not only to simply assert a link between (hegemonic) masculinity and war, but also to explore more deeply how ‘masculinity in the context of the military operates as a kind of intersection of hierarchies, in which a dominant hierarchical distinction between masculine and feminine sustains other hierarchies within and between men and women in different categories of military life’ (hutchings, 2008: 392). this can be observed in descriptions of basic training, where masculinity is bolstered not just by denigrating femininity and female anatomy, but also at the intersection with sexuality, when those who are perceived to deviate from the heterosexual norm are disparaged.9 melissa herbert’s (1998) study of the ways in which us servicewomen have to negotiate femininity and masculinity is revealing here: she notes that women who minimize their femininity to become ‘one of the guys’ are just as likely as women who play up their femininity to have both their gender identity and their sexuality questioned. notably, when traditional femininity is emphasized, this is less threatening to military hierarchies since these servicewomen do not make a claim to authority on the basis of hegemonic masculinities. importantly, while these intersecting hierarchies are fluid (as we can see after the reversal of don’t ask don’t tell, the policy that did not allow gay and lesbian service members to serve openly in the us military, where the threat of being labeled lesbian or gay is less costly), ‘the only absolutely fixed element in the concept [hegemonic masculinity] is its signification of superior value in a formal dynamics of valorization’ (hutchings, 2008: 394).10 the official opening of all military occupational specialties in the us military to women, especially in branches such as the us marine corps that have vehemently resisted this move, consequently must also be interpreted as a direct attack on this hegemonic value system. indeed, reading the resistance of the us marine corps as a deeply gendered response to a (perceived) attack on hegemonic masculinity and its attendant privileges allows for a deeper understanding of the length to which its leadership went to defend the status quo, for example by producing a flawed study (walters, 2015). at the same time, we might also consider evidence from other fully integrated militaries (e.g. eichler, 2013), which indicates that the integration of women into combat is unlikely to impact the us marine corps’ culture without further intervention by the leadership. hutchings’ claims about shared norms of manliness and warfighting are supported by aaron belkin’s (2012) analysis of military masculinity in the us military. he describes military masculinityas a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that enable individuals – men and women – to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideals’ (belkin, 2012: 3). importantly, as herbert attests also, whilemilitary masculinity has been more available to men than to women for sustaining claims to power … women have harnessed it as well’ (belkin, 2012: 3) – albeit with varying success. in her discussion of post-traumatic stress, sandra whitworth (2008: 110) points out that it ‘lays bare the fragile ground on which [white] military masculinity is built’.11 given that the experience of military masculinity is dependent on gender as well as on race, however, whitworth finds that ‘whereas white [male] soldiers discover through their emotions that they have not lived up to the norms of the warrior brotherhood, women and marginalized men discover they were never equal partners in the ‘brotherhood’ to begin with’ (whitworth, 2008: 110–111). in the case of the us military, this is a common theme in recent (auto)biographi

Explained as: linear model

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Contribution? Feature
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… 185 more positive …
… 208 more negative …
-0.410 and the
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-0.432 if it
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-0.712 cisprivilege
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Contribution? Feature
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… 201 more positive …
… 177 more negative …
-0.340 security have
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Contribution? Feature
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… 26 more positive …
… 48 more negative …
-0.636 reproduction
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-0.813 transpeople
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Contribution? Feature
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… 153 more positive …
… 144 more negative …
-0.648 with
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Contribution? Feature
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… 120 more positive …
… 110 more negative …
-0.663 producing
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-0.921 to
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-1.391 are
-2.026 and
-5.323 of
Contribution? Feature
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… 182 more positive …
… 143 more negative …
-0.491 we can
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-0.668 social
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Contribution? Feature
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… 182 more positive …
… 163 more negative …
-0.485 corporeality
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-0.593 2000
-0.617 between
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-0.784 gender
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Contribution? Feature
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… 160 more positive …
… 177 more negative …
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-0.544 sex
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Contribution? Feature
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… 91 more positive …
… 85 more negative …
-0.706 security
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Contribution? Feature
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… 111 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-0.670 as
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-0.918 by
-0.927 of violence
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-1.085 a
-1.232 in
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-3.047 of
-3.235 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.645 violent reproduction
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+0.932 ontopolitical
+0.875 other
+0.753 reproduction of
… 170 more positive …
… 145 more negative …
-0.762 this violence
-0.769 policing
-0.798 in
-0.842 producing the
-0.859 these
-0.880 a
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-0.912 but
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-1.699 we
-1.709 it
-2.675 and

y=ANB (probability 0.962, score 3.979) top features

Contribution? Feature
+6.703 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 185 more positive …
… 208 more negative …

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=CAP (probability 0.023, score -3.745) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 201 more positive …
… 177 more negative …
-6.861 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -27.245) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 26 more positive …
… 48 more negative …
-24.230 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.181) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 153 more positive …
… 144 more negative …
-11.056 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.288) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 120 more positive …
… 110 more negative …
-12.067 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=EX (probability 0.012, score -4.354) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 182 more positive …
… 143 more negative …
-11.735 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.209) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 182 more positive …
… 163 more negative …
-10.067 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -7.515) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 160 more positive …
… 177 more negative …
-5.601 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -11.738) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 91 more positive …
… 85 more negative …
-15.675 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -14.646) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 111 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-18.525 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -9.846) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 170 more positive …
… 145 more negative …
-13.060 Highlighted in text (sum)

taking cisprivilege seriously draws attention to the fact that even the most inclusive interpretations of security exclude the ambiguous (munoz, 1999: 2), the cross (mccloskey, 2000: xii; roen, 2002), the invisible (bettcher, 2007: 52), the disidentified (heyes, 2003: 1096) and the 'in' (shotwell and sangray, 2009: 59). we argue here that this is neither incidental nor accidental, even if it is not a conscious practice of exclusion, and that these exclusionary practices are forms of violence. foucault suggested that '[a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities' (1983: 340). violence perverts, inverts or renders unintelligible certain ways of being in the world while endorsing others; in this, violence is perhaps best conceptualised as a specific relation of power that is not necess- arily repressive but productive. a conceptualisation of violence inspired by foucault can allow for the admission of 'the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject' (hanssen, 2000: 215) as acts of violence that are simultaneously practices of power. on this view, violence is not reducible to (physical) constraint or repression but rather encompasses regulative idea(l)s and performs ordering functions in our collective cognitive frameworks. if we accept that representing transpeople and queer bodies specifically as in- and hypervisible in war stories and security strategy is a form of violence, and that this violence has its foundation in unexamined and often unconscious privilege enjoyed by cispeople, then we can begin to understand how a nuanced and sophisticated gendered theory of security needs to incorporate corporeality, including trans- corporeality. we can note parallels between transphobic violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of gender) and transnational violence (policing and actively (re)producing the boundaries of religions, states, ethnicities and/or alliances. laura shepherd (2008: 78; see also shepherd, 2010c) terms these processes 'the violent reproduction of gender' and 'the violent reproduction of the international'). the borders of gender are policed as a part of an active policing of the borders between states, the borders between states and non-states, and the borders between the (safe) self-state and the (dangerous, terrorist) other. narratives of the international fetishise and orientalise the exotic 'other' (be it a colonial other, a trans- other or a terrorist other) to associate otherness with violence and inspire violence towards the other. 'non-violent' resisters of existing (engendered) social orders are often addressed by the dominant (gendered) social order violently, much like non-violent transpeople are often attacked for the very presentation of trans-ness in the face of a social order that excludes their existence both de jure and de facto. we suggest that these are ontopolitical practices; as michael dillon explains, 'all political interpretation is simultaneously ontopolitical because it cannot but disclose the ontology sequestered within iť (1999: 112). the ontopolitical (representational) practices of security have thus far been founded on embedded cisprivilege. the ontology of security, even of gendered security theory, has conventionally relied on gender/sex certainty and gender/sex hierarchy. if it is analytically and conceptually productive to see transphobic violence as the violent reproduction of a stable sex/gender system that 'naturally' privileges cisgender performances because such performances are associated with normality and safety and trans- performances are associated with danger and discomfort, it then becomes possible to ask questions about the ways that trans-in(/hyper)visibiiity, cisprivilege and a regulative, exclusionary ontopolitical social order are violently reproduced in inter/transnational relations. in tentative conclusion, we suggest that

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.944, score 3.935) top features y=CAP (probability 0.050, score -2.907) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -35.206) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -8.577) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.908) top features y=EX (probability 0.000, score -11.926) top features y=FED (probability 0.000, score -8.118) top features y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -8.591) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.735) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.613) top features y=TOP (probability 0.006, score -5.085) top features
Contribution? Feature
+1.533 the
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+0.468 critique
+0.375 rights of
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+0.367 orientalist
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+0.323 for
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… 225 more positive …
… 208 more negative …
-0.298 with queer
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-0.331 performative reiteration
-0.351 rights and
-0.385 way to
-0.386 of
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Contribution? Feature
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+0.438 is not
+0.422 a critique
+0.374 and redeployed
+0.370 communities
+0.331 about homonationalism
+0.328 respectability of
… 196 more positive …
… 207 more negative …
-0.334 someone who
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Contribution? Feature
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… 31 more positive …
… 53 more negative …
-0.465 are
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-0.732 i
-0.767 critique
-0.864 rights
-1.070 or
-1.097 not
-1.144 some
-1.257 as
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-1.651 a
-1.663 queer
-1.745 to
-5.835 and
-8.905 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.305 of homonationalism
+1.195 homonationalism
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+1.027 as
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… 141 more positive …
… 109 more negative …
-0.552 gay
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-2.044 of
-4.140 the
Contribution? Feature
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… 89 more positive …
… 88 more negative …
-0.438 rights
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-8.128 the
Contribution? Feature
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… 207 more positive …
… 163 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 175 more positive …
… 183 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 188 more positive …
… 158 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 130 more positive …
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Contribution? Feature
+2.927 of homonationalism
+0.833 relation to
+0.671 politically
+0.666 homonationalism
+0.511 to the
… 46 more positive …
… 70 more negative …
-0.418 forms
-0.457 a
-0.498 orientalist
-0.605 racial
-0.752 position
-0.833 not
-0.858 critique
-0.989 is
-0.993 rights
-1.078 with
-1.466 i
-1.550 an
-1.744 queer
-2.927 as
-4.516 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.943 of homonationalism
+1.540 of the
+0.756 homonationalism in
+0.513 not only
… 144 more positive …
… 100 more negative …
-0.528 how
-0.569 proliferation
-0.577 and the
-0.586 to
-0.620 rights
-0.631 critique
-0.647 are
-0.761 been
-0.857 position
-0.858 queer
-0.884 of
-0.887 different
-1.275 or
-1.395 i
-1.430 an
-2.965 the

y=ANB (probability 0.944, score 3.935) top features

Contribution? Feature
+2.007 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 225 more positive …
… 208 more negative …

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position ofqueer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities withqueer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=CAP (probability 0.050, score -2.907) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 196 more positive …
… 207 more negative …
-2.373 Highlighted in text (sum)

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities withqueer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -35.206) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 31 more positive …
… 53 more negative …
-29.865 Highlighted in text (sum)

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queeras one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities withqueerand with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -8.577) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 141 more positive …
… 109 more negative …
-8.463 Highlighted in text (sum)

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position ofqueeras one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.908) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 89 more positive …
… 88 more negative …
-13.407 Highlighted in text (sum)

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -11.926) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 207 more positive …
… 163 more negative …
-19.171 Highlighted in text (sum)

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queeras one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queerand with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=FED (probability 0.000, score -8.118) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 175 more positive …
… 183 more negative …
-7.156 Highlighted in text (sum)

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position ofqueeras one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities withqueer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -8.591) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 188 more positive …
… 158 more negative …
-12.362 Highlighted in text (sum)

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusationit is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queeras one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queerand with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -9.735) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 130 more positive …
… 77 more negative …
-15.648 Highlighted in text (sum)

my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position ofqueer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities withqueerand with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.613) top features

Contribution? Feature
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my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position of “queeras one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities withqueerand with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

y=TOP (probability 0.006, score -5.085) top features

Contribution? Feature
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my intention in terrorist assemblages was not only to demonstrate simply a relationality of the instrumentalization of queer bodies by the u.s. state, or only the embracing of nationalist, and often xenophobic and imperialist interests of the united states by queer communities. homonationalism fundamentally highlights a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations. simply stated, homonationalism is the concomitant rise in the legal, consumer, and representative recognition of lgbtq subjects and the curtailing of welfare provisions, immigrant rights, and the expansion of state power to surveil, detain, and deport. this process relies on the shoring up of the respectability of homonationalism in trump times 229 homosexual subjects in relation to the performative reiteration of the pathologized perverse (homo- and hetero-) sexuality of racial others, in specific, muslim others upon whom orientalist and neo-orientalist projections are cast. however, in terrorist assemblages i looked not only at the proliferation of queerness as a white christian secular norm, but also at the proliferation of homonationalism in south asian queer communities in the united states, where forms of hindu secularism and indian nationalism often converge. homonationalism, therefore, is not a synonym for gay racism, a critique of the racial exclusions and whiteness of mainstream lgbt communities, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries. the concept of homonationalism has been adapted and redeployed to suit different needs, different strategies, different politics. it has created synergy across and through various political movements and struggles and has generated capacious theoretical paradigms as well as important debates about the fraught relationships between academia and activists, theory and praxis.4 the text and its conceptual apparatus have moved across different disciplinary and geopolitical terrains, crossing the activist-academic species divide many times over and resonating with organizing underway in northern europe, the middle east, india, and the united states. a robust debate about homonationalism is happening in france, where funnily enough the book has been, in some circles, denounced for its queer intersectional thrust. some interlocutors have interrogated the relation of homonationalism to israeli pinkwashing. others take up the theorization of intersectionality and assemblage, noting, correctly, that i do not properly honor the history or precarity of black feminist theories in relation to the institutional centrality of white male canonicity. this is an error and an elision that i attempt to redress in a later article. as someone who has been drawing on the formative work of black feminists and also insisting on and producing intersectional scholarship for two decades now, my interest in rethinking intersectionality was never about a fidelity to assemblage theory, rather a commitment to what mel chen calls “feral methodologies.” i myself do not think of homonationalism as an identity, a position, or an accusation—it is not another marker meant to cleave a “good” (progressive / transgressive / politically left) queer from a “bad” (sold-out / conservative / politically bankrupt) queer. i feel it is especially unhelpful as an accusation, as if some of us are magically exempt from homonationalism (by virtue, most often, through claiming the position ofqueer” as one of the political avant-garde or as politically pure, transcendent, or inherently immune to critique) and others of us are intrinsically predisposed to it. the accusation 230 postscript of homonationalism works to disavow our own inevitable and complex complicities with “queer” and with “nation.”5 as an analytic (rather than a descriptor, stanc

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Contribution? Feature
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n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

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Contribution? Feature
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n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

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Contribution? Feature
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n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

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n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

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n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

y=EX (probability 0.001, score -7.269) top features

Contribution? Feature
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… 133 more negative …
-10.266 Highlighted in text (sum)

n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

y=FED (probability 0.002, score -6.897) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 147 more positive …
… 151 more negative …
-9.343 Highlighted in text (sum)

n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

y=HEG (probability 0.004, score -6.063) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 135 more positive …
… 143 more negative …
-4.465 Highlighted in text (sum)

n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -7.400) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 123 more positive …
… 98 more negative …
-9.181 Highlighted in text (sum)

n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

y=POL (probability 0.178, score -2.275) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 98 more positive …
… 98 more negative …
-3.793 Highlighted in text (sum)

n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -11.699) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 124 more positive …
… 139 more negative …
-10.590 Highlighted in text (sum)

n their influential texts, mearsheimer, hardt and negri aim to do two things through their arguments: first, they aim to paint a big picture of what international politics is like, how it works, and what is likely to happen to it; and second, they aim to establish the credentials of their particular mode of analysis in relation to other possibilities. i have suggested in both cases that drawing on a logic of masculinity helps accomplish these aims. it is likely that these theorists would argue that the use of masculine language and logic is a matter of rhetorical decoration and does not affect the validity of their substantive inductive or deductive arguments. on this account, these theorists could make the same arguments either without rhetorical decoration altogether or by using another set of rhetorical tropes to make the same case. i would argue, however, that the logic of masculinity provides a powerful incentive against raising questions about the substantive assumptions and inductive and deductive moves made in the arguments of theorists such as mearsheimer, hardt and negri. the framing of contemporary international politics in terms of masculinity logic locks our social scientific imagination into a very familiar world in which we already understand how things ontologically work in terms of value hierarchies. but it also provides a massively efficient short cut for the cognitive tasks of categorization and analysis and for the evaluative tasks of judgement with which mearsheimer, hardt and negri are concerned. of course, it is the case that the formal characteristics of the logic of masculinity are intertwined with other conceptual schemes grounded in binary oppositions. we have, for instance, seen how the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ operates to help sustain the logic of contrast and contradiction essential to mearsheimer, hardt and negri’s arguments. nevertheless, we have also seen, at least in the context of these particular theories of world politics, the logic of masculinity providing a particularly stable reference point for rendering the cognitive operations of contrast and contradiction intelligible, regardless of referential meanings assigned to practising or theorizing international politics.17 cognitive short cuts 41 feminist scholars have long pointed out that the logic of masculinity, as a mechanism for framing our understanding of international politics, renders the thinking of the feminine and the feminized impossible other than in terms of lack or absence. quite rightly, much feminist analysis has been devoted to tracing the practical effects of this logic for the ways in which international politics is practised and understood and as a precursor to challenging masculine hegemony in its many different forms. as this chapter has demonstrated, however, the resilience of masculinity as a mode of making sense of world politics reflects the amount of analytic and normative work that it accomplishes. therefore, it raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics. this also suggests that disentangling the operations of thought from the operations of gender is a profoundly difficult task.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.717, score 0.980) top features y=CAP (probability 0.008, score -4.786) top features y=ECON (probability 0.002, score -6.453) top features y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.504) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -10.282) top features y=EX (probability 0.163, score -1.618) top features y=FED (probability 0.003, score -5.874) top features y=HEG (probability 0.041, score -3.135) top features y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -6.529) top features y=POL (probability 0.057, score -2.799) top features y=TOP (probability 0.008, score -4.856) top features
Contribution? Feature
+1.375 and
+1.230 french
+1.099 in
+0.764 a
+0.660 permission and
+0.555 arms trade
+0.527 trade development
+0.476 and the
+0.475 to secure
+0.442 arguments
… 219 more positive …
… 209 more negative …
-0.442 free trade
-0.477 for
-0.489 italy had
-0.495 sovereignty
-0.502 were
-0.540 article nine
-0.547 the french
-0.593 in the
-0.806 advocates
-0.858 by
Contribution? Feature
+0.844 power to
+0.705 a
+0.640 the french
+0.569 free trade
+0.534 license to
+0.505 their
+0.481 norms obscures
+0.479 restraint were
+0.450 proscription generally
… 208 more positive …
… 195 more negative …
-0.544 was
-0.549 of permission
-0.577 more
-0.589 example
-0.593 french
-0.597 colonial
-0.607 power
-0.710 act
-1.322 sovereignty
-1.684 arms
-2.488 trade
Contribution? Feature
+1.495 on the
+0.983 of arms
+0.923 brussels act
+0.920 for example
+0.843 in the
+0.815 right of
+0.639 license to
+0.636 proscription were
+0.609 of sovereignty
… 144 more positive …
… 122 more negative …
-0.568 which
-0.577 by
-0.658 example
-0.742 advocates
-0.808 as
-0.873 was
-0.970 brussels
-1.002 sovereignty
-1.249 colonial
-2.084 permission
-5.553 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.598 on the
+1.409 a
+0.811 for
+0.776 the french
+0.675 license to
+0.617 to the
… 185 more positive …
… 148 more negative …
-0.607 flag
-0.609 permission
-0.639 imperial
-0.650 were
-0.731 was
-0.775 their
-0.779 arms
-0.830 to
-0.896 in
-0.999 and
-1.007 sovereignty
-1.116 and the
-1.222 by
-3.579 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.971 free trade
+1.272 the act
+0.892 permission and
+0.774 both
+0.646 sea
+0.637 or protectorate
+0.621 to the
… 192 more positive …
… 184 more negative …
-0.646 proscription
-0.659 restraint
-0.712 arguments
-0.744 act
-0.775 proponents of
-0.802 advocates
-0.810 and the
-0.995 were
-1.055 trade
-2.399 and
-2.401 to
-2.811 the
-4.791 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.647 in
+0.646 permission and
+0.558 abyssinia
+0.543 had
+0.513 the standard
+0.503 of sovereignty
+0.486 their
+0.458 for example
+0.416 proponents of
+0.413 to maintain
+0.410 of the
+0.393 french
… 216 more positive …
… 238 more negative …
-0.401 <BIAS>
-0.454 development and
-0.468 spaces
-0.497 of
-0.512 a
-0.540 proscription
-0.565 permission
-1.610 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.591 operating
+0.577 license to
+0.552 sovereignty ibid
+0.527 standard of
+0.469 advocates
+0.465 regulation
+0.396 provided the
… 205 more positive …
… 192 more negative …
-0.441 both
-0.448 advocates of
-0.496 provided
-0.496 governing
-0.530 or protectorate
-0.591 brussels act
-0.593 and the
-0.617 were
-0.618 the standard
-0.760 this
-0.785 was
-1.632 trade
-3.536 of
Contribution? Feature
+2.134 arms
+0.788 the brussels
+0.576 this
+0.488 had
+0.460 colonial
+0.375 norms
… 216 more positive …
… 209 more negative …
-0.371 proponents of
-0.403 their
-0.421 vigorously promoted
-0.427 the standard
-0.442 spaces
-0.452 on
-0.569 in
-0.684 on the
-0.720 advocates
-0.795 for
-0.829 arms trade
-0.860 and the
-0.918 brussels
-1.223 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.583 flag represented
+0.485 red sea
+0.471 dhow
+0.467 failed to
+0.430 undertaken by
+0.426 this is
… 218 more positive …
… 206 more negative …
-0.403 that both
-0.432 the act
-0.438 colonial possessions
-0.445 flag
-0.448 suffused with
-0.449 article
-0.466 in
-0.503 development and
-0.590 license to
-0.648 french
-0.683 which
-0.973 by
-1.064 a
-5.507 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.133 arms
+0.733 on
+0.713 both the
+0.643 of sovereignty
+0.547 advocates of
+0.475 to maintain
… 176 more positive …
… 166 more negative …
-0.477 officials considered
-0.486 the arms
-0.529 right
-0.543 spaces
-0.584 the french
-0.597 as
-0.619 permission
-0.626 advocates
-0.642 was
-0.647 by
-0.695 french
-0.840 colonial
-0.843 of arms
-1.375 to
Contribution? Feature
+1.384 act
+0.953 the advocates
+0.723 local
+0.705 for example
+0.599 of sovereignty
+0.556 each heavily
+0.548 sovereign state
+0.524 the arms
… 215 more positive …
… 196 more negative …
-0.512 example
-0.518 access to
-0.560 markets and
-0.714 free trade
-0.778 sovereignty
-0.812 advocates
-0.870 trade
-0.945 and the
-1.009 a
-1.202 to
-1.611 of
-2.850 arms

y=ANB (probability 0.717, score 0.980) top features

Contribution? Feature
+1.851 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 219 more positive …
… 209 more negative …

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=CAP (probability 0.008, score -4.786) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 208 more positive …
… 195 more negative …
-5.051 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=ECON (probability 0.002, score -6.453) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 144 more positive …
… 122 more negative …
-7.220 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=EDU (probability 0.001, score -7.504) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 185 more positive …
… 148 more negative …
-8.553 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -10.282) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 192 more positive …
… 184 more negative …
-12.787 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorateof another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=EX (probability 0.163, score -1.618) top features

Contribution? Feature
+1.342 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 216 more positive …
… 238 more negative …
-0.401 <BIAS>

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=FED (probability 0.003, score -5.874) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 205 more positive …
… 192 more negative …
-7.966 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorateof another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=HEG (probability 0.041, score -3.135) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 216 more positive …
… 209 more negative …
-4.294 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -6.529) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 218 more positive …
… 206 more negative …
-10.190 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag representeda license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=POL (probability 0.057, score -2.799) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 176 more positive …
… 166 more negative …
-5.259 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

y=TOP (probability 0.008, score -4.856) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 215 more positive …
… 196 more negative …
-6.389 Highlighted in text (sum)

however, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. first, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (tagliacozzo 2005; mathew 2016). second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. for example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-european competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (grant 2007; chew 2012). policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. as will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization. for example, the brussels act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into abyssinia and somalia where, by 1908, british officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of french support for a profitable arms trade through french-controlled djibouti. in this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. the legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by article ten of the brussels act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the british. this affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and italy had previously announced abyssinia’s adhesion to the agreement. compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the french had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any sovereign state.”30 enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of brussels was also hampered by french refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the french flag. arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the red sea and the persian gulf quickly realized the french flag represented “a license to traffic” (mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. this is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. the arms provisions of the brussels act were ultimately predicated on the fact that european powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (article nine) in their colonial possessions. thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention. similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. in africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting african laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (storey 2008, 196). conversely, proponents of restri

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.415, score -1.714) top features y=CAP (probability 0.072, score -3.601) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -25.423) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -11.988) top features y=ENV (probability 0.093, score -3.338) top features y=EX (probability 0.226, score -2.401) top features y=FED (probability 0.015, score -5.187) top features y=HEG (probability 0.157, score -2.794) top features y=NAT (probability 0.009, score -5.660) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.639) top features y=TOP (probability 0.012, score -5.440) top features
Contribution? Feature
+0.682 type
+0.452 and
+0.426 of
+0.400 unrelenting
+0.377 settler
+0.369 dispossession
+0.356 of elimination
+0.356 decolonisation
+0.342 attacks against
+0.337 pervasive
+0.323 decolonial
+0.323 disavows previous
… 114 more positive …
… 125 more negative …
-0.302 non relation
-0.304 colonial present
-0.318 these
-0.321 decolonisation of
-0.359 strategy
-0.529 type of
-0.807 indigenous
-0.959 to
Contribution? Feature
+0.600 non relation
+0.496 type of
+0.354 this they
+0.335 collection propose
+0.326 pervasive influence
+0.325 the settler
+0.279 go die
… 114 more positive …
… 112 more negative …
-0.310 they critically
-0.322 non
-0.324 out
-0.345 that
-0.348 unrelenting
-0.351 <BIAS>
-0.360 they
-0.362 indigenous
-0.442 type
-0.493 pervasive
-1.028 of
-1.374 the
-1.497 settler
Contribution? Feature
+5.139 settler colonial
… 1 more positive …
… 32 more negative …
-0.282 pervasive
-0.295 however
-0.301 accumulation
-0.437 unrelenting
-0.454 non
-0.554 specifically
-0.625 that
-0.643 is
-0.647 challenge
-0.767 ongoing
-0.876 way
-0.894 they
-1.531 relation
-1.888 settler
-2.339 indigenous
-2.698 of
-3.034 a
-3.987 colonial
-4.652 the
Contribution? Feature
+4.478 settler colonial
+1.202 non relation
+0.715 and
+0.662 type of
+0.639 specifically settler
+0.618 possession that
… 63 more positive …
… 54 more negative …
-0.489 way
-0.580 they
-0.590 must
-0.623 to
-0.645 present
-0.703 is
-0.744 that
-0.951 the
-1.238 relation
-1.322 indigenous
-2.219 a
-2.670 settler
-3.450 of
-3.484 colonial
Contribution? Feature
+0.625 settler colonial
+0.479 pervasive influence
+0.474 should begin
+0.411 also constitute
+0.388 decolonial strategy
+0.388 collectively the
+0.386 the pervasive
+0.386 colonial subjectivities
+0.382 relation a
… 80 more positive …
… 77 more negative …
-0.406 against
-0.410 elimination
-0.460 that
-0.546 the
-0.565 relation
-0.603 as
-0.866 a
-1.181 indigenous
-1.235 settler
-1.365 colonial
-1.465 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.530 of specifically
+0.493 former against
+0.376 a way
+0.369 to this
+0.367 an unrelenting
+0.358 the pervasive
+0.354 constitute a
+0.335 recommend that
… 92 more positive …
… 99 more negative …
-0.336 social
-0.342 colonial
-0.343 geographies projects
-0.345 decolonial
-0.348 dispossession
-0.366 of
-0.371 logic of
-0.421 this
-0.429 influence
-0.495 unrelenting
-0.562 relation
-0.623 that
Contribution? Feature
+0.991 type of
+0.910 of settler
+0.677 the pervasive
+0.632 of the
+0.628 the settler
+0.606 colonial relation
+0.541 pervasive influence
+0.499 use patrick
+0.438 colonial modes
+0.431 go die
… 86 more positive …
… 85 more negative …
-0.431 renounce
-0.490 dispossession
-0.508 a
-0.600 unrelenting
-0.798 they
-1.013 relation
-1.057 to
-1.767 indigenous
-2.634 of
-2.776 settler
Contribution? Feature
+1.297 settler colonial
+1.033 non relation
+0.777 to
+0.645 the ongoing
+0.476 violence and
+0.469 new type
+0.447 projects of
… 83 more positive …
… 82 more negative …
-0.385 dispossession
-0.396 ongoing
-0.419 systematically
-0.452 against
-0.454 communities
-0.459 relation
-0.473 of
-0.480 influence
-0.562 present
-0.617 and that
-0.687 they
-1.271 colonial
-1.428 settler
Contribution? Feature
+1.188 indigenous
+0.627 settler colonial
+0.579 colonial present
+0.475 settler
+0.452 challenge the
+0.406 pervasive influence
… 105 more positive …
… 100 more negative …
-0.416 challenge
-0.472 and
-0.500 of elimination
-0.521 present
-0.523 this
-0.531 colonial situation
-0.564 pervasive
-0.611 a
-0.626 unrelenting
-0.810 relation
-1.050 colonial
-1.409 that
-1.470 the
-2.226 of
Contribution? Feature
+3.903 settler colonial
+0.870 pervasive influence
+0.737 of possession
+0.708 type of
+0.657 possession that
+0.641 that
+0.594 to this
+0.569 of specifically
… 37 more positive …
… 46 more negative …
-0.510 to
-0.564 unrelenting
-0.566 non
-0.586 elimination
-0.633 however
-0.696 a
-0.837 challenge
-0.957 and
-1.091 they
-1.200 relation
-1.687 indigenous
-4.964 colonial
Contribution? Feature
+2.622 settler colonial
+1.162 non relation
+0.524 pervasive influence
+0.486 type of
+0.416 propose a
+0.400 of possession
+0.398 indigenous isolation
… 76 more positive …
… 50 more negative …
-0.398 they
-0.483 influence
-0.510 that
-0.585 relation
-0.612 elimination
-0.806 ongoing
-0.835 challenge
-1.435 of
-1.460 a
-1.635 settler
-1.795 indigenous
-2.317 the
-2.332 colonial

y=ANB (probability 0.415, score -1.714) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.844 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 114 more positive …
… 125 more negative …

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=CAP (probability 0.072, score -3.601) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 114 more positive …
… 112 more negative …
-0.351 <BIAS>
-4.490 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -25.423) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 1 more positive …
… 32 more negative …
-21.765 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -11.988) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 63 more positive …
… 54 more negative …
-11.393 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=ENV (probability 0.093, score -3.338) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 80 more positive …
… 77 more negative …
-5.183 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=EX (probability 0.226, score -2.401) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 92 more positive …
… 99 more negative …
-1.798 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelentinglogic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=FED (probability 0.015, score -5.187) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 86 more positive …
… 85 more negative …
-5.723 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=HEG (probability 0.157, score -2.794) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 83 more positive …
… 82 more negative …
-2.938 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=NAT (probability 0.009, score -5.660) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 105 more positive …
… 100 more negative …
-8.004 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonialsituation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.639) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 37 more positive …
… 46 more negative …
-5.612 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

y=TOP (probability 0.012, score -5.440) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 76 more positive …
… 50 more negative …
-9.195 Highlighted in text (sum)

a type of possession that systematically disavows previous relationships to the land, the pervasive influence of settler colonial geographies, projects of elimination that target indigenous socio-reproductive capacities, the pervasive influence of specifically settler colonial violent attacks against indigenous and exogenous alterities, and an old/new type of capitalist accumulation that ‘indigenises’ colonial subjectivities: this is the settler colonial present. however, as they critically analyse the settler colonial present, these papers also suggest ways out of the settler colonial relation. they identify its specific structures. they recommend that we challenge notions of possession that negate the legitimate claims of prior owners, that sustain indigenous isolation, and that prevent the social reproduction of indigenous communities. they challenge the ongoing power of typically settler colonial narratives, the permanence of specifically settler colonial modes of violence, and ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession. collectively, the authors contributing to this collection propose a decolonial strategy. as a way to conclude, i want to very briefly add to this strategy. the decolonisation of settler colonial forms should begin from the appraisal of the settler colonial ‘situation’. a fundamental and unrelenting demand that indigenous people ‘go die’ ultimately envisages a non-relation. hypothetical settler departure, however, would also constitute a non-relation. a decolonised post-settler colonial relation must be ongoing. if settler colonialism is fundamentally characterised, to use patrick wolfe’s terminology and framework, by settlers that ‘come to stay’ and by an unrelenting ‘logic of elimination’, the way out needs to turn the former against the latter. settlers must renounce and denounce the logic of elimination. for this they need indigenous leadership.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.572, score -2.915) top features y=CAP (probability 0.015, score -6.622) top features y=ECON (probability 0.001, score -8.951) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.579) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.939) top features y=EX (probability 0.002, score -8.495) top features y=FED (probability 0.290, score -3.620) top features y=HEG (probability 0.117, score -4.541) top features y=NAT (probability 0.002, score -8.581) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.272) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -19.492) top features
Contribution? Feature
+1.434 national security
+0.570 white
+0.526 of citizenship
+0.388 epistemological
+0.352 an indefinite
+0.348 become and
+0.344 as the
+0.338 nation states
+0.335 of perceiving
… 215 more positive …
… 235 more negative …
-0.319 fossil
-0.320 beheadings drone
-0.332 techniques deployed
-0.338 militarised
-0.345 colonising state
-0.358 the others
-0.410 state
-0.416 mythologies of
-0.494 of people
-0.826 national
-1.260 security
Contribution? Feature
+1.305 method of
+0.839 security as
+0.655 security
+0.617 settler colonial
+0.497 with
+0.465 by
+0.448 pipeline they
… 220 more positive …
… 201 more negative …
-0.444 <BIAS>
-0.451 the pipeline
-0.487 much we
-0.509 nation
-0.546 settler
-0.558 white nation
-0.581 a method
-0.625 mythologies of
-0.769 to
-1.086 national security
-1.724 the
-1.829 and
-3.332 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.591 national security
+1.374 as a
+1.158 method of
+0.748 the pipeline
+0.747 nation states
+0.737 as the
+0.553 of existence
… 111 more positive …
… 87 more negative …
-0.526 state of
-0.695 experiences
-0.826 logics
-0.859 which
-0.897 an
-1.015 state
-1.085 for
-1.187 will
-1.279 settler
-1.594 a
-2.379 security
-3.124 the
-3.223 as
Contribution? Feature
+1.068 of the
+0.995 national security
+0.922 security as
+0.895 white nation
+0.842 and the
+0.823 mythologies of
+0.686 by
+0.661 wars
… 191 more positive …
… 131 more negative …
-0.745 states that
-0.870 knowing
-0.900 method
-0.927 will
-1.042 states
-1.165 and
-1.333 national
-1.628 as
-1.666 a
-1.893 that
-3.473 of
-8.179 the
Contribution? Feature
+2.384 national security
+1.791 as a
+1.471 to
+1.103 of existence
+0.909 state of
+0.796 colonial logics
+0.793 white nation
+0.720 method of
+0.661 in the
… 125 more positive …
… 162 more negative …
-0.555 will
-0.620 white
-0.874 protectors
-0.995 as
-1.028 colonial
-1.268 security
-1.504 national
-2.091 a
-2.273 and
-3.582 the
-4.367 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.662 of white
+0.624 becomes
+0.575 world
+0.511 security as
+0.509 dint of
… 219 more positive …
… 199 more negative …
-0.505 belonging
-0.514 on
-0.580 ontological
-0.585 nation
-0.626 these
-0.636 a
-0.654 as predicated
-0.704 states that
-0.711 that
-0.715 and
-0.866 as
-0.951 settler colonial
-1.160 in
-1.530 security
-6.378 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.489 colonial logics
+0.938 of people
+0.892 white nation
+0.815 and national
+0.800 security
+0.779 that
+0.759 state
+0.621 the settler
+0.615 mythologies of
… 195 more positive …
… 215 more negative …
-0.613 which
-0.638 nation states
-0.652 as
-0.680 settler
-0.693 white
-0.744 of citizenship
-0.839 logics
-0.857 in
-1.305 to
-1.320 national security
-1.480 a
Contribution? Feature
+0.774 of people
+0.760 of white
+0.636 a method
+0.586 security
+0.487 capitalist enterprise
+0.477 against which
+0.451 settler
+0.401 flesh
+0.397 with its
… 213 more positive …
… 206 more negative …
-0.444 colonial
-0.457 world
-0.461 experiences
-0.465 the settler
-0.590 state
-0.637 as a
-0.724 of existence
-0.824 logics
-0.908 settler colonial
-0.911 of
-2.336 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.502 as a
+1.189 national security
+1.179 of the
+0.858 white supremacy
+0.762 the settler
+0.745 of white
+0.709 through
+0.642 state
+0.604 to
+0.557 belonging
+0.542 be
… 190 more positive …
… 199 more negative …
-0.583 s
-0.610 national
-0.634 an
-1.001 for
-1.013 and
-1.575 a
-1.796 as
-3.298 of
-3.815 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.395 national security
+1.106 in the
+1.000 nation states
… 153 more positive …
… 102 more negative …
-0.533 security
-0.538 experiences
-0.565 logics
-0.583 militarised
-0.595 ethnographic
-0.601 supremacy
-0.623 colonial
-0.716 through
-0.761 state
-0.910 that
-0.925 method
-1.002 will
-1.413 to
-2.571 and
-3.035 as
-3.632 the
-4.662 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.560 security as
+1.474 as a
+1.373 with
+0.938 state of
+0.928 the settler
+0.880 settler colonial
+0.769 method of
… 157 more positive …
… 150 more negative …
-0.594 citizenship and
-0.638 people
-0.753 logics
-0.789 pipeline
-0.808 nation
-0.818 existence
-1.304 settler
-1.361 for
-1.922 white
-1.976 a
-2.409 as
-4.309 and
-8.182 the

y=ANB (probability 0.572, score -2.915) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 215 more positive …
… 235 more negative …
-0.782 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=CAP (probability 0.015, score -6.622) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 220 more positive …
… 201 more negative …
-0.444 <BIAS>
-7.669 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=ECON (probability 0.001, score -8.951) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 111 more positive …
… 87 more negative …
-11.781 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -10.579) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 191 more positive …
… 131 more negative …
-16.930 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.939) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 125 more positive …
… 162 more negative …
-8.531 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=EX (probability 0.002, score -8.495) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 219 more positive …
… 199 more negative …
-14.235 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=FED (probability 0.290, score -3.620) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 195 more positive …
… 215 more negative …
-2.112 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=HEG (probability 0.117, score -4.541) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 213 more positive …
… 206 more negative …
-3.790 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=NAT (probability 0.002, score -8.581) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 190 more positive …
… 199 more negative …
-5.035 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -17.272) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 153 more positive …
… 102 more negative …
-20.162 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -19.492) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 157 more positive …
… 150 more negative …
-17.942 Highlighted in text (sum)

national security is an ontological and epistemological reality founded on settler colonial logics. security becomes a state of existence and a way of knowing democracy as predicated on an indefinite sense of insecurity, which in turn authorises a monopoly on legitimate violence to preserve and persevere in the demonstration of citizenship and national belonging to white nation states that are forged in histories of colonial invasion, genocide, theft of land, slavery and the protracted occupation of indigenous territories. what if we observe national security as a collection of stories – as the mythologies of white nation states that are animating the settler colonial logics of imperialist wars? these ‘official mythologies of white nation-states’ are rooted in the settler colonial logics that sherene razack (2000 , 128– 129) identifies as ‘ narratives of innocence’ : through dint of hard work, the settler conquered the wilderness; the colonizer civilized the natives. in this era of globalization … whites must now contend with the disorder and chaos wrought by natives left to their own devices after decolonization. the chaos spills over from the lands of the south when migrants and refugees ‘invade’ and ‘color’ the spaces of the white north. establishing white supremacy as the ideological foundation of north american and european national security, renowned early twentieth-century british-australian scholar, gilbert murray proclaimed (quoted in sanjek [1994] 1996, 1): there is in the world a hierarchy of races…. [t]hose nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work of the world will tend in the long-run to be done by the lower breeds of man. this much we of the ruling colour will no doubt accept as obvious. as ontological and epistemological realities of settler colonial logics, these mythologies of white supremacy inform national security as a state of existence that becomes an inexorable part of a coloniser’ s identity. ethnographic methodologies invite researchers to grapple with these realities and the consequences of critical inquiry that endeavours to understand national security as a method of perception and participation, a method of knowing and being a settler citizen of colonising state regimes. ethnographic field methods invite us to witness the politics of knowledge production through an awareness of national security as a state of existence that informs a method of perceiving the experiences of citizenship and national belonging in conjunction with its opposites – indefinite displacement and not belonging through experiences of, for example: racial discrimination, forced migration, extraordinary rendition, torture and incarceration, soldiers’ suicides and suicide bombings, beheadings, drone strikes, and dogs bites exposing the flesh and blood of people exercising their first amendment rights to protest a militarised capitalist enterprise that channels the insatiable desire for fossil fuel to be delivered through the dakota access pipeline, which consequently pollutes the waters of the missouri river that sustains the lives of thousands of americans. they call themselves water protectors – hundreds of people, including veteran soldiers of the iraq and afghanistan wars, who joined in solidarity to become and belong to the standing rock nation as protectors of ecological sovereignty and security against the militarised expansion of the pipeline. they are perceived as a threat to national security. the state situated the protestors as the enemy against which it was required to wage war by deploying local and national law enforcement officers and private security contractors with attack dogs, water hoses in freezing temperatures, rubber bullets, pepper sprays, tear gas and concussion grenades to provide security for the capitalist project of building the pipeline. these techniques deployed to contain and neutralise the resistance of civilian protests to the pipeline are examples of the normalised, phenomenological feat

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.474, score 4.369) top features y=CAP (probability 0.015, score -3.422) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.389) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -18.465) top features y=ENV (probability 0.053, score -2.093) top features y=EX (probability 0.003, score -5.191) top features y=FED (probability 0.001, score -6.172) top features y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -6.138) top features y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -6.126) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -9.678) top features y=TOP (probability 0.452, score 2.793) top features
Contribution? Feature
+1.466 of
+0.856 settler colonialism
+0.674 as a
+0.622 structure
+0.615 the
+0.501 as
+0.459 ontological
+0.438 indianness
+0.411 is
+0.407 colonialism
+0.403 observes that
+0.380 the primal
+0.357 white
+0.346 society
+0.345 superseded
… 178 more positive …
… 192 more negative …
-0.361 an
-0.398 have
-0.413 indians
-0.415 tain its
-0.423 byrd the
Contribution? Feature
+0.582 u s
+0.486 that
+0.417 principle of
+0.412 enter the
+0.392 the ontological
+0.370 and racialization
… 195 more positive …
… 165 more negative …
-0.356 superseded
-0.356 jodi byrd
-0.359 of
-0.370 which
-0.376 tensing reflects
-0.405 ontological
-0.416 is
-0.417 argues as
-0.419 u
-0.584 she
-0.598 indigenous
-0.673 s
-0.932 as
-1.672 the
Contribution? Feature
+2.408 settler colonialism
+1.715 as a
+1.378 u s
+0.521 she argues
… 80 more positive …
… 78 more negative …
-0.455 indians
-0.520 tions
-0.630 from
-0.633 its
-0.684 is
-0.691 native
-0.696 elimination
-0.768 structure
-0.898 an
-0.962 a
-1.002 u
-1.043 and
-1.185 ontological
-2.984 of
-3.145 settler
-4.842 the
Contribution? Feature
+2.656 settler colonialism
+0.867 and the
+0.687 colonial society
+0.618 s settler
+0.602 u s
… 60 more positive …
… 61 more negative …
-0.565 its
-0.603 ontological
-0.677 tions
-0.680 is
-0.722 elimination
-0.826 colonialism
-0.909 she
-0.935 to
-1.227 u
-1.625 a
-1.695 as
-1.966 s
-2.180 settler
-3.192 of
-5.736 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.857 which u
+0.833 s settler
+0.792 settler colonial
+0.481 he
+0.479 a historical
+0.479 she argues
… 150 more positive …
… 92 more negative …
-0.473 off
-0.478 as
-0.554 colonial
-0.647 she
-0.737 u
-0.759 on
-0.830 will
-0.862 native
-0.885 is
-0.919 indigenous
-1.210 a
-1.613 to
-1.824 settler
-2.796 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.719 and the
+0.610 attention from
+0.441 that a
+0.359 served as
… 152 more positive …
… 133 more negative …
-0.347 through the
-0.394 from
-0.406 she
-0.406 of the
-0.407 as a
-0.480 rather
-0.486 society
-0.498 u
-0.508 will
-0.540 tions
-0.640 settler colonialism
-0.672 settler
-0.880 that
-0.909 ontological
-0.967 as
-1.129 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.728 settler colonialism
+0.654 through the
+0.524 through which
+0.517 the native
+0.463 the ontological
+0.439 casting place
+0.436 which u
… 152 more positive …
… 148 more negative …
-0.429 discursively to
-0.443 indians
-0.470 argues
-0.484 to
-0.490 indigenous
-0.510 native
-0.588 tions
-0.656 off
-0.673 an
-1.488 s
-1.639 colonialism
-1.732 the
-3.506 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.899 u s
+0.530 settler colonialism
+0.513 on the
+0.488 through
+0.464 elimination
+0.433 to focus
+0.412 a mobile
… 155 more positive …
… 134 more negative …
-0.424 occurrence
-0.441 that
-0.444 on
-0.505 ontological
-0.532 u
-0.791 the
-0.902 of
-1.059 and
-1.112 colonialism
-1.314 to
-1.371 settler
-1.500 as
-1.729 s
Contribution? Feature
+0.685 as a
+0.539 which
+0.514 which u
+0.453 elimination
+0.437 u s
… 155 more positive …
… 156 more negative …
-0.440 s
-0.445 part of
-0.452 as
-0.460 illuminating
-0.615 settler colonialism
-0.616 observes that
-0.631 is
-0.632 through
-0.669 colonization
-0.746 to
-0.895 ontological
-1.164 that
-1.507 of
-1.578 a
-2.417 the
Contribution? Feature
+2.225 as a
+1.892 settler colonialism
+0.743 and the
+0.688 elimination of
… 78 more positive …
… 54 more negative …
-0.607 indigenous
-0.618 tions
-0.627 being
-0.731 its
-0.776 an
-0.781 on
-0.813 native
-0.819 off
-0.965 as
-0.996 ontological
-1.011 is
-1.238 settler
-1.383 s
-2.028 the
-2.074 of
-2.377 colonialism
Contribution? Feature
+2.673 settler colonialism
+1.477 u s
+1.449 of settler
+0.817 and the
+0.710 observes that
+0.607 s settler
+0.550 colonialism and
+0.501 as the
+0.489 structure
+0.428 he
… 104 more positive …
… 88 more negative …
-0.504 rather
-0.538 to
-0.552 colonization
-0.631 possession
-0.668 its
-0.669 elimination
-0.676 tions
-0.964 u
-1.474 ontological
-2.422 settler

y=ANB (probability 0.474, score 4.369) top features

Contribution? Feature
+6.270 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 178 more positive …
… 192 more negative …

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” asa historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=CAP (probability 0.015, score -3.422) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 195 more positive …
… 165 more negative …
-5.272 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -16.389) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 80 more positive …
… 78 more negative …
-15.117 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” asa historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -18.465) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 60 more positive …
… 61 more negative …
-18.108 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” asa historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=ENV (probability 0.053, score -2.093) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 150 more positive …
… 92 more negative …
-10.665 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial willasa historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=EX (probability 0.003, score -5.191) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 152 more positive …
… 133 more negative …
-7.538 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial willasa historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=FED (probability 0.001, score -6.172) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 152 more positive …
… 148 more negative …
-9.346 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -6.138) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 155 more positive …
… 134 more negative …
-8.384 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes thatelimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=NAT (probability 0.001, score -6.126) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 155 more positive …
… 156 more negative …
-10.638 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” asa historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes thatelimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes thatcolonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -9.678) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 78 more positive …
… 54 more negative …
-12.296 Highlighted in text (sum)

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” asa historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

y=TOP (probability 0.452, score 2.793) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.602 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 104 more positive …
… 88 more negative …

if nineteenth-century american literary studies tends to focus on the ways indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. in settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology, patrick wolfe argues, “settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. the split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. the colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 he suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” he observes thatelimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). in aileen moreton-robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 in “writing off indigenous sover- eignty,” she argues, “as a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “writ- ing off treaties,” she suggests, “at an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). for jodi byrd, the deployment of indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of u.s. settler colonialism. she observes thatcolonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). she argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to u.s. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which u.s. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of indians and indianness have served as the ontological ground through which u.s. settler colonialism enacts itself"

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.970, score 1.543) top features y=CAP (probability 0.006, score -5.346) top features y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -31.427) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -16.364) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.937) top features y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.013) top features y=FED (probability 0.022, score -3.968) top features y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -11.701) top features y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -6.120) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -19.160) top features y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -24.510) top features
Contribution? Feature
+5.413 of
+1.151 colonial studies
+1.051 s
+0.673 peoples
+0.659 that
+0.644 our
+0.550 production not
+0.472 how
+0.471 critical
+0.458 methods culture
+0.446 formations as
+0.445 politics
… 198 more positive …
… 203 more negative …
-0.438 examination of
-0.445 theorizations of
-0.454 foundational to
-0.494 the production
-0.513 within the
-0.596 indigenous
-0.828 of indigenous
-1.032 colonial
Contribution? Feature
+1.006 of indigenous
+0.687 colonial
+0.657 theorizations of
+0.540 examination
+0.528 settlement
+0.481 an
+0.471 and material
+0.460 undeconstructable core
+0.458 u s
+0.446 for chickasaw
… 192 more positive …
… 193 more negative …
-0.463 and formalism
-0.465 offer
-0.484 formation
-0.503 white
-0.519 settler
-0.579 colonial studies
-0.655 p
-1.332 studies
-1.691 the
-3.237 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.317 of indigenous
+0.806 as a
+0.645 of cultural
… 6 more positive …
… 38 more negative …
-0.359 must
-0.404 p
-0.433 queer
-0.523 indigenous
-0.650 for
-0.700 power
-0.993 be
-1.043 in
-1.067 a
-1.290 as
-1.353 cultural
-1.398 theorizations
-1.861 settler
-2.289 the
-3.080 studies
-6.163 and
-7.110 of
Contribution? Feature
+2.578 cultural studies
+1.695 theorizations of
+1.551 critical
+1.491 as a
+1.226 and the
+0.831 undeconstructable core
+0.826 within u
+0.753 politics of
+0.734 u s
+0.677 of settler
… 78 more positive …
… 77 more negative …
-0.949 s
-1.104 theorizations
-1.345 and
-1.376 in
-1.624 a
-2.856 settler
-3.014 as
-3.226 cultural
-4.041 the
-6.901 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.446 as a
+1.395 settler colonialism
+1.356 settler colonial
+0.765 u s
+0.686 must be
+0.625 colonial studies
… 115 more positive …
… 108 more negative …
-0.658 indigenous
-0.672 p
-0.738 settler
-0.755 in
-0.854 to
-0.885 a
-0.931 queer
-0.982 that
-1.030 studies
-1.333 cultural
-1.401 theorizations
-1.463 the
-3.032 of
-3.697 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.063 of settler
+0.815 indigenous
+0.776 examination of
+0.679 of power
+0.670 issue
+0.619 knowledge
… 164 more positive …
… 150 more negative …
-0.573 on
-0.575 the
-0.587 space
-0.604 post
-0.648 p
-0.658 settler
-0.695 yet
-0.795 knowledge power
-0.830 white
-0.936 queer
-1.022 for
-1.150 our
-2.216 studies
-3.146 of
Contribution? Feature
+2.132 cultural studies
+2.072 in
+1.260 to
+1.232 erasure of
+1.185 of the
+1.116 indigenous
+0.999 and material
+0.974 for
… 197 more positive …
… 148 more negative …
-0.852 studies
-0.885 colonialism
-0.916 of settlement
-0.918 with
-0.957 theorizations
-0.993 s
-1.118 race
-1.255 byrd
-1.576 the
-2.143 cultural
-2.828 of
-3.091 as
Contribution? Feature
+1.920 cultural studies
+0.841 and material
+0.804 erasure of
+0.790 colonial studies
+0.723 special issue
… 138 more positive …
… 116 more negative …
-0.588 politics
-0.603 presume
-0.722 settler
-0.783 formations
-0.808 are
-0.811 critical
-0.881 material
-1.123 theorizations
-1.206 as
-1.258 for
-1.347 cultural
-1.577 studies
-2.205 indigenous
-2.733 of
-4.672 and
Contribution? Feature
+2.877 cultural studies
+1.309 indigenous
+0.998 theorizations of
+0.992 and material
+0.961 of the
+0.844 colonial
+0.719 settler
+0.719 settler colonialism
+0.675 of settler
… 126 more positive …
… 149 more negative …
-0.703 a
-0.722 examination
-0.729 for
-0.778 in
-0.864 theorizations
-1.109 the
-1.115 colonialism
-1.554 of
-1.734 cultural
-2.339 studies
-3.563 and
Contribution? Feature
+2.309 of indigenous
+2.033 cultural studies
+1.179 u s
+1.107 theorizations of
+0.539 that
… 30 more positive …
… 54 more negative …
-0.539 on
-0.574 but
-0.590 critical
-0.646 power
-0.695 colonialism
-0.957 be
-0.990 settler
-1.045 for
-1.341 as
-1.604 cultural
-1.763 to
-1.803 studies
-3.050 and
-3.285 the
-4.787 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.169 indigenous peoples
+0.761 studies circulates
+0.735 of race
… 50 more positive …
… 66 more negative …
-0.458 to
-0.497 best
-0.512 colonial
-0.561 racialization
-0.575 u
-0.594 for
-0.606 byrd
-0.607 material
-0.704 theorizations
-0.754 undeconstructable
-1.190 that
-1.256 cultural
-1.452 settler
-2.302 studies
-3.195 the
-4.048 and
-6.902 of

y=ANB (probability 0.970, score 1.543) top features

Contribution? Feature
+7.632 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 198 more positive …
… 203 more negative …

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=CAP (probability 0.006, score -5.346) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 192 more positive …
… 193 more negative …
-4.195 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as theundeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -31.427) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 6 more positive …
… 38 more negative …
-27.946 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -16.364) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 78 more positive …
… 77 more negative …
-14.076 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as theundeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -11.937) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 115 more positive …
… 108 more negative …
-12.157 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.013) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 164 more positive …
… 150 more negative …
-9.814 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studies’ theorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=FED (probability 0.022, score -3.968) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 197 more positive …
… 148 more negative …
-6.561 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrds (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -11.701) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 138 more positive …
… 116 more negative …
-16.240 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=NAT (probability 0.003, score -6.120) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 126 more positive …
… 149 more negative …
-5.117 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -19.160) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 30 more positive …
… 54 more negative …
-16.504 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as the “undeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

y=TOP (probability 0.000, score -24.510) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 50 more positive …
… 66 more negative …
-23.545 Highlighted in text (sum)

this special issue on settler colonialism and cultural production seeks to intervene in cultural studies, drawing on indigenous studies and approaches to analyzing settler colonialism to untangle the cultural and material work of settlement as a foundational solipsism of u.s. and global relations of power and control. cultural studiestheorizations of race, space, and colonization have yet to adequately grapple with the politics of settlement on indigenous land. critical cultural studies projects are often grounded in assumptions that presume and erase settler colonial epistemologies so that even in our best attempts to challenge systems of exclusion and privilege unwittingly reify the normatively white enlightenment subject, and the settler colonial grounds on which it is formed. for chickasaw theorist, jodi byrd, the production of critical projects like cultural studies circulates through the erasure of indigenous genocide and conquest. byrd’s (2011) careful genealogical critique reveals that “prevailing understandings of race and racialization within u.s. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples” (p. 24). the methods culture critics deploy, like genealogy and deconstruction, presume, and participate in the erasure of indigenous peoples as modern subjects, but rather as “located outside temporality and presence,” which is particularly egregious in the “face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives” (byrd, 2011, p. 6). byrd (2011) underscores how “the savage and the ‘indian’ . . . serves as the ground and pre-condition for structuralism and formalism, as well as their posts” and persists as a “an undeconstructable core within critical theories that attempt to dismantle how knowledge, power, and language function” (p. 10). the figure of the native as theundeconstructable core” within the knowledge/power/language formation of cultural studies circulates as an undigested subtext. our unwitting reproduction of settler logics are foundational to our theorizations of racial, (post)colonial, and material formations as our knowledge production not only erases the identities experience of first nations peoples but also perpetuates and remains complicit with settler projects: the “disappearance” of native peoples, the theft and privatization of land for profit, and the ongoing genocide of indigenous people. in part, then, this special issue aims to offer the field of cultural studies host of theoretical resources and methodological approaches to settler colonial studies as a way to deepen our treatment of settler cultural formations to begin the dirty work of deconstructing the rhetorical and material practices of settler colonialism. for instance, whiteness must be more fully interrogated as a settler project, especially within u.s. contexts; imperialism must be theorized as productive of, but not the same as, settler colonialism; popular cultural studies should be radically rethought through a critical examination of pervasive representations that disappear indigenous peoples. works in settler colonial studies may be at their best when they engage indigenous theorizations of genocide and survivance, especially in conversation with black theorizations of antiblackness and futurity. as such, settler colonial studies provides a vibrant examination of power relations in its extensive treatment of such topics as sovereignty, nationalism and nation formation; imperial formations, genocide, removal, colonial legacies; the politics of land, landedness, space and place; intersectionality, queer theory, gender studies; race, racialization, white supremacy; affect studies; futurities, materialities, environmentalism, new materialism; and tourism and travel. new approaches to a variety of the above topics are of urgent importance to cultural studies practitioners. yet, with the exception of a handful of scholars, treatments of settler colonialism have largely remained undertheorized in

Explained as: linear model

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Contribution? Feature
+0.683 futurity
+0.471 white
+0.442 racism
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… 156 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-0.333 interrupt settler
-0.337 project
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Contribution? Feature
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… 127 more positive …
… 153 more negative …
-0.398 does
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-0.455 futurity
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-0.567 that
-0.608 the
-0.672 settler
-0.873 is
-0.970 to
-1.054 in
Contribution? Feature
+1.779 the future
+1.359 the ways
+1.204 the present
+0.980 is invested
+0.889 invested in
+0.794 replacement is
+0.776 settler colonial
… 43 more positive …
… 61 more negative …
-0.693 ways
-0.704 an
-0.727 colonialism
-0.800 is
-0.802 in
-0.817 indigenous
-1.016 project
-1.067 be
-1.301 future
-1.607 futurity
-2.264 settler
-2.293 to
-5.614 the
Contribution? Feature
+2.321 the present
+2.014 the future
+1.179 of replacement
+0.918 curricular project
+0.873 settler colonial
+0.858 in
+0.805 in which
+0.700 invested in
… 63 more positive …
… 62 more negative …
-0.647 racism
-0.733 invested
-0.739 to
-0.757 land
-0.838 this
-0.866 peoples
-1.332 which
-1.442 past
-2.005 settler
-2.057 that
-2.120 is
-5.369 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.624 settler futurity
+0.908 colonial curricular
+0.887 the future
+0.828 is invested
+0.590 curricular project
+0.568 in something
… 107 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-0.587 invested
-0.617 colonial
-0.647 past
-0.664 as
-0.679 land
-0.680 racism
-0.721 futurity which
-0.750 colonialism
-0.853 not
-0.903 is
-0.943 be
-1.329 futurity
-1.482 to
-2.652 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.537 the present
+0.510 of replacement
+0.474 this historical
+0.431 is invested
+0.411 baldwin
+0.405 turn intervenes
+0.386 privileges an
+0.385 invested in
… 145 more positive …
… 110 more negative …
-0.378 temporality
-0.398 thus
-0.399 that
-0.492 this
-0.513 racism
-0.653 be
-0.713 the
-0.718 settler colonialism
-0.815 invested
-0.922 an
-1.096 is
-2.005 futurity
Contribution? Feature
+0.640 settler futurity
+0.629 invested in
+0.534 of replacement
+0.492 white racism
+0.477 p 173
… 118 more positive …
… 98 more negative …
-0.468 curricular project
-0.501 ways
-0.507 racism
-0.553 futurity
-0.557 something
-0.575 present and
-0.637 future
-0.847 peoples
-0.918 land
-1.089 invested
-1.357 settler
-1.395 which
-1.657 is
-1.814 to
-2.581 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.153 of replacement
+1.003 of the
+0.702 in which
+0.607 say that
+0.451 settler colonialism
+0.443 curricular project
+0.395 came before
… 97 more positive …
… 100 more negative …
-0.396 white
-0.463 curricular
-0.474 racism
-0.493 an
-0.515 invested
-0.560 be
-0.885 that
-0.916 land
-0.974 is
-1.031 future
-1.221 futurity
-1.942 settler
-2.099 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.834 invested in
+0.791 the future
+0.612 in which
+0.599 settler colonialism
+0.561 locate the
+0.547 indigenous
+0.513 replacement is
+0.457 land
… 125 more positive …
… 107 more negative …
-0.450 p
-0.487 does
-0.536 an
-0.561 white
-0.603 not
-0.613 future
-0.648 racism
-0.723 in
-1.383 futurity
-1.678 of
-2.280 is
-2.962 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.234 of the
+0.633 the future
+0.609 the present
… 41 more positive …
… 48 more negative …
-0.530 foreclose
-0.545 we
-0.567 i
-0.578 an
-0.631 upon
-0.658 that
-0.761 say
-0.800 invested
-0.818 this
-0.905 be
-1.140 p
-1.547 is
-1.634 in
-1.866 future
-2.365 of
-2.610 settler
-4.888 the
Contribution? Feature
+2.212 is invested
+1.302 invested in
+1.231 the future
+0.874 settler futurity
+0.826 the present
+0.700 of the
… 65 more positive …
… 63 more negative …
-0.606 settler
-0.642 something
-0.768 does
-0.875 invested
-0.898 peoples
-0.965 to
-0.973 future
-0.996 an
-1.017 is
-1.149 futurity
-1.161 in
-1.203 indigenous
-2.436 which
-2.571 the

y=ANB (probability 0.507, score -2.454) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 156 more positive …
… 127 more negative …
-4.492 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something elses futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=CAP (probability 0.041, score -5.036) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 127 more positive …
… 153 more negative …
-3.922 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something elses futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=ECON (probability 0.000, score -14.164) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 43 more positive …
… 61 more negative …
-11.926 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=EDU (probability 0.003, score -7.583) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 63 more positive …
… 62 more negative …
-9.235 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=ENV (probability 0.141, score -3.792) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 107 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-8.101 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=EX (probability 0.261, score -3.158) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 145 more positive …
… 110 more negative …
-5.565 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=FED (probability 0.003, score -7.631) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 118 more positive …
… 98 more negative …
-12.685 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=HEG (probability 0.024, score -5.586) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 97 more positive …
… 100 more negative …
-7.213 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=NAT (probability 0.017, score -5.935) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 125 more positive …
… 107 more negative …
-8.012 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -21.164) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 41 more positive …
… 48 more negative …
-20.368 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

y=TOP (probability 0.002, score -7.942) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 65 more positive …
… 63 more negative …
-9.117 Highlighted in text (sum)

the settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what andrew baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). when we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. to say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] according to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. it cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. to be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of indigenous land by nonindigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. that is to say that indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of indigenous peoples.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.878, score 1.598) top features y=CAP (probability 0.034, score -3.400) top features y=ECON (probability 0.003, score -5.819) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -23.265) top features y=ENV (probability 0.022, score -3.854) top features y=EX (probability 0.000, score -16.715) top features y=FED (probability 0.000, score -19.175) top features y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -7.499) top features y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -18.417) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -21.094) top features y=TOP (probability 0.030, score -3.537) top features y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -22.162) top features y=QER (probability 0.033, score -3.449) top features y=COL (probability 0.000, score -13.536) top features
Contribution? Feature
+2.134 black
+1.849 slavery
+0.844 chattel
+0.709 of
+0.698 the
+0.589 decolonial
+0.329 escaped
+0.287 unfolded
+0.274 a
… 38 more positive …
… 56 more negative …
-0.249 developments
-0.257 black chattel
-0.262 address
-0.276 incorporate
-0.283 <BIAS>
-0.289 have
-0.326 revised
-0.340 increase
-0.349 university
-0.430 universities
-0.785 efforts
Contribution? Feature
+0.366 institutional
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+0.274 over the
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… 55 more positive …
… 39 more negative …
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-0.340 how
-0.414 a
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Contribution? Feature
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… 53 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 43 more negative …
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-0.365 universities
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Contribution? Feature
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… 62 more positive …
… 29 more negative …
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-0.730 chattel
-0.744 narratives
-1.252 the
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Contribution? Feature
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… 48 more negative …
-0.285 scholarship
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-1.033 the
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Contribution? Feature
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… 45 more negative …
-0.260 on
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-0.326 <BIAS>
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-1.812 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.686 of how
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… 53 more positive …
… 47 more negative …
-0.324 these
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-0.336 scholarship
-0.344 narratives
-0.354 apology
-0.390 have
-0.401 <BIAS>
-0.424 their
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-0.720 a
-0.734 of
-0.745 the
-0.827 how
-0.960 slavery
-0.970 black
-1.016 and
Contribution? Feature
… 9 more positive …
… 38 more negative …
-0.251 narratives
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-0.275 university
-0.280 histories
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-0.339 <BIAS>
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-0.941 institutional
-0.955 how
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-1.088 the
-1.108 slavery
-1.336 of
-1.885 and
Contribution? Feature
… 49 more negative …
-0.272 efforts
-0.287 scholarship
-0.289 <BIAS>
-0.293 attention
-0.294 who
-0.299 an
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-1.404 and
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-1.969 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.476 and decolonial
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… 59 more positive …
… 34 more negative …
-0.309 efforts
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-0.344 a
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-0.584 how
-0.613 the
-0.841 institutional
-1.092 slavery
-1.137 black
Contribution? Feature
… 52 more negative …
-0.278 scholarship
-0.279 <BIAS>
-0.283 histories
-0.294 an
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-0.335 attention
-0.336 intersections
-0.492 their
-0.526 have
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-1.140 and
-1.281 the
-2.396 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.331 a single
+0.310 of how
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+0.297 single university
+0.266 institutional narratives
+0.265 in and
… 61 more positive …
… 42 more negative …
-0.296 scholarship
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-0.332 benefitted
-0.353 institutional
-0.430 higher
-0.436 education
-0.486 efforts
-0.491 <BIAS>
-0.501 a
-0.673 the
-0.712 in
-0.833 black
-0.904 slavery
-1.000 of
Contribution? Feature
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… 32 more positive …
… 47 more negative …
-0.291 intersections
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-0.349 histories
-0.350 <BIAS>
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y=ANB (probability 0.878, score 1.598) top features

Contribution? Feature
+4.150 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 38 more positive …
… 56 more negative …
-0.283 <BIAS>

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=CAP (probability 0.034, score -3.400) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 55 more positive …
… 39 more negative …
-0.513 <BIAS>
-4.435 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=ECON (probability 0.003, score -5.819) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 56 more positive …
… 53 more negative …
-0.384 <BIAS>
-6.095 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -23.265) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 1 more positive …
… 43 more negative …
-16.024 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=ENV (probability 0.022, score -3.854) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 62 more positive …
… 29 more negative …
-7.321 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -16.715) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 24 more positive …
… 48 more negative …
-0.403 <BIAS>
-11.615 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=FED (probability 0.000, score -19.175) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 17 more positive …
… 45 more negative …
-0.326 <BIAS>
-13.048 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=HEG (probability 0.001, score -7.499) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 53 more positive …
… 47 more negative …
-0.401 <BIAS>
-7.268 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=NAT (probability 0.000, score -18.417) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 9 more positive …
… 38 more negative …
-0.339 <BIAS>
-12.817 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -21.094) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 49 more negative …
-0.289 <BIAS>
-13.333 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=TOP (probability 0.030, score -3.537) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 59 more positive …
… 34 more negative …
-0.399 <BIAS>
-7.313 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -22.162) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 52 more negative …
-0.279 <BIAS>
-13.846 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=QER (probability 0.033, score -3.449) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 61 more positive …
… 42 more negative …
-0.491 <BIAS>
-5.493 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

y=COL (probability 0.000, score -13.536) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 32 more positive …
… 47 more negative …
-0.350 <BIAS>
-10.800 Highlighted in text (sum)

over the past 10 years there has been an increase in institutional recognition of how us universities and their founders directly participated in and benefitted from black chattel slavery. however, these developments have largely escaped the attention of scholars who take higher education as their object of study. this article offers a conceptual reading of how apology efforts around slavery have unfolded at a single university. drawing on the intersections of black studies and decolonial scholarship, i consider how revised institutional narratives develop through efforts to address and incorporate these violent histories.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.012, score -4.182) top features y=CAP (probability 0.059, score -2.546) top features y=ECON (probability 0.134, score -1.623) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -46.942) top features y=ENV (probability 0.002, score -5.847) top features y=EX (probability 0.002, score -5.948) top features y=FED (probability 0.333, score -0.370) top features y=HEG (probability 0.018, score -3.781) top features y=NAT (probability 0.124, score -1.715) top features y=POL (probability 0.022, score -3.591) top features y=TOP (probability 0.136, score -1.603) top features y=ORI (probability 0.041, score -2.946) top features y=QER (probability 0.062, score -2.493) top features y=COL (probability 0.054, score -2.654) top features
Contribution? Feature
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… 90 more positive …
… 69 more negative …
-0.381 violations
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-0.545 forms
-0.571 ihl
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Contribution? Feature
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… 112 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-0.251 rights
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-0.353 att
-0.463 that
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Contribution? Feature
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… 110 more positive …
… 124 more negative …
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-0.305 is
-0.345 major
-0.476 a
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-0.607 <BIAS>
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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… 91 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
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-4.075 of
Contribution? Feature
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… 86 more positive …
… 47 more negative …
-0.492 violations
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-0.589 by
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Contribution? Feature
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+0.188 preparation practices
… 105 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-0.200 western
-0.203 preparation
-0.283 practices
-0.306 of
-0.312 rights
-0.331 exercised
-0.334 a
-0.500 <BIAS>
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-1.034 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.631 liberal
+1.426 states
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+0.274 arms transfers
… 93 more positive …
… 87 more negative …
-0.285 in
-0.340 <BIAS>
-0.343 forms
-0.479 western
-0.557 att
-0.640 militarism
-0.680 the
-0.754 human
-0.808 arms
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-1.087 and
Contribution? Feature
+1.569 war
+0.517 that
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+0.381 militarism
+0.316 arms
… 138 more positive …
… 102 more negative …
-0.264 the att
-0.269 war making
-0.297 regulatory
-0.320 form
-0.390 <BIAS>
-0.394 is
-0.408 morality
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-0.556 practices
-0.569 human
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-1.024 of
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Contribution? Feature
+1.013 the att
+0.918 of human
+0.640 and ihl
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+0.470 major western
… 81 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-0.459 major
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-0.549 militarism
-0.574 human
-0.639 in
-0.643 states
-0.686 a
-0.808 is
-0.913 war
-1.191 and
-1.298 the
-1.327 of
-1.418 liberal
Contribution? Feature
+0.791 of
+0.269 human rights
+0.239 that
+0.231 by major
+0.201 the predominantly
+0.182 optimistic emerging
+0.178 in the
+0.171 western liberal
+0.164 transfers as
… 118 more positive …
… 110 more negative …
-0.177 stake
-0.183 assessment
-0.215 spenders
-0.221 att
-0.235 by
-0.286 ihl
-0.325 regulatory
-0.424 rights
-0.556 <BIAS>
-0.621 liberal
-0.685 states
Contribution? Feature
+0.634 liberal states
+0.613 the att
+0.550 exercised by
+0.537 human rights
+0.516 effect of
+0.378 arms transfers
… 93 more positive …
… 61 more negative …
-0.345 <BIAS>
-0.366 is
-0.369 a
-0.384 form
-0.398 that
-0.411 effect
-0.472 war
-0.501 exercised
-0.511 western
-0.528 human
-0.647 forms
-1.253 and
-1.314 of
-1.654 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.318 human
+0.256 effect of
+0.240 of regulatory
+0.237 violence
+0.236 and war
+0.222 for them
… 114 more positive …
… 84 more negative …
-0.225 that
-0.229 for
-0.237 att
-0.280 it
-0.329 rights
-0.331 arms
-0.420 ihl
-0.424 major
-0.468 war
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-0.684 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.532 war making
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+0.327 effect of
+0.318 liberal forms
… 94 more positive …
… 64 more negative …
-0.325 regimes
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-0.402 it
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y=ANB (probability 0.012, score -4.182) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 90 more positive …
… 69 more negative …
-5.615 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=CAP (probability 0.059, score -2.546) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 112 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-0.503 <BIAS>
-3.747 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=ECON (probability 0.134, score -1.623) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 110 more positive …
… 124 more negative …
-0.607 <BIAS>
-0.956 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -46.942) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 47 more negative …
-40.997 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=ENV (probability 0.002, score -5.847) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 91 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-11.612 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=EX (probability 0.002, score -5.948) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 86 more positive …
… 47 more negative …
-11.920 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=FED (probability 0.333, score -0.370) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 105 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-0.500 <BIAS>
-1.746 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=HEG (probability 0.018, score -3.781) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 93 more positive …
… 87 more negative …
-0.340 <BIAS>
-2.367 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=NAT (probability 0.124, score -1.715) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 138 more positive …
… 102 more negative …
-0.390 <BIAS>
-4.714 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=POL (probability 0.022, score -3.591) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 81 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-6.308 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=TOP (probability 0.136, score -1.603) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 118 more positive …
… 110 more negative …
-0.556 <BIAS>
-0.944 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=ORI (probability 0.041, score -2.946) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 93 more positive …
… 61 more negative …
-0.345 <BIAS>
-5.581 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=QER (probability 0.062, score -2.493) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 114 more positive …
… 84 more negative …
-0.513 <BIAS>
-3.908 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

y=COL (probability 0.054, score -2.654) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 94 more positive …
… 64 more negative …
-0.345 <BIAS>
-7.655 Highlighted in text (sum)

in this article i argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the att is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. it is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the att will bring no new responsibilities for them. the same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as russia and, increasingly, china. there is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. there is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and ihl are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and ihl. this legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the att in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. with the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the att takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism.

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.070, score -3.050) top features y=CAP (probability 0.073, score -3.018) top features y=ECON (probability 0.621, score -0.409) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -55.961) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -40.969) top features y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.447) top features y=FED (probability 0.015, score -4.656) top features y=HEG (probability 0.006, score -5.555) top features y=NAT (probability 0.008, score -5.263) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -15.929) top features y=TOP (probability 0.161, score -2.161) top features y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -16.635) top features y=QER (probability 0.043, score -3.554) top features y=COL (probability 0.003, score -6.188) top features
Contribution? Feature
+1.267 the
+0.628 as
+0.369 global civil
+0.310 society
+0.263 war has
+0.241 global war
+0.239 polices civil
+0.236 tends
+0.226 argue convincingly
… 216 more positive …
… 214 more negative …
-0.250 argue
-0.266 warfare
-0.359 <BIAS>
-0.368 ibid
-0.386 that
-0.429 negri
-0.453 global
-0.902 wars
-0.939 civil
-1.063 and
-2.308 war
Contribution? Feature
+0.461 biopolitical
+0.387 global civil
+0.365 war has
+0.301 to the
+0.262 social
+0.250 with
+0.249 of global
+0.245 as the
+0.242 on the
+0.237 state
… 202 more positive …
… 184 more negative …
-0.292 has
-0.329 negri
-0.331 <BIAS>
-0.344 that
-0.384 to
-0.493 and
-0.916 wars
-1.206 of
-1.524 the
-2.164 war
Contribution? Feature
+0.450 civil
+0.445 civil war
+0.419 negri
+0.343 global civil
+0.294 as the
+0.239 surveillance
+0.237 spatial exchange
+0.236 that it
+0.225 imperialism
+0.211 decolonization
+0.199 hardt and
… 214 more positive …
… 222 more negative …
-0.212 s
-0.215 news to
-0.224 global
-0.262 of decolonization
-0.357 that
-0.387 has
-0.442 war
-0.448 <BIAS>
-0.538 is
Contribution? Feature
… 38 more negative …
-0.508 society
-0.633 biopower
-0.662 social
-0.692 ibid
-0.760 at
-0.803 its
-0.806 that
-0.816 s
-1.045 is
-1.233 hardt
-1.267 as
-1.391 global
-1.570 it
-2.040 for
-2.385 in
-2.834 civil
-4.238 war
-6.704 and
-9.125 the
-11.715 of
Contribution? Feature
… 44 more negative …
-0.463 argue
-0.496 which
-0.508 that
-0.654 has
-0.660 negri
-0.662 wars
-0.751 its
-0.816 social
-0.986 is
-0.989 s
-1.053 it
-1.159 as
-1.292 hardt
-1.366 global
-1.469 a
-2.992 war
-3.309 in
-3.414 civil
-5.397 the
-8.101 of
Contribution? Feature
+1.499 civil war
+1.424 and negri
+1.324 hardt and
+1.255 of global
+1.163 global
+0.786 at the
+0.710 has become
+0.607 civil wars
… 87 more positive …
… 86 more negative …
-0.625 become
-0.678 has
-0.685 hardt
-0.706 social
-0.865 the
-0.882 is
-0.909 its
-1.604 as
-2.270 civil
-3.020 and
-3.534 of
-4.166 war
Contribution? Feature
+1.070 global civil
+0.600 hardt and
+0.445 to the
+0.444 civil war
+0.368 wars
+0.343 become a
+0.340 of capital
… 170 more positive …
… 152 more negative …
-0.340 <BIAS>
-0.383 and negri
-0.393 is
-0.394 biopolitical
-0.403 has
-0.468 social
-0.530 civil
-0.605 as
-0.615 that
-0.729 the
-1.280 global
-1.617 and
-2.319 of
Contribution? Feature
+0.793 and negri
+0.684 argue that
+0.639 global civil
+0.564 of global
+0.560 new
+0.533 hardt and
… 117 more positive …
… 63 more negative …
-0.542 decolonization
-0.596 biopolitical
-0.647 the
-0.794 negri
-0.823 in
-0.825 biopower
-0.851 that
-0.852 is
-0.899 s
-0.903 social
-0.932 of
-0.960 global
-2.032 and
-2.887 war
Contribution? Feature
+2.405 war
+1.102 wars
+0.780 global civil
+0.488 and negri
… 193 more positive …
… 174 more negative …
-0.276 as
-0.292 decolonization
-0.294 for
-0.297 civil
-0.333 negri
-0.334 ibid
-0.343 biopower
-0.466 colonial
-0.511 society
-0.513 is
-0.635 hardt
-0.662 of
-0.839 biopolitical
-0.992 social
-1.659 the
-1.887 and
Contribution? Feature
+5.476 global civil
+3.931 hardt and
+3.746 and negri
+1.788 civil war
+0.785 to the
… 7 more positive …
… 49 more negative …
-0.698 is
-0.708 s
-0.878 to
-0.973 hardt
-1.028 wars
-1.134 that
-1.208 for
-1.279 negri
-1.854 war
-1.941 as
-2.083 the
-2.561 global
-2.580 civil
-3.401 of
-4.581 and
Contribution? Feature
+0.505 negri
+0.489 ibid
+0.462 in
+0.336 global civil
+0.228 the construction
… 234 more positive …
… 225 more negative …
-0.212 to the
-0.227 31 necessary
-0.232 for
-0.235 state
-0.239 new
-0.264 a
-0.265 war has
-0.279 social
-0.362 argue
-0.371 as
-0.426 hardt and
-0.467 s
-0.477 <BIAS>
-0.514 global
-1.226 the
Contribution? Feature
+4.598 hardt and
+3.867 global civil
+3.505 civil war
+0.779 civil wars
+0.595 framework ibid
+0.564 that it
… 24 more positive …
… 56 more negative …
-0.618 its
-0.637 social
-0.657 is
-0.909 negri
-0.948 hardt
-0.993 wars
-1.338 as
-2.131 civil
-2.160 in
-2.494 global
-2.957 of
-2.981 war
-3.044 the
-3.405 and
Contribution? Feature
+0.689 civil war
+0.448 hardt and
+0.319 of global
+0.303 violence
+0.194 of new
+0.183 to the
… 236 more positive …
… 194 more negative …
-0.183 therefore rightly
-0.184 different
-0.212 that
-0.227 modes of
-0.240 legal framework
-0.276 ibid
-0.346 civil
-0.431 <BIAS>
-0.534 to
-0.710 global
-1.015 in
-1.186 the
-1.302 war
-1.335 of
Contribution? Feature
+2.110 global civil
+1.777 and negri
+1.103 to the
+0.565 it is
+0.558 become a
+0.506 today s
+0.459 of the
… 109 more positive …
… 70 more negative …
-0.457 argue
-0.487 22
-0.585 its
-0.667 hardt
-0.744 that
-0.803 civil
-0.949 biopolitical
-0.999 as
-1.027 wars
-1.502 global
-2.541 war
-2.771 and
-3.218 the

y=ANB (probability 0.070, score -3.050) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 216 more positive …
… 214 more negative …
-0.359 <BIAS>
-3.586 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=CAP (probability 0.073, score -3.018) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 202 more positive …
… 184 more negative …
-0.331 <BIAS>
-4.653 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=ECON (probability 0.621, score -0.409) top features

Contribution? Feature
+0.662 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 214 more positive …
… 222 more negative …
-0.448 <BIAS>

¶ the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -55.961) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 38 more negative …
-51.225 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -40.969) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 44 more negative …
-36.539 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.447) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 87 more positive …
… 86 more negative …
-11.174 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=FED (probability 0.015, score -4.656) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 170 more positive …
… 152 more negative …
-0.340 <BIAS>
-6.126 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=HEG (probability 0.006, score -5.555) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 117 more positive …
… 63 more negative …
-10.770 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=NAT (probability 0.008, score -5.263) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 193 more positive …
… 174 more negative …
-5.557 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -15.929) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 7 more positive …
… 49 more negative …
-11.182 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=TOP (probability 0.161, score -2.161) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 234 more positive …
… 225 more negative …
-0.477 <BIAS>
-3.300 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -16.635) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 24 more positive …
… 56 more negative …
-11.365 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=QER (probability 0.043, score -3.554) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 236 more positive …
… 194 more negative …
-0.431 <BIAS>
-5.614 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil war¶ as with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

y=COL (probability 0.003, score -6.188) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 109 more positive …
… 70 more negative …
-9.669 Highlighted in text (sum)

the necropolitics of global civil waras with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. it "tends," as hardt and negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. hardt and negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). what hardt and negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "war," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). for example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). the ambiguity of hardt and negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." at the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). if none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with hardt and negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ in fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the united states of america, specifically after 11 september 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as crystal bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. for example, in sri lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's sinhala only movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since president jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-tamil pogrom in 1983. similarly, according to achille mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the european imperial project in "africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). in other words, although hardt and negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. indeed, not only do hardt and negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what david harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. as for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional associat

Explained as: linear model

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Contribution? Feature
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+0.472 to security
… 137 more positive …
… 115 more negative …
-0.505 soviet
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Contribution? Feature
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… 111 more positive …
… 89 more negative …
-0.435 as
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-2.943 the
Contribution? Feature
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… 180 more positive …
… 164 more negative …
-0.273 on
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-0.523 security
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Contribution? Feature
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… 13 more positive …
… 52 more negative …
-0.561 have
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Contribution? Feature
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… 21 more positive …
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-0.658 have
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-1.220 was
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Contribution? Feature
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… 119 more positive …
… 85 more negative …
-0.496 was
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Contribution? Feature
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… 197 more positive …
… 182 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 98 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 256 more negative …
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Contribution? Feature
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… 97 more positive …
… 79 more negative …
-0.536 western
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-0.812 war
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-2.137 to
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-3.174 the
Contribution? Feature
+1.269 of
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+0.337 top down
+0.252 themiddle
+0.237 soviet union
… 224 more positive …
… 199 more negative …
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-0.319 <BIAS>
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Contribution? Feature
+1.192 the cold
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+0.827 in the
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… 101 more positive …
… 81 more negative …
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-0.724 this
-0.732 by
-0.755 to
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-1.203 of
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-4.928 the
Contribution? Feature
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+0.892 of security
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+0.635 the cold
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… 133 more positive …
… 88 more negative …
-0.453 were
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Contribution? Feature
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+3.090 security in
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+0.662 of the
… 9 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-0.657 global
-0.664 western
-0.823 its
-0.910 states
-0.941 war
-1.041 this
-1.069 of
-1.085 military
-1.146 that
-1.309 was
-1.362 regional
-1.919 middle
-2.038 and
-2.170 the
-2.943 in
-3.778 security

y=ANB (probability 0.004, score -5.910) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 137 more positive …
… 115 more negative …
-8.314 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in themiddle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=CAP (probability 0.000, score -8.821) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 111 more positive …
… 89 more negative …
-12.564 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle eastwas maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in themiddle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=ECON (probability 0.064, score -2.967) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 180 more positive …
… 164 more negative …
-0.398 <BIAS>
-4.384 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle eastwas maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -11.711) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 13 more positive …
… 52 more negative …
-5.825 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle eastwas maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in themiddle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -12.140) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 21 more positive …
… 53 more negative …
-6.519 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle eastwas maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in themiddle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -9.351) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 119 more positive …
… 85 more negative …
-8.830 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant bysecurity in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=FED (probability 0.307, score -1.190) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 197 more positive …
… 182 more negative …
-0.403 <BIAS>
-2.279 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arabisraeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=HEG (probability 0.013, score -4.582) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 147 more positive …
… 98 more negative …
-8.316 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state of ‘regional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=NAT (probability 0.566, score -0.283) top features

Contribution? Feature
+2.753 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 216 more positive …
… 256 more negative …

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -8.017) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 97 more positive …
… 79 more negative …
-8.687 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle eastwas maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in themiddle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=TOP (probability 0.042, score -3.414) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 224 more positive …
… 199 more negative …
-0.319 <BIAS>
-5.176 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=ORI (probability 0.001, score -7.506) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 101 more positive …
… 81 more negative …
-10.879 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant bysecurity in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in themiddle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=QER (probability 0.003, score -6.186) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 133 more positive …
… 88 more negative …
-8.521 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant bysecurity in themiddle eastwas maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in the ‘middle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

y=COL (probability 0.000, score -21.922) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 9 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-13.683 Highlighted in text (sum)

throughout the twentieth century, the middle east remained as an arena of incessant conflict attracting global attention. as the recent developments in israel/palestine and the us-led war on iraq have showed, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of middle eastern insecurities for world politics. by adopting a critical approach to re-think security in the middle east, this study addresses an issue that continues to attract the attention of students of world politics. focusing on the constitutive rela-tionship between (inventing) regions, and (conceptions and practices of)security, the study argues that the current state ofregional security’ –often a euphemism for regional insecurities – has its roots in practices thathave throughout history been shaped by its various representations – thegeopolitical inventions of security. in doing this, it lays out the contours o fa framework for thinking differently about regional security in the middleeast. prevailing approaches to regional security have had their origins in thesecurity concerns and interests of western states, mainly the united states.the implication of this western bias in security thinking within themiddle eastern context has been that much of the thinking done onregional security in the middle east has been based on western concep-tions ofsecurity’. during the cold war what was meant by ‘security in themiddle east’ was maintaining the security of western (mostly us) interestsin this part of the world and its military defence against other externalactors (such as the soviet union that could jeopardise the regionaland/or global status quo). western security interests in the middle eastduring the cold war era could be summed up as the unhindered flow ofoil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the arab–israeli conflict, the pre-vention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and the maintenanceof ‘friendly’ regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. this was (andstill is) a top-down conception of security that was military-focused,directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. let us takea brief look at these characteristics. the cold war approach to regional security in the middle east was top-down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples. in the eyes ofbritish and us defence planners, communist infiltration and soviet inter-vention constituted the greatest threats to security in the middle eastduring the cold war. the way to enhance regional security, they argued,was for regional states to enter into alliances with the west. two securityumbrella schemes, the middle east defence organisation (1951) and thebaghdad pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. although therewere regional states such as iraq (until the 1958 coup), iran (until the1978–79 revolution), saudi arabia, israel and turkey that shared this per-ception of security to a certain extent, many arab policy-makers begged todiffer.traces of this top-down thinking are still prevalent in the us approachto security in themiddle east’. during the 1990s, in following a policy ofdual containment us policy-makers presented iran and iraq as the mainthreats to regional security largely due to their military capabilitiesand the revisionist character of their regimes that were not subservient tous interests. in the aftermath of the events of september 11 us policy-makers have focused on ‘terrorism’ as a major threat to security in themiddle east and elsewhere. yet, us policy so far has been one of ‘con-fronting the symptoms rather than the cause’ (zunes 2002: 237) as ithas focused on the military dimension of security (to the neglect ofthe socio-economic one) and relied on military tools (as with the war oniraq) in addressing these threats. this is not to underestimate the threatposed by weapons of mass destruction or terrorism to global and regionalse

Explained as: linear model

y=ANB (probability 0.212, score -2.205) top features y=CAP (probability 0.020, score -4.659) top features y=ECON (probability 0.214, score -2.192) top features y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -36.737) top features y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -62.867) top features y=EX (probability 0.000, score -10.321) top features y=FED (probability 0.013, score -5.100) top features y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -28.812) top features y=NAT (probability 0.153, score -2.562) top features y=POL (probability 0.000, score -35.837) top features y=TOP (probability 0.338, score -1.669) top features y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -68.424) top features y=QER (probability 0.049, score -3.747) top features y=COL (probability 0.001, score -7.316) top features
Contribution? Feature
+1.115 the
+0.504 is
+0.462 as
+0.238 a
+0.224 with
+0.198 proceed from
+0.195 ibid pp
+0.192 thinking analyses
… 228 more positive …
… 226 more negative …
-0.187 and
-0.189 dangerous
-0.191 power
-0.245 peoples
-0.261 <BIAS>
-0.261 be
-0.461 p
-0.482 western
-0.539 east
-0.722 orientalist
-0.754 orientalism
-1.011 ibid
Contribution? Feature
+0.773 about the
+0.667 ibid p
+0.524 ibid pp
+0.505 as a
+0.496 the region
… 134 more positive …
… 114 more negative …
-0.413 western
-0.425 its
-0.452 orientalism
-0.454 region
-0.456 not
-0.488 models
-0.494 for
-0.508 are
-0.533 p
-0.626 orientalist
-0.663 that
-0.816 knowledge
-1.006 of
-1.377 is
-1.407 ibid
Contribution? Feature
+0.676 ibid
+0.322 the east
+0.311 the west
+0.274 content with
… 167 more positive …
… 133 more negative …
-0.293 p
-0.318 <BIAS>
-0.320 by
-0.330 a
-0.341 are
-0.370 inferiority
-0.374 with
-0.381 intellectual
-0.383 therefore
-0.388 of the
-0.482 which
-0.522 be
-0.545 as
-0.571 it
-0.667 orientalism
-1.010 is
Contribution? Feature
+4.158 ibid p
… 2 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-0.561 their
-0.661 all
-0.692 that
-0.707 power
-0.714 knowledge
-0.758 not
-0.792 orientalist
-1.153 a
-1.323 this
-1.328 and
-1.435 its
-1.639 to
-1.739 as
-1.860 be
-2.329 are
-3.014 is
-3.192 ibid
-3.439 of
-5.366 the
Contribution? Feature
… 42 more negative …
-0.760 all
-0.850 its
-0.871 not
-0.943 about
-0.958 from
-1.083 in
-1.107 that
-1.314 be
-1.429 with
-1.463 this
-1.506 are
-1.750 a
-1.784 as
-1.914 to
-3.130 of
-3.433 p
-3.587 ibid
-4.348 and
-6.628 is
-16.028 the
Contribution? Feature
+4.121 ibid p
+0.647 ibid pp
+0.617 and a
+0.554 the west
… 125 more positive …
… 82 more negative …
-0.517 s
-0.598 this
-0.609 orientalism
-0.616 are
-0.634 as
-0.682 with
-0.718 be
-0.764 their
-0.774 to
-0.786 in
-0.799 and
-1.200 is
-1.857 of
-1.913 p
-2.842 ibid
-3.664 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.540 east
+0.319 to
+0.310 as a
+0.298 phenomena are
+0.295 the west
… 155 more positive …
… 123 more negative …
-0.267 is
-0.286 clercs
-0.302 intellectual
-0.330 <BIAS>
-0.334 more
-0.350 phenomena
-0.439 orientalism
-0.478 for
-0.621 and
-0.722 ibid
-0.962 as
-1.039 of
-1.116 orientalist
-1.211 a
-2.984 the
Contribution? Feature
+6.333 ibid p
… 17 more positive …
… 46 more negative …
-0.497 its
-0.550 about
-0.550 them
-0.638 for
-0.639 that
-0.783 all
-0.791 from
-0.799 not
-0.900 this
-1.007 be
-1.129 as
-1.836 are
-1.915 a
-2.112 ibid
-2.390 to
-2.441 of
-2.540 and
-3.469 p
-4.429 is
Contribution? Feature
+2.084 ibid p
+0.854 the west
+0.558 it the
+0.549 the orient
+0.369 of orientalist
+0.364 ibid pp
+0.357 trahison des
… 120 more positive …
… 103 more negative …
-0.376 of
-0.437 not
-0.499 their
-0.578 to
-0.602 as
-0.620 knowledge
-0.634 for
-0.708 and
-0.720 orientalist
-0.728 ibid
-0.732 be
-0.749 orientalism
-1.345 p
Contribution? Feature
+7.443 ibid p
… 2 more positive …
… 50 more negative …
-0.802 power
-0.886 not
-0.898 with
-0.915 in
-0.982 about
-0.993 knowledge
-1.029 its
-1.086 this
-1.170 be
-1.369 as
-1.374 are
-1.487 a
-1.690 and
-2.394 to
-2.888 is
-3.204 of
-3.433 p
-3.445 ibid
-6.295 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.907 orientalist
+0.741 orientalism
+0.644 ibid
+0.393 western
+0.329 east
+0.259 peoples
+0.236 phenomena
+0.191 knowledge
+0.186 region
… 237 more positive …
… 252 more negative …
-0.193 thinking analyses
-0.195 the east
-0.207 p 57
-0.219 orientalism s
-0.241 with
-0.260 its
-0.336 this
-0.351 is
-0.379 ibid p
-0.652 the
-1.239 to
Contribution? Feature
… 38 more negative …
-0.727 all
-0.823 knowledge
-0.844 in
-0.854 that
-0.906 from
-1.127 its
-1.135 not
-1.213 p
-1.384 be
-1.456 with
-1.540 are
-1.841 a
-2.153 this
-2.191 to
-2.756 as
-3.040 of
-4.307 and
-4.539 ibid
-6.808 is
-20.973 the
Contribution? Feature
+0.463 ibid p
+0.366 and
+0.352 the east
+0.265 committed to
+0.261 region as
+0.222 filled with
… 203 more positive …
… 177 more negative …
-0.224 western
-0.243 more
-0.261 from
-0.282 are
-0.288 phenomena
-0.299 knowledge
-0.391 <BIAS>
-0.393 orientalist
-0.418 the
-0.435 p
-0.753 a
-0.943 to
-0.976 of
-1.080 ibid
Contribution? Feature
+1.760 ibid p
+1.225 the east
+0.620 of this
+0.562 is its
+0.515 is committed
… 105 more positive …
… 82 more negative …
-0.491 with
-0.503 peoples
-0.524 western
-0.526 this
-0.543 for
-0.570 as
-0.585 be
-0.637 p
-0.691 their
-0.732 to
-0.762 and
-1.072 orientalist
-1.317 orientalism
-1.585 is
-2.408 the

y=ANB (probability 0.212, score -2.205) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 228 more positive …
… 226 more negative …
-0.261 <BIAS>
-1.914 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=CAP (probability 0.020, score -4.659) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 134 more positive …
… 114 more negative …
-7.152 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=ECON (probability 0.214, score -2.192) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 167 more positive …
… 133 more negative …
-0.318 <BIAS>
-5.396 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -36.737) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 2 more positive …
… 58 more negative …
-28.545 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate thatpower is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -62.867) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 42 more negative …
-54.885 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=EX (probability 0.000, score -10.321) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 125 more positive …
… 82 more negative …
-13.033 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalisms close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=FED (probability 0.013, score -5.100) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 155 more positive …
… 123 more negative …
-0.330 <BIAS>
-9.349 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -28.812) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 17 more positive …
… 46 more negative …
-23.082 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=NAT (probability 0.153, score -2.562) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 120 more positive …
… 103 more negative …
-3.592 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -35.837) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 2 more positive …
… 50 more negative …
-28.898 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=TOP (probability 0.338, score -1.669) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 237 more positive …
… 252 more negative …
-0.384 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalisms close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -68.424) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 38 more negative …
-60.617 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=QER (probability 0.049, score -3.747) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 203 more positive …
… 177 more negative …
-0.391 <BIAS>
-4.667 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=COL (probability 0.001, score -7.316) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 105 more positive …
… 82 more negative …
-8.263 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

Explained as: linear model

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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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Contribution? Feature
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y=ANB (probability 0.181, score -1.352) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 244 more positive …
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-0.205 <BIAS>
-1.889 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=CAP (probability 0.026, score -3.497) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 158 more positive …
… 105 more negative …
-10.434 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is thereforenever raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=ECON (probability 0.023, score -3.619) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 160 more positive …
… 124 more negative …
-0.331 <BIAS>
-6.167 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=EDU (probability 0.000, score -47.133) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 48 more negative …
-40.664 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=ENV (probability 0.000, score -54.973) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 55 more negative …
-46.405 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=EX (probability 0.001, score -7.211) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 97 more positive …
… 65 more negative …
-8.208 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=FED (probability 0.008, score -4.741) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 155 more positive …
… 123 more negative …
-0.285 <BIAS>
-7.274 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=HEG (probability 0.000, score -13.203) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 27 more positive …
… 62 more negative …
-7.942 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=NAT (probability 0.004, score -5.380) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 125 more positive …
… 91 more negative …
-7.728 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalisms close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=POL (probability 0.000, score -18.957) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 2 more positive …
… 55 more negative …
-12.649 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=TOP (probability 0.752, score 1.754) top features

Contribution? Feature
+3.380 Highlighted in text (sum)
… 232 more positive …
… 258 more negative …

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=ORI (probability 0.000, score -65.868) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 50 more negative …
-57.944 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=QER (probability 0.005, score -5.241) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 199 more positive …
… 181 more negative …
-0.407 <BIAS>
-6.003 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o

y=COL (probability 0.000, score -9.216) top features

Contribution? Feature
… 113 more positive …
… 92 more negative …
-11.131 Highlighted in text (sum)

as a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“east” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). it represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the west must confront forcefully. moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: today, bookstores in the us are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about islam and terror, islam exposed, the arab threat and the muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). this portrayal of the east as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of orientalist literature. however, as well as exaggerating the east’s distinctiveness, the orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. the second core characteristic of orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from western norms. specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as chaim weizmann put it to arthur balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). what is more, unlike superior europeans, [they] orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). in dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, orientalism is committed to rectifying it. the east must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the west imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. the knowledge produced by orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. for this reason, said brands orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of western power’ (ibid., p. 223). having said this, recognition of orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. the third prominent feature of orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). said explains that over time western writing about the orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. this problem is exacerbated by the tendency for area studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: first is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). second is eternality: the orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). third, orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the west. prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘o